Critics (including this writer) of HR 2194 -- the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act (IRPSA), which was passed by the House yesterday -- have argued that if the US wants to put pressure on the government of Iran, sanctions that deliberately cause suffering to the Iranian people are unlikely to do the job and could well backfire. During yesterday's House debate on IRPSA, several speakers attempted to refute this criticism by raising the South Africa precedent. They noted, correctly, that in the South Africa context, crippling economic sanctions worked.
It is clear why supporters of IRSPA want to focus on South Africa: this is the only example in recent history where sanctions similar to those being proposed for use against Iran achieved their intended purpose.
But those raising the South Africa ignore a key fact: while the sanctions may be similar, their justification and intended purpose are not. These differences render the comparison specious and the conclusion - that sanctions that worked in South Africa will work in Iran - dubious.
It is clear why supporters of IRSPA want to focus on South Africa: this is the only example in recent history where sanctions similar to those being proposed for use against Iran achieved their intended purpose.
But those raising the South Africa ignore a key fact: while the sanctions may be similar, their justification and intended purpose are not. These differences render the comparison specious and the conclusion - that sanctions that worked in South Africa will work in Iran - dubious.
The unambiguous justification for crippling sanctions against South
Africa was to promote the interests and rights of South African blacks
who were suffering from systematic and institutionalized discrimination
at the hands of the Apartheid regime. The goal of the sanctions was to
change the policies of the Apartheid government toward its own people.
The sanctions were imposed despite the fact that they involved very
real financial and political costs to the US. These sanctions thus
had clear moral legitimacy, including among South African anti-Apartheid activists
and in the eyes of the world.
In contrast, both the justification for and the goal of crippling sanctions against Iran have little to do with promoting the interests and rights of the Iranian people (except as an afterthought). These sanctions are about promoting US interests, not the interests of the Iranian people. No doubt some will argue, especially in the wake of the June 2009 Iranian elections, that human rights and democracy are among the reasons why the US must impose crippling sanctions on Iran. But let's not kid ourselves: while no doubt the concern for the Iranian people is genuine, it is no more the real justification for these sanctions than democracy and human rights were the real reason for the US invasion of Iraq.
This is clear in the text of the bill, which makes no reference at all to human rights or democracy, either in the context of imposing sanctions or lifting them. This was also clearly demonstrated yesterday on the floor of the House of Representatives, where the many statements in support of IRPSA barely mentioned human rights or democracy. They focused, instead, on Iran's nuclear programs and the threat of growing Iranian power to US interests (including Middle East energy resources), to Israel, to the balance of power in the region, etc...
All of which are wholly legitimate US national security concerns, but have nothing to do with the rights and interests of the Iranian people. Sanctions that result from such considerations may thus be viewed by the US as legitimate tools of US foreign policy, but by no stretch of the imagination do they have the moral legitimacy - in the eyes of the Iranian people or the world - that sanctions had in the South Africa context.
Supporters of IPRSA can try to sell these sanctions as an altruistic US effort to support the Iranian people; Iranians know better. They know because they have been living with far-reaching US sanctions for more than 20 years and because they listen to the debate in Washington. And they know that if tomorrow the Iranian government comes to an agreement with the international community on the nuclear program - a program that to many Iranians is a symbol of national pride and defiance in the face of decades of sanctions and anti-Iran rhetoric - human rights and democracy issues will be instantly relegated to a very low spot on the US-Iran agenda, just as is the case with countries like China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
If members of Congress are looking for real parallels to the current Iran sanctions - examples where sanctions that cause serious harm to civilians were employed as part of an effort to promote US interests and goals - they should look not to South Africa, but to Cuba, Iraq, Gaza and, indeed, Iran.
In all those cases, crippling sanctions - sanctions that continue to this day (except for Iraq, for obvious reasons) - are causing serious suffering to the civilian population.
And in all these cases, the sanctions have failed to bring down the regime. To the contrary, the regimes in question all remain firmly in power (again, except for Iraq, for reasons that have nothing to do with sanctions), while the sanctions and resulting hardship have fed anti-US sentiment.
These are the real precedents for the proposed crippling Iran sanctions.
If people want to support IRPSA despite these precedents - despite the fact that in parallel political contexts such sanctions have not achieved their intended results and have even backfired - that is their prerogative. But let's not fool ourselves into believing that the South Africa experience has any relevance to this debate.
In contrast, both the justification for and the goal of crippling sanctions against Iran have little to do with promoting the interests and rights of the Iranian people (except as an afterthought). These sanctions are about promoting US interests, not the interests of the Iranian people. No doubt some will argue, especially in the wake of the June 2009 Iranian elections, that human rights and democracy are among the reasons why the US must impose crippling sanctions on Iran. But let's not kid ourselves: while no doubt the concern for the Iranian people is genuine, it is no more the real justification for these sanctions than democracy and human rights were the real reason for the US invasion of Iraq.
This is clear in the text of the bill, which makes no reference at all to human rights or democracy, either in the context of imposing sanctions or lifting them. This was also clearly demonstrated yesterday on the floor of the House of Representatives, where the many statements in support of IRPSA barely mentioned human rights or democracy. They focused, instead, on Iran's nuclear programs and the threat of growing Iranian power to US interests (including Middle East energy resources), to Israel, to the balance of power in the region, etc...
All of which are wholly legitimate US national security concerns, but have nothing to do with the rights and interests of the Iranian people. Sanctions that result from such considerations may thus be viewed by the US as legitimate tools of US foreign policy, but by no stretch of the imagination do they have the moral legitimacy - in the eyes of the Iranian people or the world - that sanctions had in the South Africa context.
Supporters of IPRSA can try to sell these sanctions as an altruistic US effort to support the Iranian people; Iranians know better. They know because they have been living with far-reaching US sanctions for more than 20 years and because they listen to the debate in Washington. And they know that if tomorrow the Iranian government comes to an agreement with the international community on the nuclear program - a program that to many Iranians is a symbol of national pride and defiance in the face of decades of sanctions and anti-Iran rhetoric - human rights and democracy issues will be instantly relegated to a very low spot on the US-Iran agenda, just as is the case with countries like China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
If members of Congress are looking for real parallels to the current Iran sanctions - examples where sanctions that cause serious harm to civilians were employed as part of an effort to promote US interests and goals - they should look not to South Africa, but to Cuba, Iraq, Gaza and, indeed, Iran.
In all those cases, crippling sanctions - sanctions that continue to this day (except for Iraq, for obvious reasons) - are causing serious suffering to the civilian population.
And in all these cases, the sanctions have failed to bring down the regime. To the contrary, the regimes in question all remain firmly in power (again, except for Iraq, for reasons that have nothing to do with sanctions), while the sanctions and resulting hardship have fed anti-US sentiment.
These are the real precedents for the proposed crippling Iran sanctions.
If people want to support IRPSA despite these precedents - despite the fact that in parallel political contexts such sanctions have not achieved their intended results and have even backfired - that is their prerogative. But let's not fool ourselves into believing that the South Africa experience has any relevance to this debate.
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Keep in mind that Iran is an imperialist nation in the worst sense of the word. They already are milking Iraq for all they can. Recent energy development agreements puts Iraq’s oil in Iranian hands while making a good deal of money for Tehran -- money which undoubtedly will go to support terrorism and to develop nuclear weapons. Note that Iran is the major foreign influence in Lebanon, and with their involvement in the Yemenite civil war seeks to expand their control over that country as well.
Don’t forget how the Iranians threaten Israel. That is important, isn’t it?
We all want peace. But most of us live in the real world.
In fact, I suggest that sanctions and boycott and divestment did not even work against aparthied South Africa. Two key factors in deKlerk's decision to release Manmdela from prison and start negotiating with the ANC are fear and reassurance. The fear was that black labor strikes were shutting down the economy and there was a real fear of black violence. The reassurance was that the ANC and its partners always had a vision of a South Africa shared by black and white. This was expressed in the The Freedon Chartes signed bythe ANC and its partners in 1955. This document starts with "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white." And leaders like Manela and Biship Tutu carried that message of uinclusiveness. So in South ASfrica there was real fear for the economy and for personal safety from internal threats, and a reassurance that the whites will be welcomed in a new South Africa. The boycotts and sanctions did not bring down the South African economy - there was too much leakage by "cheating" nations including Israel.
I have a lot of expertise on the subject of sanctions regarding both South Africa and Iran as my doctoral dissertation in International Relations (1990, USC) was on internal settlements in Southern Africa and I studied closely the issue of sanctions against Pretoria, I also did much of the background research on sanctions for AIPAC's paper on Iran in 1995 that led to the Iran Relations Act. Sanctions contributed partly to F.W. de Klerk's Feb. 1990 decision to release Mandela, unban the liberation movements, and begin negotiations that eventually led to majority rule four years later. The sanctions of the U.S. Congress and the EU only affected about 2-3% of South Africa's trade. What was crucial was the decision by European banks to massively downgrade South Africa's credit rating for purely commercial reasons--with the internal unrest that rocked South Africa from 1984-88 it was a bad credit risk. The implementation of legal trade sanctions threatened to combine with guerrilla warfare and internal unrest to affect South Africa over the long term in the way that Rhodesia had been affected--the low road. So De Klerk opted for negotiations--the high road--and he did it as the African National Congress was in the process of being kicked out of Angola as part of the Namibian settlement of Dec. 1988 and the Cold War was ending. De Klerk learned from Ian Smith's mistakes and decided to negotiate from a position of strength.
Sanctions may or may not work against Tehran depending upon how determined the regime is to acquire nuclear weapons or at least a nuclear weapons option. Targeted sanctions affecting gasoline could badly hurt the regime. They could either trigger a massive reaction against the regime or could cause the population to side with the regime against the West. I don't think that anyone in the West knows the answer to this for certain. Remember that Lenin, a professional revolutionary who was Russian failed to correctly anticipate the timing of the Russian Revolution. Most of the Iranian population thinks that Iran should be entitled to at least enrich its own uranium if not build nuclear weapons. The question is whether the populace will side with the West to rid themselves of the Mullahs or side with the regime to protect what they perceive as the country's national rights and honor.