We say: We support Israel's right to self-defense, including Israel's right to go after terrorists. At the same time, we know that Israel cannot ensure its security through military means alone. We also know that sometimes a military response, especially an ever-escalating military response, can be counterproductive. The best long-term strategy to deal with terrorism combines military tactics with a political process that provides hope that a negotiated end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is within reach.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, at its heart, a political conflict. Palestinian terrorism against Israel is a horrendous byproduct of this conflict that cannot be countered simply by increasing the harshness of the Israeli response. Rather, it will be best brought to heel by more intensely pursuing peace, in tandem with smart counter-terrorism measures that capitalize on intelligence and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as other Arab stakeholders (like Egypt and Jordan). Indeed, it is no coincidence that the ONLY period in recent history when Palestinian terrorism against Israel ground to an almost total halt was during the mid-1990s, when Israel was engaged in an effort to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace, and was working closely with the PA both to promote the peace process and to fight terror.

It is tempting to believe that if the world (and the Left) would just keep quiet and let the IDF do its job, Israel could finish off Palestinian terrorism once and for all. Tempting, but foolish. The fact is, Israel has engaged in major military operations, targeted killings, home demolitions, arrests/detentions, deportations, and most recently, massive economic pressure in an effort to bring Palestinian violence against Israel to a halt. And the fact is, too, that these tools have been insufficient.

What Israel has learned, instead, is that even the most "successful" military operation or tactic is of only limited utility: Take, for example, the barrier that Israel constructed around Gaza in the early 1990s. This barrier was indeed successful in preventing suicide bombers from Gaza reaching Israel. Yet, as the political situation stagnated, the barrier proved to not be enough: Palestinian terrorists turned to rocket and mortar fire with which to target Israelis.

Moreover, the IDF cannot assassinate every Palestinian who engages in or one day may engage in the use of violence against Israel, nor can it "break" the Palestinian will through detentions, arrests, and home demolitions. Indeed, such operations and tactics arguably have the unintended consequence of sowing the seeds for future violence and support for violence against Israel - whether it is committed by friends and family members of those targeted by Israel, or family members of the innocent bystanders who suffer as "collateral damage" in an operation. It is precisely why, for example, Israel has largely abandoned its policy of home demolitions - an IDF panel of experts examined the policy in 2005 and concluded that demolishing homes of terrorists' families causes more harm than benefit to Israel's fight against terrorism.

The answer is for Israeli security forces to continue working to stop terrorists, weighing short-term advantages against long-term costs, and for Israel's political leaders to seriously pursue negotiations to resolve the conflict. This is not an easy path, but all the alternative paths are dead-ends.