We say: Peace on Israel's northern border is one of Israel's primary national security interests, which warrants paying the territorial price on the Golan Heights. One of the clear lessons of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war remains that in the absence of a peace treaty, it is only a matter of time before war breaks out.

It is true that Israelis are very attached to the Golan Heights and are reluctant, or even strongly opposed, to relinquishing them to Syria. This does not mean that a peace agreement that exchanges the Golan for real security for Israel would not be embraced by Israelis. The same polls that show Israelis unwilling to cede the Golan show that Israelis support the negotiations with Syria. It is also worth recalling that many Israelis initially opposed the Camp David Accords and opposed paying the price for peace with Egypt - the complete return of the Sinai Peninsula. Today, few if any Israelis would argue that Israel should have kept the Sinai and rejected peace with Egypt, or that Israel would somehow be in a better position if it had done so.

It is also worth noting that Israeli popular support for a peace deal with Syria fluctuates. It is influenced by the perceived credibility of Syria's leader - and that of Israel's leaders. It is also impacted by other bilateral and regional variables. In the past, there have been times when Israelis were more supportive of fully withdrawing from the Golan Heights. Israelis appear to be more reluctant to pay the full price for peace with Syria when they do not trust their current leadership to make a good deal, and they don't trust Syria's President Bashar Assad to deliver a full, reliable peace.

There is a good reason to believe, however, that Israelis will change their attitude once a credible deal is on the table. And there is good reason to believe - based on what is publicly known about past negotiations - that any deal would be structured to address Israeli concerns. When Israelis and Syrians unofficially negotiated a possible peace agreement between 2004 and 2006, they agreed on a lengthy phased Israeli withdrawal (over the course of five years or more), on demilitarizing the Golan Heights as the territory is gradually returned to Syrian sovereignty, and on establishing a park in most of the territory, for use by both Israelis and Syrians.

When Israeli leaders are serious about making peace with Syria, they will begin to make the case for it publicly. When they do, they are likely to point out that savvy Israeli diplomacy, with the help of Israel's allies, could reap the fruits of an Israeli-Syrian peace deal much beyond the Israel-Syria border.

• An Israeli-Syrian deal is likely to open the door for an Israeli-Lebanese deal that would weaken Hezbollah and contribute to security and stability on Israel's northern border.
• Israeli-Syrian peace could be leveraged toward comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world, in the context of the Arab League's peace initiative, which offers full peace between Israel and all 22 members of the Arab League in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders.
• An Israeli deal with Syria is almost certain to drive a wedge between Damascus and Teheran, weakening Iran's influence in the region and making it easier for the U.S. and its allies worldwide to confront Iran.