This week, a significant departure from our usual format. I've recently read a piece by Ron Kraybill, who is Quaker International Affairs Representative in the Middle East and Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding and Diplomacy of the American Friends Service Committee. He blogs at http://www.riverhouseepress.com/WordPress (link has expired) www.RiverhouseEpress.com/WordPress.
I've had mixed feelings over the years regarding "second track" peacemaking. But the Kraybill account of the South African experience is, in my view, riveting - and, just maybe, a precedent?
I thank Dr. Kraybill for permitting us to publish his essay here.
BUILDING PEACE FROM A BASE IN CIVIL SOCIETY
Will the politicians and generals work out a deal this time? It's the question of the decade as emissaries return to Israel and Palestine from the Annapolis summit talks. But if the architects of peace talks review hard-won lessons from peace processes elsewhere, they might discover there are other equally critical questions.
Common wisdom is that getting a settlement among high level negotiators at a bargaining table is the major difficulty in achieving peace. In reality, it is often challenges at other locations around the table that block peace. As in war, success in peace must be pursued systematically on multiple fronts, with strategies that address all levels of the societies involved. Peace rarely arrives through a simple "trickle down" process from above, it has to be seeded broadly and actively cultivated throughout a society from near the beginning of the transition.
One reason for the success of the South Africa talks of the 1990s is that the politicians who designed them were quicker than most to learn this. A bitter season of killings froze and threatened to de-rail the entire process less than a year after talks had started in 1990. After several months of fumbling, South African leaders in the major parties responded by establishing structures and strategies at local, regional, and national levels to address the threats to peace that now faced every level of the bitterly divided country. They did this while the outcome of top-level talks still hung in a dicey balance, well before agreements were reached about the key issues driving the conflict.
Things had started, as they usually do, with a top-down focus. In February, 1990 President de Klerk shocked the
world by releasing Nelson Mandela and unbanning his party, the African National Congress. Hopes for peace rose in
April that year when the parties gathered for the first major round of talks. And hopes rose even higher in the
following months when the parties agreed on a set of principles to guide the talks.
But the prospect of major change unleashes vast pent-up energies in a society. Human emotions, good and bad, are
escalated. People desperate for change press hopefully forward with their dreams. Those who fear change or a repeat
of past traumas raise shrill voices of warning. Those hungry for power position themselves to grab what they can.
At the same time, the institutions and social processes that normally keep things under control are weakening. When
people believe new structures are at hand, they take the old structures less seriously. In business, education,
health care, transportation, human services, courts, policing, local and regional politics, people recognize that
whatever was done in the past will change. Those managing these sectors postpone decisive action while they wait
for word of where things are headed. Governance and social control almost unavoidably diminish.
Into this gap between raised hopes and reduced social order step a host of opportunists. Many are economically
motivated. In South Africa transportation quickly became a warzone as poorly regulated local-level taxi owners
competed for routes and customers. Business people, both legitimate and criminal, were quick to recognize new
opportunities for sales and services. Real estate speculators began fostering rumors about the future of certain
locations as a way to drive prices in their favor.
Political groups of every stripe raised their rhetoric in an effort to win support for their favored formulas. Radicals on all sides stepped up their activities. Incidences of threats, intimidation and violence increased. Some were motivated by present political realities but some seemed to simply be about settling old scores.
By early 1991, South Africans picked up their newspapers at the end of many weekends to frightening news: multiple deaths in faction fighting in Cape Town, dozens killed in raids by local level mobs run by political goons in Natal province, white farmers killed in rural areas by intruders unknown; scores killed and wounded throughout the country in small incidents of violence of unclear origins; police moving in armored vehicles against stone throwers, hundreds of demonstrators tear-gassed, attacked by dogs, and targeted with rubber bullets by police. It seemed the entire country could go up in flames while politicians dawdled in endless talks. I was shocked one Friday evening to realize that every bridge I passed en route to a friend's house was guarded by heavily armed troops. "It's war!" I thought.
It was clear something had to be done. The white government made a game try, convening a broad "peace conference" to discuss how to deal with the wave of violence. But they botched it by unilaterally announcing the event as a government initiative, without consulting the other parties. No black leader could maintain credibility in his own community, where his reputation was already in jeopardy if he supported negotiation with hated whites, by participating in a government-sponsored "peace conference". A classic example of a constructive outcome, desired by many, destroyed by bad process in setting it up! Only white government reps and a few blacks known to be stooges attended.
Violence - and panic - continued to escalate. The politicians clearly were not going to deliver. In this time a handful of black and white business and religious leaders got together and agreed on a strategy: They would convene a conference on addressing the violence under their own joint auspices and invite the politicians to attend. The group was well-balanced, black and white. They knew and trusted each other, and they were well-connected to key political leaders. No one group would gain power or credibility by having the conference convened in their name. Politicians of all backgrounds happily accepted their invitation to a second conference held in June, 1991.
The National Peace Accord that resulted established the world's largest conflict resolution structure. A dozen Regional Peace Committees were formed made up of respected black and white leaders. A National Peace Committee made up of senior national politicians oversaw the regional committees. Beneath the Regional Committees, dozens of Local Peace Committees were set up in hot areas. More than two thousand training workshops were held, most several days in length, to train people in skills for monitoring violence, negotiation, conflict analysis, and mediation. Hundreds of salaried staff and a far larger number of volunteers served as monitors for marches and demonstrations, as advocates on behalf of local community needs, as mediators to defuse local tension points, and as motivators for peace within their own communities. A media section conducted a media campaign advocating peace. Programs were conducted in schools telling stories of peace and training youngsters in conflict resolution.
The National Peace Accord structure had many flaws, but it played a pivotal role time and again in defusing crises . On dozen of occasions, confrontations that threatened large-scale violence were defused or diverted. The energies and goodwill of a vast network of supporters of peace were harnessed to maintain calm while talks were going on at the top. Equally important, South Africans at all levels had access to the peace process. In spite of traumatizing events that included the assassination by a white racist of Mandela's key lieutenant and numerous bloody massacres, enough people were able to maintain hope in the possibility of peace that the talks always got back on track.
As director of training of a conflict resolution organization, I sat with a number of other civil society advisors on the training committee of that National Peace Accord structure. Half the committee were high-level politicians also deeply involved as negotiators in the national talks. I often wondered how they found the time to sit and labor several times a month over the details of training conferences on negotiation and violence monitoring. But there they were. Enough of the key political leadership on both sides grasped that they could not singlehandedly drive the country to peace that there was a constant effort to root the process downwards. Though the politicians focused mostly on the high level talks, they invested deeply in broadening the process to all levels of the nation. As a result, even massive disruptions were never able to halt for long the momentum for change.
South Africa built its transition not only from above but also from within, with active involvement of the civil society throughout the key stages. The beleaguered people of Israel/Palestine deserve no less.
----------------------------------------
Copyright Ron Kraybill 2007. May be reproduced, but web versions must point to the author blog at
www.RiverhouseEpress/WordPress.
Ron Kraybill, PhD, was Training Advisor to the South African National Peace Accord 1993-95. A professor of
peacebuilding and conflict transformation and a consultant to the UN, he has trained leaders at local, national and
regional levels in skills of negotiation, conflict analysis and peacebuilding in over twenty countries, including
South Africa, Ireland, Sri Lanka, Liberia, and Guyana. Presently he is based in Jerusalem as Senior Advisor on
Peacebuilding and Diplomacy for the American Friends Service Committee.
----------------------------------------
i For more information on the South African Peace Accord, see reflections by Peter Gastrow, a former MP and one of the negotiators, at http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/part1/8_joint_.htm
Tweet
Email a friend
feed
twitter
facebook
Leonard,
I found this interesting and don't rule out the use of track-two diplomacy in the Middle East. I think, however, that there are two critical differences between South Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, in South Africa eventually all sides saw themselves as belonging to one nation. Under apartheid the Afrikaners stressed first their ethnic identity and then their racial identity and saw blacks in a mirror-image fashion. Once the Afrikaners gradually came to realize that their South African identity was most important as it was for blacks it was possible to negotiate a peace to share the spoils. The ANC had always emphasized nonracial majority identity. Second, the whites faced much more severe demographic and economic pressures than Israelis face. Israelis face the prospect of becoming a minority within the old mandatory Palestine, but can govern like this particularly as most Palestinians aren't legally part of Israel. While some sanctions--or more likely voluntary boycotts--might come from Europe, Israel can redirect its trade to North America, East Asia and Eastern Europe. The National Party government was facing the prospect of South Africa becoming eventually a failed state similar to many other African countries due to economic sanctions and internal unrest. The Afrikaners, like Israelis and unlike most Rhodesians and Portuguese colonists, had no foreign destination to go to. So they decided to make an accommodation. In the end they did not even need foreign mediation to negotiate a peace agreement.
That having been said, having third country nationals or left-wing Israelis trusted by Palestinians to help to implement certain decisions might be useful. In Northern Ireland outsiders were brought in from the British mainland and from America and elsewhere to help staff special "quangoes"--quasi autonomous non-governmental organizations that dealt with such controversial matters as sectarian parades, decommissioning of paramilitary organizations and monitoring of ceasefires. Figures were generally picked who were acceptable to both the British and Irish governments, taking into account the interests of their respective clients.
I'll check out Peter Gastrow's reflections; I interviewed him twice in 1988 and 1990.
I found this article of considerable interest, especially as a member of an Israeli civil society group (ICAHD) that has ongoing relationships with our Palestinian counterparts. I have often advocated more constructive relationships between Israeli and Palestinian NGOs.
Israeli activists find ourselves currently as partners in the Palestinian liberation struggle, focusing on ending the Occupation and neglecting post-liberation frameworks. Palestinians are very sensitive to what is called 'normalization', or building relationships that are not implicitly part of the liberation struggle. While civil society organizations are not major actors in negotiations we could have a role in building frameworks for reconciliation.
Tom mentioned that "The ANC had always emphasized nonracial majority identity." In Israel/Palestine we may eventually come back to a version of the original PLO concept of a democratic Palestine. However here is currently little concept among Israelis and Palestinians of a shared state identity. Whereas South Africa succeeded by subsuming tribal and white national ideologies within a South African identity, we have two national identities in Israel/Palestine - Jewish/Israeli & Arab/Palestinian. The dominant languages, Arabic and Hebrew, and the two primary religions, Islam and Judaism, are embedded in these identities.
To develop a shared citizenship/state identity, separate from the two national identities is a major issue. For one state to emerge, or even a confederation, will require a major paradigm shift in both societies.
Even among the Israelis and Palestinians in my circles, who work together on an ongoing basis, there is little common ground for an overarching shared identity. We share some values and politics, but not identity.
Most ideological advocates of one state promote the concept of a democratic Palestine, denying the legitimacy of today's Israeli identity. This will not serve the future any more than will the denial of the Palestinian Arab nation. The reality is that both identities did not exist a hundred years ago. This should give us hope for a shared future.
I had a discussion last week with a colleague about convening a series of meetings between Palestinians and Israelis to discuss these issues, to look a little beyond 'ending the Occupation', and explore the shape of the 'peace'. We were thinking more about structural issues but maybe these critical issues of identity would be a more worthy challenge, and less of an academic exercise.
I largely agree with Tom's analysis of the difference between the Israel/Palestine conflict and the South African one. He reflects here a good grasp of the dynamnics of the South African context.
However, my point is in a different direction. I'm not calling for "Second-track diplomacy" as it is often understood, namely, non-political actors mediating between political actors. Rather, I am saying that peace needs to be constructed across all levels of society, not through top-down trickle-down approaches but through direct involvement of people at other levels.
Imagine two pyramids, side by side. Each has a top level, middle level, and grassroots level. Now imagine lines across between the pyramids, connecting top to top, middle to middle, grassroots to grassroots. Most peace processes have only a line across at the top. A very important line, to be sure, but it is very hard to carry the freight of decades of hostility across that one line, no matter how strong it is.
In South Africa there were many such lines constructed beginning very soon after the talks began. Some didn't work, but others did.
Occasionally key linkages across at the middle level proved pivotal in helping keep the top level process on track. For example, the creation of the National Peace Accord which I describe in the essay above came only because, in a time of crisis when the talks were floundering, influential business and religious leaders got together and then convened the politicians. Or, near the very end when one of the key black leaders pulled out of the talks entirely and thereby threatened the entire process, it was a middle level Kenyan professor (summoned through religious networks) who flew to South Africa and talked Buthelezi into returning to the process.
But those are exceptional moments. The top-level usually is pretty good about arranging its own political mediators when people are ready for it.
What is missing in most peace processes:
- active linkages at the other levels
- awareness by people at the top that those other levels are critically important
- any kind of strategic coordination among the levels.
It is difficult and often impossible to create a peace settlement forged only at the top and then simply drop it on the rest of the societies involved. I call this the "trickle down theory of peace" and it is very poorly supported in reality.
There needs to be a preparation process and some kind of involvements of people at other levels in the society in the dilemmas that peace creates.
Awareness among the people at the top of
how important work at the other levels helps a lot. National level politicians in South Africa put a good bit of time and effort into setting up mechanisms to enable this to happen, and they did this alongside their other involvements in the political track.
But it is also true that the top level people rarely recognize the importance and potential for work at other levels. South Africa was gifted with a number of business and religious leaders who had the chutzpah to establish connections among each other on their own initiative, and then to use their personal connections with top level people to convince them of the need for attention at other levels.
The creation of the National Peace Accord, which was largely focused on day-to-day tensions and crises at middle and grassroots levels of the society (eg: local faction fights, confrontations between whites who showed up at black demonstrations, joint monitoring of police conduct which was highly controversial, etc.) made it possible to coordinate among all the levels. It was often rudimentary coordination to be sure, but enough to enable the country to survive dozens of crises of large and small proportions that constantly threatened to freeze the talks.
Often there is resistance to creating such linkages. "Dialogue" often comes to be seen by whoever's lives are most disrupted by a prolonged conflict as simply a tactic to prolong the status quo and delay addressing the real issues. South African blacks were actively discouraged from any kind of dialogue by some of their leaders from the mid-80s onwards. But as the talks progressed even the skeptics relaxed and withheld criticism of those who engaged. The key is to make it clear that the purpose of engagement is to facilitate and hasten the essential process of change required to bring peace.
Ron Kraybill
www.Riverhouseepress.com/Wordpress
As a former president of the American Committee on Africa and a current board member of Americans for Peace Now, I have long advocated civil society diplomacy in peacemaking. I thank Label for sharing Dr. Kraybill's illuminating article with us. While there are obvious differences between South Africa then and Israel/Palestine now, we must guard against the fallacy of Israeli exceptonalism, i.e. the notion that nothing that has ever happened in other parts of the world is relevant to bringing about a just and peaceful solution to the I/P conflict.
Which leads me to a question for Dr. Kraybill: With your vast experience with civil society peacemaking diplomacy, can you
point to other examples of situations where this has played an important role in resolving major conflicts? Ireland? Rhodesia? Algeria? I am not asking for another series of essays from you, but would welcome some references from a literature with which you must be familiar.
Peter Weiss
A lot of clarification seems in order.
-To have peace, it seems one has to begin with a legal peace agreement at a level that can guarantee national level commitments. Call it rack 1.
-But as has been pointed out, to have a sustainable peace, there has to be agreement, not only at the top (track 1) but reconciliation at several other levels. It is important to see the need for a people-to-people reconciliation as essential to success. That is, attempts at healing. Resentments, losses, everything. At the level of Community by community, village by village, neighborhood by neighborhood, person to person.
-Pleae don't call it track 2. It implies politics when it is really about healing.
-There are processes for doing this. As indicated, there is a huge educational task involved.
-Also as indicated, the earlier the top echelons recognize this real need, the earlier it can begin. It may, indeed, under a bit of ideal circumstances, dovetain with political negotiations. Now in fact may be an opportune time to begin education of the top Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.
-An educational success may result in both sides assuming some responsibility for the pain, hurts and losses.
-Finally, Restorative Practices, Restorative Justice, Compassionate Listening, Non Violent Communications, World Work, are some of the places that have experience in the skills involved.
-The least challenging scenario is where political nefotiators proceed with no change until a legal agreement is signed and only then will some versions of what is being talked about here will be initiated, unless somebody (Fred? Ron Kraybill?) can see some earlier way of beginning the reconciliation dialogues.
-Is there anybody in touch with the politicians on this, on either side? It seems to me there is coherence between the formal, legal proceedings, with reconcilliation at more personal level, but politicians, as has been mentioned may not feel this way. It is important to attempt contact.
Leonard et al.,
Great thanks for introducing the idea of applying the South African experience to the I/P conflict, i.e., the idea of constructing direct channels for involvement in the peace process of people at all levels of society. This idea may be an important key to achieving peace. However, there are two matters that make it difficult for me to understand this idea and to evaluate it. These are, first, that many such channels have already been constructed with fewer beneficial results than one might hope. The second, is my ignorance of both the I/P and the South African situations.
Briefly, many nongovernmental channels for participation have already been created. Examples include: IPCRI, the Business Administration program at Haifa University, cooperation among physicians (in which Mustafa Barghouti is a prominent participant), Combatants for Peace, Women in Black, the recently established Palestine International Business Forum and the investment activities of Fred and his colleagues. Each of these examples clearly benefit both Israelis and Palestinians, but they are seldom if ever mentioned in articles about the possibility of peace in the I/P press.
As to my ignorance, Ron, Tom and Peter – Were there significant South African factions devoted to conflict that were analogous to Hamas and to the religious settlers? If so, how were they neutralized?
Fred – In his original article, Ron seems to be describing whites and blacks meeting to each argue for the satisfaction of the needs of their constituencies. This contrasts with groups like ICAHD, without question on the side of justice and reconciliation, which many Israelis believe are purely advocates for the Palestinians. Is this a correct picture? If so, can the images of these groups be changed, so that they are understood to be standing for the benefit of Israelis, as well?
Leonard and Fred – Ron writes of , “strategic coordination among the levels.” Is there any such coordination in Israel?
I am really pleased to see such thoughtful essays from everyone. Ron, Tom and Peter, in particular. It shows that there is a deep desire for peace, a just peace, among the players. But I am more in agreement with Tom: all of you are in lower level tracks. The important track #1 seems to be missing. I don't know what can be done if the track at the top doesn't want peace. And nothing indicates that they do. It seems that the Israeli administration will keep zig zagging around any constructive talks or plans until they have gobbled up all the land, which seems to be their goal. The Bush administration is not more helpful as the symbiosis between the two governments is working toward complete hegemony in the area. If the Israelis truly wanted peace, they don't need the Americans to bring it about. Conflict is resolved between the principal actors. It cannot be forced upon them.
In South Africa, both sides wanted peace. Thus the conflict was resolved. They didn't need third party assistance. In the I/P conflict, I see only one side desirous of peace. The only thing to do, in my opinion is to convert track #1 into peace seekers.
I'm thinking that there may be some aspects of Israel/Palestine that are especially well suited to peacemaking, although it hasn't seemed to work so far. These relate to economic interdependence, shared water issues, shared sacred places, even the intertwined geographic configuration.
Granted that up until now it hasn't been so much interdependence as complete Palestinian dependence; still, there are those who realize that neither side can have fulfilled statehood if the other doesn't, that cooperation succeeds better than contention. IPCRI is one organization that comes to mind.
These issues have to be dealt with anyway; maybe they should be leading issues rather than following issues.
Who decides what comes first?
Intermission from Cold Facts Ave: On a bright day, when feeling giddy and generous, we may say we have a legal code for international accountability; we certainly don’t even claim to have a moral, or a just one.
Cold Facts Ave continues: Justice, while incommensurable with our current metrics (pssst...“how many divisions does Justice have”?) it prevails in the long run, and determines the sustainability of expedient, even if legal, practices. Remember, slavery was just, moral, and legal in the Bible? Now it is illegal.
So, who decides what comes first? You and I do. We have a saying here in Boulder: As I change, the Universe changes. Cold Facts Ave says: Yeah, but not that much.
Ron,
Thank you very much for the clarification. I think it was much more understandable than the original article. I would be curious as to how you access the role of such organizations as Black Sash, NUSAS, and others primarily composed of whites (or at least non-Africans) who either agreed with the ANC/UDF or were between it and the government.
Peter,
I don't believe in Israeli exceptionalism, just that Northern Ireland has many more parallels with Israel/Palestine than does South Africa.
Joel,
The closest South African counterpart to Hamas was the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania, which rejected the ANC/UDF's nonracial philosophy of cooperation with other races. The PAC was a racial rather than a sectarian organization like Hamas. It received only 2 percent of the vote in the 1994 majority rule election.
Eugene,
I think that you greatly oversimplify things. For some 70 years there has been an ongoing dynamic in historical Palestine/Eretz Israel in which the actions of both sides feed off of those of the other side. Any attempted solution that attempts to deal only with the actions of one side, either Israel or the Palestinians is bound to fail. South Africa was isolated internationally during the 1970s and 1980s because the mainstream liberation movement eschewed terrorism. If the Palestinians did this the dynamics of the conflict might change significantly, but I don't see this happening anytime soon.
I read with interest the opinions expressed. I as a citizen of Sri Lanka was trying to figureout the possibilities of such a peace process being applied in the Sri Lankan context.
Would any person or organization be good enough to get itself involved in the Sri Lanka conflict to bring about peace in this war-torn country.
This request is being made by a sufferer on behalf of all the ordinary people in this country who are yearning for peace and good governance.
I have a draft paper in solving the conflict and I am prepared to send it to anyone who wants to get involved in solving the problem of our country.
A third party is absolutely necessary as the top on both siodes do not seem to be eager for peace but the ordinary people areeager for peace
Sie.Kathieravelu,
I know next to nothing about the conflict in Sri Lanka beyond what you wrote. I am not in position to provide you with material support. But I want to encourage you to continue your search for means of making peace. One thing that continues to work here, and does not require exorbitant resources, is education. Make your findings known to people in you community, and begin a conversation, even among a small group of people in a house, after work.
Good luck
Sie.Kathieravelu --
I'm afraid that I can be of very little help, but you may find it useful to go to commonway.org.
Sie Kathieravelu,
There are in fact numerous organizations in Sri Lanka working on peace building. I travelled there twice several years ago and led several workshops, addressed a gathering of MPs, etc.
One of the organizations is this:
One National Peace Council
of Sri Lanka
12/14 Purana Vihara Road
Colombo 6
Tel: 2818344, 2854127, 2819064
Tel/Fax:2819064
E Mail: npc@sltnet.lk
Internet: www.peace-srilanka.org
I think they could direct you to others.
Sarvodhaya has sought to do some peacebuilding work as well.
If you will google "peacebuilding in Sri Lanka" you will get a number of hits.
Eugene,
I think people usually want peace. The problem is we often want it on our terms only and we aren't willing to make serious effort to understand and address the needs of the other side. There was plenty of self-centeredness evident in South Africa, espcially in the early days. Some of the most difficult issues didn't get resolved till the very end.
My sense is that both Olmert and Abbas genuinely want peace. I think the serious problems arise at other levels. Specifically, both of them have constituencies that extremist and stubborn, and big and strong enough to make life very difficult. Olmert could lose a ruling majority.
This is actually quite common. People think the big problem in peacebuilding is getting an agreement across the table. But in fact, the big obstacles to peace tend to lurk behind the table on each side, that is, in the internal divisions that usually arise as an effort towards peace advances.
What to do about this? I have no easy answers. Since thoughts anyway:
- There's far more need for internal dialogue (within each side) than is widely recognized. In a conflict in northeast India, a strategy that we pursued for a year was arranging opportunities for conversation among middle level leaders on one side. These people hardly ever met, and there was a lot of conflict among them. No peace would be achievable if these bitter divisions continued.
- Creating financial incentives for people to cooperate/support peace can be effective. Eg: financial benefits that are accessible only if people cooperate.
- Media ia an extremely important tool that is rarely utilized well. I am frequently surprised at the one-sidedness of Israeli TV, for example. How could Israelis be expected to support peace settlements when the only media they watch constantly portrays Palestinians as terrorists? There are many decent people in Israeli media and I wonder if there has ever been a strategic effort to get them to use their vast power to contribute to peace rather than to just reinforce stereotypes. In South Africa, we did a whole series of workshops for journalists to get them more aware of the ways in which journalists often unwittingly exacerbate conflict.
- Some of the most important contributions to peace often come from people in the upper middle level, eg; influential business people, religious leaders, etc. In South Africa this was particularly true. These people can reach upwards to top level people, across to other significant actors who are parallel to them, or downwards to the grassroots. They usually have more room to maneuver than anyone else. But they need to feel an inner call to this and make it a priority. It takes a lot of commitment and time. South Africa had several highlevel businesspeople who pretty much set aside everything else for a two year period to support the talks.
- Outside actors can be extremely helpful in all this. South Africa had so many, too many at times it seemed. Yet they did keep the pressure on the parties and provided important training, ideas, and moral support.
I agree with Meir's call for restorative practices, nonviolence training, listening skills, etc. All help. To have hope that they can live together in peace, people need to see new possibilities for dealing with conflict constructively. It's obviously not possible to retrain a whole society. It's rather a matter of planting seeds of awareness, doing enough demonstrating and training in constructive forms of interaction that people get a whiff of alternatives. This gives hope, an essential ingredient.
The National Peace Accord conducted over 2000 multi-day training workshops over a two year period in South Africa, many of them in conflict resolution, negotiation, conflict analysis, violence monitoring, etc.
Peter,
This is work that has often been undertaken by religious leaders. There's a great book titled, "Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft" by Doug Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, (Oxford Press), with about a dozen stories in it (unfortunately, all are stories of Christians). An account of work in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is there, and others.
There are numerous other books out there.
Google "grassroots level peacebuilding" and you will get examples of work at that level. Google "citizen diplomacy" and you get other examples.
Conciliation Resources is a London based group at http://www.c-r.org/ that has some good materials. In particular, they have done a whole series of detailed case studies of peace efforts. If I recall correctly the one on ending the Mozambique conflict details the role of the business community.
The problem is not there is a lack of experience or documentation. The problem is that very few people are aware of this experience. That's the challenge now, to get the word out.
Your analysis of the problem (how the prospect of peace increases anxiety at all levels of society and provokes violence by some) seems accurate! I have seen it repeatedly both from afar in the Middle East and up close in local mediation work. I like how you explained it without blame. The dynamic is too often overlooked, as if wishful thinking would make it go away.
How nice to know, too, that there is an organizational model for addressing the problem that has more or less worked in the past. Now I await "a handful of [Israeli and Palestinian] business and religious leaders" to convene their own peace conference, to which they invite the politicians.
I thank Leonard Fein for calling wider attention to this piece.
Ron,
In my opinion the most effective act by a business leader was Clem Sumter of Anglo-American Corp. who created his "high road, low road" presentation that he presented hundreds or thousands of times during the 1980s to business and political leaders around the country. I think this made it very easy for F.W. de Klerk to convince the National Party to go along with his reforms.
Another major step was the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba in 1986, negotiated between the provincial government of Natal--the only province not controlled by the National Party--and the Zulu homeland, that resulted in a successful negotiation to remove petty apartheid in Natal province. The National Party government refused to allow it to be implemented, but it demonstrated to many whites that negotiations could be successful, even if Mangosutho Buthelezi wasn't the correct negotiating partner on a national basis. I believe that it was the Indaba that started the process that ultimately resulted in De Klerk's reforms in 1990. The Natal business community bankrolled the Indaba for four years--one of negotiation and three of publicity.
When the Geneva Accords were announced resulting in a similar type of initiative between Meretz and Labor on one hand and leading Fatah figures on the other hand in November 2003, I knew that it would have a similar effect in Israel. I think it was one of the main reasons why Sharon decided to withdraw from Gaza in 2005. Unfortunately, Sharon didn't really contemplate going very far beyond the Gaza withdrawal and Hamas misinterpreted the withdrawal.
When I was in Northern Ireland in the summer of 1998 doing research I asked John Alderdice, the new speaker of the NI Assembly and former leader of Alliance, why NI business leaders didn't attempt initiatives similar to Sumter's. He told me that in his opinion the businessmen lacked the status. There is no industry comparable to the SA mining industry in Northern Ireland. After the shipbuilding industry crashed there in the 1970s and 1980s nothing replaced it.
If Israeli business leaders could back similar peace initiatives they might have some effect. I believe there probably was major business support for the Geneva Accords. But the Israeli industrialists can't solve the problem of the Palestinian split.
I am very impressed with the wealth of expeience you all seem to have in the area of conflict resolution, and many of your ideas are of value. I cannot claim to have any such experience and only express my opinions as an outside, but very interested observer. In this capacity, I will note that from my perspective, I see no honest efforts to constuct an equitable, just initiative from the powers that be. The split on the Palestinian side was created intentionally by the Israelis. Abbas is a tool of the Israel/US cabal and seems ready to give the house away only to remain in "power." Hamas, though seemingly intransigent at this point, have made many overtures for cease-fire and willingness to meet, only to be rejected by Israel. Much as the relationship between US and Iran. Continued oppression by Israel in the case of the Palesrinians, and continued saber-rattling by US in the case of Iran do not seem to be conducive to conflict resolution. This is why I am so skeptical and pessimistic about anything good happening in the near future.
I might mention that some of us (the Overseas American Academy)are in the process of creating a Conflict Resolution Center here in Geneva. The idea being to provide a neutral location for parties in conflict to meet and attempt to resolve problems away from the spotlight of places like Annapolis, etc., and from under the egis of international bodies such as the UN or US. If anyone is interested in this project, you can contact me at my personal address (eschulma@worldcom.ch) and I will be happy to send you some info, both, on the project and the Academy.
Eugene –
I am surprised by and grateful for your efforts with regard creating a Conflict Resolution Center. I will certainly be contacting you directly.
You are correct, that, “The split on the Palestinian side was created intentionally by the Israelis,” by promoting the creation of Hamas as a counterpoise to the PLO. But, that was done some time ago by another government. There is reason to believe that Olmert is sincere about the negotiations, as evidenced by his public statements, by his ignoring or cracking down on the demonstrations against changing the status of Jerusalem and by his reigning in his ministers with regard to building in East Jerusalem.
There is, however, one disturbing note. Yesterday, in his joint press conference with Bush, Olmert said: “There will be no peace unless terror is stopped. And terror will have to be stopped everywhere. We made it clear to the Palestinians. They know it and they understand that Gaza must be part of the package and that as long as there will be terror from Gaza, it will be very, very hard to reach any peaceful understanding between us and the Palestinians.” On its face, this statement rejects negotiating a West Bank peace with Abbas, with provisions for expanding the agreement to include Gaza once Hamas and the other dedicated militants are neutralized. This may be an intentional stumbling block, but it may also be that it is only a negotiating point, which pacifies some of Olmert’s Israeli opponents, or it may be that Olmert intends to provide such support to Abbas that the PA will be able expel Hamas from all of the territories. It is encouraging that in his statements, Bush did not endorse the position that Olmert expressed.
Joel, in an earlier post you wonder whether South Africa had extremists comparable to those on both sides here. For sure. There was the Pan-Africanist Congress and AZAPO, black extremists dedicated to returning land to blacks. The motto was of the PAC was "One settler, one bullet," and they killed dozens of whites as the talks were ongoing. On the white side there were rogue elements within the security forces who dressed as blacks and killed people in black communities to fuel internal conflicts there. And there were ex-security force commanders and cronies calling for an army of whites to establish and defend a white homeland.
How did the government and others respond to these dangerous provocations? Once the negotiations had started, by doing relatively little. (Prior to that it was a different story.) Of course they sought and arrested murderers where possible. But they did not engage in the kind of all-out effort to go after anyone who was in any way associated with these groups that we sometimes see.
The extremist groups had many bystanders who agreed with their goals, even if only a few supported their tactics. An aggressive campaign to root out all associated with them would have backfired, stirring more trouble and winning more support for the radicals. It seems to me the goal of the police and security forces in this time was to limit the damage caused by the extremists but not to do anything that would turn them into martyrs or heroes or drive others into their arms.
It was a very interesting thing to see how the extremists slowly faded from the scene, looking more and more out of touch. They maintained their rhetoric for quite a while, but their support base dwindled and dwindled. Some of them came into the mainstream and some just sort of dropped out. Today I'm not aware that any of them have a significant following.
Leonard,
It is a bit puzzling to me that we haven't yet heard a word, one way or the other, from Shalom Achshav. What am I to make of that?
Eugene: Re The Conflict Resolution Center in Geneva, I wonder whether its assumptions -- be they implicit or explicit -- vis a vis the reasons for the conflict will be in line with yours -- to wit, that one side seeks peace and the other does not. If that's how it plays out, it will serve merely to reenforce the conflict, not to resolve it. It wouldn't work constructively were it organized by people who believe that Israel's hand are clean but that the people it faces are savages, and it won't work constructively if the people who organize it are convinced that the Israeli (and Americans) are villains and the Palestinians are merely a peace-loving, freedom-seeking people that has too often been victimized.
More generally: Israel is pocked with noble efforts at understanding and reconciliation. I don't have any idea how many thousands of folks are engaged, one way or another, in the work of peace in one of the many dozens of groups, organizations and movements that already exist, but that there are many thousand there is no doubt.
Alas, there is little coordination between them, largely (I think) because the work they do so often seems utterly quixotic. Since peace is remote rather than proximate, there's no sense of urgency. On the Palestinian side, there's fear of being branded as a collaborator if you become too visible an advocate for reconciliation. Some sort of new paradigm is required -- but there have been so many start-ups that continue to poke along that there's little appetite for yet another "bold vision" or what have you.
It is of some interest to note the timing of the South African experience that Ron Kraybill has here described. First came the agreement at the top. The involvement of civil society was subsequent to that and specific around one issue -- safety -- at first. That, as I understand it, was the way the foot got in the door, and because it worked, the door was then opened wider. Parallels to the I/P conflict are not easy to come up with.
Meir -- I'll transmit your question to them.
All in all, I'm very, very pleased at the conversation here. Perhaps some good may come of it.
Leonard, the Conflict Resolution Center project is not aimed at Israel/Palestine alone. Rather at any group that needs a neutral, objective location to iron out problems. I assure you its mission is not conditioned on my personal views about any conflict.
I know that there have been, and are, many groups in and out of Israel/Palestine that are working toward a just solution. I praise all. Because my personal views are cynical and pessimistic does not mean that all should give up hope. I certainly haven't. I'd just like to see a bit of sincerity at the top. GWB's statements about a "Jewish" state are not helpful. If that is the condition the Palestinians must accept, we all know there will never be a Palestinian state along side Israel, and the conflict will last another sixty years.
Eugene,
I don't understand why recognizing Israel as a Jewish state would be such an obstacle. After all, many Arab states require the president or prime minister to be a Muslim. Sari Nusseibeh has said that the important consideration is the treatment of the Palestinian minority rather than the official classification of the state.
I am opposed as much to Islamic states as I am to a Jewish state, and would be to a Christian state. Religion and democracy are incompatible. That was the wisdom of the American founding founders. In religious states, the minority religions are always second class citizens and do not enjoy the same rights as the majotity. Such pertains to
all such religious states throughout history, as you can see in both Israel and the Islamic states. I fear that even the U.S is heading in that direction, if the current oligarchy has its way. All of the U.S. presidential candidates are running on their religion and want the U.S. to be Christian. Fortunately for Europe, they dropped trying to get Christianity into their proposed constitution.
Though I personally am secular, I have no deep seeded objections to religious institutions, so long as they keep their beliefs out of the institution of the state.
Tom --
That Arab states may require that their president or p.m. be a Muslim does not mean that those who recognize such states are recognizing them AS Muslim states. Recognition would not be withdrawn were they to cease being Muslim. The issue with Israel is not whether it is de facto or even de jure Jewish; it is whether others must agree to its definition of self -- and for the life of me, I cannot understand why that's part of the discussion. I am not invalidated as a Jew because the U.S. "recognizes" me as a citizen (without modifier). Israel is not more or less Jewish because others view it one way or another.
Eugene,
For the most part, I agree with you. I would rephrase one of your remarks to read: “Religion and democracy in a pluralistic state are incompatible.” However, a state with an official religion (or other intolerant official cultural institution) which is trying and failing to be democratic may be a necessary stage before a truly democratic state emerges. This is particularly true of Israel and Palestine, where secular vs. religious wars are being waged. For me, Yugoslavia is clear proof that pluralistic democracy cannot be forced upon diverse peoples, which are not confident about their own character and worth.
Finally, I want to share a cynicism that I just received:
“President Bush said today that he is worried that Iraq will be overrun by religious fundamentalists. Hey, let me tell you something. If it’s good enough for the Republican Party, it is good enough for Iraq.”
"Being Jewish"
It is okay, I suppose, to look for parallels between Israel and other pluralistic democracies on how they deal with the state/religion issue.
But Israel stands singular. Today, still it is hard to separate “being Israeli” from “being Jewish”, even though there are some 20% Arab Israelis, mostly Muslim, with some being Christian and of other religions. Moreover, “being Jewish” is also almost inseparable, unless one explains at length, from being “religious”. To many, being a “secular Jew” remains an oxymoron, or at best incomprehensible. Try it sometime on your non-Jewish friends.
Beyond these considerations, there is TRADITION. Shared myths about identity. Jewish History has left a powerful legacy, that acts mostly as an autonomous (sometimes unconscious) inseparable power of identity.
The “demographic problem,” and the one-vs-two-state solutions are yet other practical indicators of the seriousness of the identity problem. The same spills over in Israel’s relation to Jews that don’t live there.
All this shows up in another uniqueness, Israel’s coalition politics. The religious parties too often work themselves into the coalition government because their demands are politically relatively expedient. They wield disproportionate governance power in matters of collective life-style (shabbat laws), marriage (no civil marriage in Israel) women, and all manner of personal law. The rabinatte and the not-orthodox...
The “demographic problem” is another practical indicator of the identity problem.
Just in the last week, The Knesset voted to reestablish a Ministry of Religious Affairs, with a Haredi minister, that gives more visibility and power to Jewish, with an orthodox accent, matters.
Point: Israel is not even close to a de jure separation of state and religion, much to my concern.
Meir,
You wrote: “The rabbinate and the not-orthodox….” Did you intend to write: “The rabbinate and not the orthodox….,” instead. If so, I don’t understand the distinction that you seem to be making. I thought that the rabbinate derives most of its power from the loyal adherence of its followers.
Leonard,
I have felt growing anger and shame about the evil acts of the settlers. With the activities reported by Akiva Eldar in today’s Haaretz (“Border Control / Who's dismantling whom?” http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/944690.html) my shame has become disgust. Please, consider making the settlers depredations the topic of our next conversation.