We say: Most Palestinians recognize that Israel is here to stay. Most also accept the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as the only real option available to the Palestinians to fulfill their national aspirations. Most accept that an agreement to create a viable Palestinian state would mean the end of territorial claims against Israel. For years, public opinion surveys among the Palestinians have consistently found this to be the case.

Certainly, there is a minority of Palestinians who don't accept a two-state solution. And even Palestinians who accept the two-state solution are not necessarily happy about it. But there is no reason they should be: Peace requires the Palestinians to sacrifice their dream of returning to land that they or their ancestors left sixty years ago.

Likewise, some Israelis and diaspora Jews dream of a Greater Israel that includes all of the West Bank and even land beyond. This minority clings to its dangerous desire, irrespective of how unattainable its dream is.

At the same time, many Israelis who support the two-state solution do so reluctantly. And for good reason: Just as peace requires Palestinians to give up the dream of returning to Jaffa, so must Israel give up the dream of holding on to Shechem (Nablus) and Hevron (Hebron), the cradle of Jewish civilization. The hope for a better future requires both sides to relinquish the realization of some of their historic dreams.

The fact remains that the vast majority of both Israelis and Palestinians want peace and accept the two-state solution. Rejectionists, on either side, must not be permitted to stand in the way of this goal. Israelis have an interest in ending the conflict with the Palestinians, and they also have a strong interest in ending the occupation of the West Bank, which drains Israeli resources, erodes the state's international standing and threatens its Jewish and democratic nature.

In practical terms, Israeli national security policy must be grounded in a sober assessment of current and potential threats. And so, even if Israelis were convinced that all Palestinians were prepared to embrace Israel, any peace agreement would still include comprehensive security arrangements to ensure that - no matter what might happen among the Palestinians or in the region - Israel's security would be protected.

The question is not whether Palestinians will give up the dream of "liberating" all of Palestine. The question is whether the existence of a rejectionist minority, potentially willing to use violence against Israel to pursue their "liberation" dream, means that peace is not possible. The answer, clearly, is no. A successful peace agreement will include two mutually reinforcing components: First, meaningful incentives to further buttress the notion, among most Palestinians, that peace is better than the reckless pursuit of unattainable dreams; and second, a strong security component to effectively deter and fend off any threats from rejectionists.