Q.  What lies behind PM Netanyahu's decision to sanction the
construction of an additional 455 settlements in the West Bank? And
what does it tell us about Netanyahu's capacity to manage a peace
process with the Palestinians?

 

A. This is certainly not a mindless provocation on Netanyahu's part.
Nor is there much substance to it. Nevertheless, as a harbinger of
things to come, it is very worrisome.

 

The spin coming out of the Prime Minister's Office is that the 455
units constitute a successful gesture to placate Netanyahu's opposition
within his own Likud party and further to the political right. The
administration, we are told, was informed in advance and, while it
doesn't approve, it is proceeding as planned with efforts to wrap up
the details of a settlement freeze so that President Barack Obama can,
together with Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas,
inaugurate a new Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process at the UN
General Assembly later this month. According to these reports, the
last-minute additional settlement construction will not even upset
plans for a number of moderate Arab countries to offer diplomatic and
economic confidence-building gestures to Israel to ensure the process
gets off on the right foot. Netanyahu's spokespersons are renaming the
prospective settlement freeze a "suspension" to further soften the blow
to the right.

 

Nearly all the 455 units are actually already under construction or are
simply being "reapproved" for show. Most are in settlement blocs close
to the green line. Some 20, however, will be constructed in a Jordan
Valley settlement, Maskiot, that is for all intents and purposes new
and will house evacuees from a Gaza Strip outpost (even these units
were already approved once before, in 2008). This, after Israel
committed to not resettle the Gaza evacuees anywhere in the West Bank.

 

Apropos outposts, Israel's long-standing and oft-postponed commitment
to remove all those built in the West Bank since 2001 is not mentioned
anywhere in the discussion of Netanyahu's new commitments regarding
settlements.

 

Thus the entire new settlements ruckus is in some ways a classic
instance of "Yisra-bluff", wherein everyone knows nothing serious is
happening and everyone plays along: Washington and settler supporters
protest (for radically different reasons) while the "settlement freeze"
begins. So why be concerned?

 

My favorite rationale mustered by the high level sources in the Prime
Minister's Office in briefing the press about the 455 units is "the
Americans didn't agree, but they understood that before you dive you
have to take a gulp of air". This implies that Netanyahu truly intends
to "dive", meaning to engage seriously in a peace process, and that
more than 300,000 settlers in the West Bank have not provided him and
his supporters with sufficient oxygen. Herein lies the real dilemma
connected to the process we appear to be entering into.

 

That dilemma can best be introduced through a series of questions.
First, if the stability of Netanyahu's coalition requires that a
nine-month settlement freeze be termed a "suspension" and that
construction continue in some 3,000 units (2,500 previously underway,
followed now by 455), how will the prime minister persuade his
followers to approve the first concession he makes in the incipient
final status negotiations with Abbas? Or does he not intend to make
concessions?

 

Second, how will Abbas now enter into negotiations, after lining up
behind Obama's original demand for a full and comprehensive freeze?
Presumably, Obama will offer the Palestinians incentives, and will
galvanize Arab pressure on Abbas, who will capitulate. There will have
to be some bluffing here, too.

 

Then too, assuming moderate Arab states do indeed deliver CBMs to
Israel, such as low-level relations, business visas and overflight
rights, how long will they maintain them if the talks register no
appreciable progress?

 

Another issue of interest is the influence of Ehud Barak on Netanyahu's
decision-making regarding settlements. After all, it is Barak who, as
minister of defense, ultimately signs off on the construction or
removal of settlements. His own Labor party contingent has not been
happy with his collaboration with Netanyahu over new settlement
construction. Now the additional 455 housing starts will almost
certainly render Barak's own political life within his shrinking party
that much more difficult.

 

Incidentally, the latest idea attributed to Barak and conceivably
destined to be floated by Netanyahu is that the Palestinians be
encouraged to declare an independent state from the outset of
negotiations, thereby ostensibly confirming Netanyahu's commitment to a
two-state solution, but also placing those talks on a state-to-state
basis and committing Israel to a totally different relationship with
the West Bank. I find it hard to believe either Netanyahu or Abbas
would buy into this idea at this early juncture. (For a comprehensive
discussion of the ramifications of a Palestinian unilateral declaration
of independence, see this week's bitterlemons.org.)

 

This brings us to the question that frames the real dilemma: what does
Netanyahu want? Is he following in the footsteps of Meridor, Olmert and
Livni--all died-in-the-wool Revisionists who recognized the folly of
the settlements and now argue passionately for a two-state solution in
order to save Israel as a Jewish state? Is that the meaning of
Netanyahu's Bar Ilan speech in June, where he guardedly accepted the
two-state solution? Is all this talk of a settlement freeze and
last-minute building permits just a smoke screen designed by a genius
at political maneuver to ease his right-wing colleagues into a real
peace process--for the greater good of Israel, its relations with the
Arabs and the US and to ensure success in its confrontation with Iran?

 

Or is Netanyahu simply maneuvering, almost on a day-to-day basis, to
stay alive politically while placating Obama and forestalling American
pressures, with little consideration given to the decisions he might
have to make in a month or two? Certainly his zigzag behavior--one day
freezing settlements, the next day building more--is highly destructive
of his already problematic credibility.

 

Judging by Netanyahu's performance of recent days and by his past
record as a politician and leader, the latter explanation is the more
persuasive. If indeed this is the case, then the process launched later
this month will not last very long before it generates a crisis either
in Netanyahu's relations with Obama, in Israel's relations with the
moderate Arabs, or within Netanyahu's coalition. . . or all of the
above.

 

 Q. Assuming they are indeed "delivered", are the Arab CBMs likely to be substantive, or largely symbolic?

 

A. The primary Arab gesture anticipated is the reopening of Israeli
economic interest sections in countries like Qatar and Tunisia and
possibly the stationing of low-level Moroccan, Omani and other Arab
diplomats in Israel. Additional Gulf emirates besides Qatar, such as
Bahrain, might offer visas for Israeli businessmen. Saudi Arabia has
reportedly been asked to allow El Al to overfly its territory en route
to India and the Far East, thereby cutting several hours off flight
time (these flights currently go south toward Kenya on the east coast
of Africa and only then turn east), but has thus far not agreed.

 

Since, during the second half of the 1990s and until the outbreak of
the second intifada in late 2000, there existed Israeli interest
sections in Arab states and low-level Arab diplomatic representatives
in Israel, it is possible--based on their previous record--to assess
their potential for boosting economic and other ties. Israel currently
exports to the tune of about one billion dollars a year to the Arab
countries it does not have full diplomatic ties with (i.e., with all
the Arab countries except Egypt and Jordan). The exports are channeled
through third parties, including in Jordan. This figure has basically
not been affected by the break in low-level ties that began in 2000 and
culminated only recently when Qatar expelled Israeli representatives.
Those links are not considered effective in generating large-scale
business, due to Arab fears of trading directly with Israel and the
effect of the draconian security measures that protect Israeli
legations in Arab countries and deter visitors (as anyone who has
visited the Israel embassy in Amman or Cairo knows well).

 

Thus the economic legation in Qatar did not make a major contribution
to Israeli exports, and a renewed presence in Doha is likely to have
little more than the same largely symbolic value. Israeli tourism to
Tunisia and Morocco has continued even without Israeli diplomatic
representation.

 

Of course, the value of such symbols should not be underestimated: they
"show the flag" and pave the way for future normalization. Yet we have
seen how little it takes by way of perceived Israeli "provocation"
(combating the second intifada; responding to attacks by Hezbollah in
southern Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza) for these low-level ties to be
publicly cancelled.

 

One expert on Israeli trade with the Arab world (outside of Egypt and
Jordan) estimates that Israeli exports, primarily to the Gulf emirates,
could be multiplied ten-fold if the atmosphere were to change. But for
this to happen, more than low-level legations have to be opened.