A. Iran is not, or not yet, on the verge of revolution. But judging by the slogans and tactics displayed in recent anti-regime demonstrations, the Green movement opposition is becoming more radical and strident and is growing in numbers. Significantly, reports emanating from recent demonstrations--some that followed the death of Grand Ayatollah Hosein-Ali Montazeri, the opposition's religious ideologue, and others that took place on the Ashura commemoration--point to a few instances in which policemen refused to combat demonstrators or the latter forcibly overcame Basij para-military troops. 

Based on what we know of previous revolutions in Iran, particularly the one that created the Islamic Republic in 1978-79, all these could be harbingers of a genuinely revolutionary situation. But it does not yet exist. The regime still holds a monopoly on the instruments of force. No faction or senior leadership has broken off from the armed forces to support the protesters or withdraw support from the regime. Nor is the opposition united around a genuinely revolutionary ideology or leadership. Indeed, Mir Hussein Mousavi, whose defeat in presidential elections half a year ago triggered the current unrest and who some view as its leader, recently issued a list of demands upon the regime that stayed well within the bounds of support for its structure, if not its current leaders.

Still, the course of events appears to have begun gradually turning against those leaders. They are employing increasingly desperate and murderous means to control demonstrations--thereby merely fueling the fire of opposition. Clearly, both Israel and the US recognize that this is not the time to use or even threaten force against Iran, as this would almost certainly compel most Iranians to rally round the regime. At a time when the regime is anxious to blame the US, UK and Israel for its distress, Washington also has to calculate carefully the degree of diplomatic or economic pressure it wants to exercise, along with the extent to which it expresses open support for the opposition and condemnation of the regime. 

Obviously, the ideal outcome of current events would be for the regime to fall, or for its current leaders to be replaced by more moderate supporters of the Iranian Islamic "system", or even for the current leaders to capitulate and compromise with the opposition. Ideally, this would happen before Iran crosses a nuclear threshold, and the new leadership and/or new policy would be more amenable to negotiating a solution with the G5 + 1. Such an outcome is no longer beyond the bounds of reality.

A. The most rational explanation for Netanyahu's invitation to Kadima to join the government is that he wanted to ensure he had a relatively moderate coalition majority as he moves into anticipated renewed negotiations with the PLO. Kadima inside the coalition would prevent a situation in which Kadima in the opposition teams up with the right wing of Netanyahu's current coalition to bring down the government if it offers concessions the right can't stomach. Guaranteeing Kadima's backing for the moves he is hinting he is about to make was presumably what Netanyahu was referring to when he compared Kadima joining the coalition at this juncture to Menachem Begin and Simcha Ehrlich joining the Labor-led coalition as ministers without portfolio on the eve of the June 1967 Six-Day War in order to project an image of national unity to a distraught Israeli population.

(An alternative explanation offered for Netanyahu's comparison to 1967 was that he anticipates war with Iran. But in view of Netanyahu's close cooperation with the Obama administration regarding Iran, the notion of imminent war is not particularly convincing.)

That Netanyahu's historical metaphors are presumptuous goes without saying. It is very doubtful that he is about to make history on the scale of June 1967. But this was another way of explaining why he was offering Kadima only three or four ministers without portfolio, two or three of whom would be in the decision-making inner cabinet, rather than disbanding his current coalition and reconstituting it with Kadima having equal ministerial representation to that of the Likud (their Knesset representation is equal). Netanyahu presumably said to Kadima leader Tzipi Livni that once the far right (possibly including Yisrael Beitenu if and when its leader, FM Avigdor Lieberman, is indicted) abandons his government, he would then be free to redistribute portfolios in accordance with Kadima's numbers. He probably also pointed out that by joining the existing coalition, Kadima would ensure it had a relatively moderate majority.

Livni turned down Netanyahu's offer not only because she has no faith in his peace-making intentions or capabilities. The coalition offer was preceded by an unsavory attempt to "poach" one-fourth of the Kadima Knesset contingent, meaning seven MKs, mostly ex-Likudniks who are disgruntled with Livni's leadership, and attach them to the Likud, Yisrael Beitenu and Labor, all coalition members and all of whom would reward the renegade Kadima MKs with plush jobs. This manipulation, incidentally, reflected unprecedentedly close cooperation among party leaders Netanyahu, Lieberman and Barak, with the latter reportedly hoping to confound his many detractors within Labor by expanding the party's ranks at Kadima's expense.

The poaching episode had little to do with Netanyahu's need to enlarge his coalition; rather, it constituted revenge against Kadima for having come into existence two Knessets ago at the expense of the Likud. When Livni successfully rallied her forces and solidified Kadima's ranks (only one Kadima MK made good on the desertion threat), Netanyahu seemingly had no choice but to make her a coalition offer he probably knew she would refuse.

The entire ugly episode, which is hardly untypical of Israeli politics, pointed to two deeper political issues. On the one hand, the current coalition with its right-wing pro-settler faction, some of whose members are Likud MKs, will indeed not last long if and when Netanyahu leads it into renewed final status talks with the Palestinians. The collapse of Netanyahu's coalition would once again reflect the toxic interaction between Israeli politics and the Palestinian issue that has characterized the past two decades.

On the other hand, Kadima is in trouble. Livni's leadership is being challenged not only by the disgruntled Shaul Mofaz, who lost to her in the Kadima primaries by a small and contested margin, but by the rank and file. At some point in the not too distant future, Livni's only recourse may be to get the best deal possible and join the coalition, if only to keep her party together and maintain her leadership position.

A. Israel certainly does things differently. The means it employs cost money, though this appears to be money relatively well spent. But Israel also "profiles" unashamedly.

The extra money is spent primarily on two lines of defense that most airports do not use. One (at Ben Gurion Airport, obviously not for El Al passengers coming from abroad) is screening of all vehicles entering the airport. A second is interrogating all passengers before they reach the check-in line. In both cases, emphasis is placed on passengers' behavior, demeanor and response to questions, on the assumption that a terrorist will reveal himself through his response. But in both these lines of defense, specific religious and ethnic groups are singled out for extra attention. 

This reflects a recognition that the screeners--usually students who are army veterans, are young and trained in the basic psychology of stress to look for blink rates, averting of one's gaze, excessive sweating and the like--need to concentrate their efforts on high-risk groups. In Israel and on El Al, this inevitably includes Arabs and other Muslims and can render their travel a decidedly unpleasant experience. 

But this approach can focus on additional groups as well. During the countdown to the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in mid-2005, security authorities were on alert for Kahanist American Jews who had threatened to disrupt the operation. Whenever I traveled abroad during that period I was taken aside at the terminal security check for extra grilling--all because my passport indicates I was born in the United States. 

The Israeli flight security check also means sizing up passengers based on their logistics arrangements. The simplest way to stop the Nigerian bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,  would have been to strip-search him once it was clear he had a one-way ticket paid for in cash and was checking no bags. Given the state of affairs in Yemen these days, Yemeni stamps in his passport would have constituted another flashing red light. These are such obvious giveaways that it almost sounds like this was a test for airport security trainee course 101. It's safe to say that at Ben Gurion the underpants bomber would never have reached the check-in counter.

Yet another line of defense originated by Israel is air marshals. The US and reportedly Germany have adopted this approach as well.

Finally, while the Israeli security community suffers from inter-service rivalries like any other country, there is generally a high degree of cooperation and exchange of early-warning information, something apparently still needing attention in the US and that was once again apparent in this latest incident. Apropos, I remain dumbfounded by the multitude of American espionage and related films and TV series that inevitably feature murderous rivalries and betrayals between US security services. . .

Concerning the Israeli system as a model for others, while singling out specific ethnic or religious groups may be a problem, asking tough questions and gauging passenger responses should not be, and is probably more efficient than having travelers remove their shoes and belts and limiting liquid carry-ons (Israel does none of this). Further, Israeli security R&D companies are working on "electronic profilers" that will eventually eliminate the stigma of overt profiling. 

Lastly, it seems logical to me that all airlines and airports should consider prohibiting passengers from carrying lighters and matches onto flights. That's something even Israel has not yet implemented. Both the shoe bomber and the underpants bomber needed to be able to ignite explosives; the logical lesson to draw from these experiences is that banning lighters and matches could seriously hinder a terrorist tactic based on starting a fire of some sort. Since smoking is no longer allowed in airports and airplanes, this looks like a no-brainer.