Alpher assesses the importance of last week's Obama-Netanyahu meeting, and reflects on the 10-year anniversary of the Camp David II peace talks.
Q. How would you characterize the achievements of last week's Obama-Netanyahu summit?
A. Judging by the two leaders' joint public appearance following the meeting, the achievements appear to be largely short-term tactical, not long-term strategic. An informed observer could not avoid the impression that Obama and Netanyahu essentially decided to call a truce in view of short-term considerations: looming American mid-term elections and the impression in some circles of administration failure thus far in managing the peace process, and the Israeli leader's need to demonstrate to his own public after a series of mishaps that he can manage relations with the US.
By the end of Netanyahu's US visit, he had spoken of a successful peace process with the Palestinians within a year, while President Obama declared it was possible by the end of his [first] term. Neither leader offered anything by way of substantiation for these bold assertions. Long before a happy end to the peace process, the big questions remained unanswered: when and how would direct peace talks begin; would the settlement freeze be extended and, if not, what would happen when it ends; specifically what confidence-building measures would Netanyahu now persuade his hawkish government to approve.
Indeed, the two leaders never mentioned settlements. They also never mentioned the possibility of renewing peace talks with Syria under US auspices--an urgent issue where the ball is in Israel's court.
If these lacunae seemingly describe the superficial nature of last week's Obama-Netanyahu rapprochement, what can we say about Obama's forthright statements regarding Israel's nuclear status and its freedom of action against perceived threats? These were not superficial. Then again, there are no immediate issues involved here, as there are regarding Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.
Q. Apropos summit meetings about peace, this month marks the tenth anniversary of the Camp David II talks. What have we learned from that experience?
A. In retrospect, it's clear that the Camp David summit was not well prepared by either the US or Israeli delegations, while the leadership of Yasser Arafat rendered Palestinian intentions problematic. The most obvious and extreme example is Jerusalem, which was not pre-negotiated due to the fear of leaks, and where at Camp David it became painfully apparent that the two sides harbored powerful misconceptions of one another's position and intentions, while the US was not well enough informed to guide discussions constructively.
Adequate preparation is one lesson; leadership and negotiating skills are another. Israeli PM Ehud Barak, in particular, turned out to be a poor negotiator and to lack emotional intelligence, even toward his own 12-member delegation.
Then too, Washington failed to coordinate Camp David with key Arab actors, especially the Egyptian and Saudi leadership, whose support would be needed for an agreement to succeed. As a result, Yasser Arafat felt too isolated from an inter-Arab standpoint to make key decisions.
From an internal Israeli standpoint, Camp David offered yet another demonstration of the toxic interaction between the Palestinian issue and Israeli politics. By the time Barak arrived at the talks, he had barely one-third of the Knesset behind him. It is questionable whether, had he succeeded at Camp David in reaching an agreement, he could have remained in office or recruited Knesset and popular approval.
From a broader Jewish viewpoint, I discovered personally that the American Jewish public would willingly support an Israeli leader moving toward peace, even if the leader and the agreement are controversial. During the Camp David period I was dispatched, as a special adviser to the prime minister, to address American Jewish leaders and the media, explain where Barak was heading and ask for support in the event of success at Camp David. Success would have meant a pledge by President Bill Clinton to invest tens of billions of dollars in refugee compensation and water desalination; American public support would have been crucial.
Prior to Camp David, key members of Barak's cabinet--particularly Natan Sharansky--actually campaigned in the US and elsewhere against the peace process, condemning Barak's intentions. Important American Jewish leaders were persuaded to publicly oppose Barak. The prime minister had neglected his American support base. Yet, when confronted with a clear presentation of Barak's peace plan and an explicit request to support him, Jewish leaders and the American media largely did so.
I'll never forget a meeting in Los Angeles with the heads of the Jewish community there. When I had completed my presentation and appeal on behalf of Barak's peace plan for Camp David, one very hawkish leader turned to another and said, "We knew this day would come. We have no alternative but to support the prime minister."
Camp David ended in stalemate, but peace negotiations continued through August and September, and even after the second intifada broke out in late September. Thus one cannot argue that Camp David directly triggered several years of violence. By the time we arrive at the Clinton parameters of late December 2000 and the Taba talks of the following January--events that directly informed the Geneva accords a few years later--it becomes clear that Camp David II, despite its problematic nature, made an important contribution to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.
Ten years later, what lessons can current negotiators take away from Camp David? Unfortunately, Israeli negotiators don't have much control over the internal Israeli political factors, including the issue of leadership. But Israel can certainly improve preparations, particularly in the form of pre-negotiations that precede a summit and timely briefing of potential supporters of a peace agreement. Not only the US, but Israel as well should strive to coordinate policy positions--in advance as well as at the height of negotiations--with Arab and other international actors of influence. Nor should a negotiating summit be billed as the be-all-and-end-all of the peace process, but rather, lest it fail, as merely one phase in a peace continuum.
Finally, we must learn better to assess the question of ripeness: in retrospect, it's clear the parties were not "ripe" for an agreement in July 2000.
Q. Last week, in an extraordinary step, the IDF published detailed and sensitive intelligence data concerning Hezbollah arms caches, bunkers and operations centers in the midst of civilian installations in al-Hiyam, one of 160 southern Lebanese villages. What motivated this unusual move?
A. A combination of factors. The most important involves public diplomacy.
As the summer of 2010 progresses, tensions are growing between Israel and Hezbollah and its patron, Iran, and speculation is rife about renewed fighting. The Israeli security establishment has learned that many of its achievements in the field of battle can be neutralized by international criticism of the methods it employs in facing an extremist non-state enemy dug in among civilians. Operation Cast Lead of January 2009 and the subsequent Goldstone report are a prime example, but even the tragic clashes aboard the Mavi Marmara last month feed this insight. In publishing the precise location of Hezbollah installations in one southern Lebanese village and hinting that it holds similar information regarding all of southern Lebanon, the IDF is in effect giving notice that any new fighting will involve unavoidable civilian casualties and that the blame will lie with Hezbollah.
Secondly, UNIFIL II forces in southern Lebanon have recently encountered opposition to their presence by local villagers. These demonstrations, some violent, appear to be carefully orchestrated by Hezbollah. The UNIFIL patrols are supposed to root out precisely the Hezbollah installations the IDF is pointing to. Thus, Israel is in effect stating that UNIFIL's actions are justified yet ineffective: witness the degree to which Hebollah has re-infiltrated southern Lebanon.
Third, this is a deliberate demonstration of the dominance of Israeli intelligence. The IDF appears to have no concern about inadvertently revealing and neutralizing sources. Hezbollah can now, if it likes, relocate these thousands of rocket caches and HQ bunkers and the IDF will find them.
There is also a message here for Lebanese intelligence officials: despite several recent spectacular arrests of alleged Israeli spy rings that had infiltrated key communications networks in Lebanon, Israel still has a very detailed picture of what is happening.
Finally, this is an exercise in deterrence. Logically, Hezbollah and its Iranian minders will respond by reasoning that the Lebanese Shi'ite organization is far too exposed militarily to risk catalyzing another war with Israel.
Will this work? Will this indeed improve Israel's international image if and when it destroys Lebanese villages while targeting Hezbollah bunkers? Will this deter Hezbollah and Iran? It's impossible to say. But given the realities of Israel's struggle against militant Islamist non-state actors on its borders, publishing the map of Hezbollah's installations in al-Hiyam seems like a smart idea.
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I still have it in mind that the outlined agreement from Taba, put together by people who had no constituency to answer to, established the best chance for a fair peace between the parties. I think more should be written about this outline.
I also have it in mind that while Arafat is generally blamed for the failure at Camp David, the agreement with which he was presented was really not something a responsible leader could accept, Dennis Ross's descriptions notwithstanding.
The Palestinians have little power to negotiate fair terms, and sadly some of them use the only weapons available to the very weak, but a livable agreement must reflect more than just their negotiating strength. It must reflect humanity, justice and courage on both sides.
There are no Israelis welcome in Taba today and none will set foot there fully aware of the potential for hostility. This despite Mubarek's near 100% complicity and partnership with Israeli militancy.