A. This is not the first time a prominent Israeli has been hosted by the Arab media. Particularly in the age of Al Jazeera this is not a unique phenomenon. I can testify that articles by Israelis published in bitterlemons frequently find their way into the Lebanese and Saudi press and onto countless Arab websites. Nevertheless, there are two interesting angles to the Ayalon article: the identity of the host newspaper and the content.

Asharq Alawsat is published in London and owned by Saudis. It and al-Hayat, also Saudi owned, are often convenient albeit convoluted vehicles for the Saudi ruling family to publish something they would not permit to appear inside the country but want the Arab world to see. There are also frequent rumors about meetings being held between prominent Saudis and Israelis to discuss Iran or Arab-Israel peace issues. Against this backdrop, the Ayalon open letter inevitably prompted speculation that it was part of some sort of Saudi-Israeli "deal". More likely, the Saudis wanted to signal Washington that they are prepared to make the occasional "normalization" gesture.

Then there is the content. The thrust of Ayalon's letter is that Israel is blameless. It is waiting heroically for a reasonable Palestinian partner and wants to work with the Arab world against Iran, the real enemy: "Israel has gone very far. . . but we must be met by a willing partner", writes Ayalon. And "we find ourselves on the same side" against Iran, which "seeks to hold an entire region. . . to ransom". 

Nowhere is there the slightest acknowledgement that Israel, too, might be at fault. "Both in 2000 at Camp David and in 2008 during the Annapolis process, Israeli prime ministers offered the Palestinians everything possible for peace." The only mention of settlements is the construction freeze. The Palestinians are blamed for not going the way of Egypt and Jordan; Syria is not even mentioned. That Israel has unilaterally annexed land seen internationally as belonging to Palestine and Syria is ignored. The Arab Peace Initiative, like the Palestinian Authority (Ayalon forgets that our peace partner is the PLO, not the PA), "remains frozen in 1993". Ayalon cannot understand why our neighbors, threatened by climate change, don't invite us to "make the desert bloom".

This most definitely does not read like an appeal from a government intent on offering the Palestinians or the Syrians far-reaching peace proposals. Ayalon's letter exudes arrogance. Obviously, had his boss and Yisrael Beitenu party leader, FM Avigdor Lieberman, signed off on this letter, no Arab paper would have published it. But even without Lieberman, it is a missed opportunity.

A. This is a tempting yet problematic assessment. The thrust of Yadlin's remark is that the two highly controversial wars of 2006 and 2009 were successful in deterring any serious further aggression from southern Lebanon and Gaza. Thus far, three and a half years and one year on, respectively, he is right. Yadlin noted correctly that there have been virtually no IDF combat casualties since the end of the Gaza war nearly a year ago, making 2009 the quietest year for a decade.

Yet Yadlin also pointed out in his rare appearance at the Institute for National Security Studies that the region's "radical axis"--Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas--was drawing lessons from these two wars and escalating its internal cooperation regarding intelligence, weapons development and smuggling and early warning against attack. And Syria, Yadlin stated, is rapidly improving its international status (this was demonstrated last weekend when Lebanese PM Saad al-Hariri visited Syrian President Assad, the man generally thought responsible for the murder six years ago of Hariri's father). 

These developments imply that the deterrent effect of the punishment Israel inflicted on Hezbollah and Hamas may be temporary. Moreover, Yadlin allowed, the downside of the 2006 and 2009 wars with regard to Israel's international image and legitimacy is contributing to Palestinian Authority efforts to recruit international support for unilateral steps and to the growing divergence of the Israeli and American agendas--both topics for Israeli concern, even if and as deterrence holds.

Yadlin cited as a major challenge for Israel the fact that it now confronts not one but two Palestinian entities, in the West Bank and Gaza. A second very senior security personality who spoke at the INSS conference but whose remarks were not for attribution, noted that both of these entities were accomplishing what many Israelis doubted was possible: both Fateh in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza were successfully monopolizing the means of force--a vital attribute of viable sovereignty--and maintaining peace and quiet. Moreover, in this speaker's view, what is accordingly emerging is not only a "three state reality" (Israel, West Bank, Gaza) but a "three peoples" reality as the differences between Gazans and West Bankers become entrenched. Whether or not this is good for deterrence and/or for peace is another matter.

A. This is a controversial concern. There is no accepted definition of what a viable state looks and behaves like. Discussion in Israel of Palestinian viability often encompasses economic demands (a Palestinian state should not be a basket case), constitutional requirements (it must be a democracy) and even moral qualifications (e.g., it must feature education for peace). 

Yet Israel is in a particularly uncomfortable position if it seeks to pronounce on Palestinian viability, given that it itself has over the decades been judged non-viable by its detractors and enemies and, most recently, by those on the far left and right in Europe and America who deny its right to exist. Back in 1947 the British mandatory authorities argued that a Jewish state would not be viable and would not be able to absorb more than 100,000 Holocaust refugees. Some Israelis argue that Israel is flanked on two borders by states, Jordan and Lebanon, that are not viable from the standpoint of ethnic-national cohesion. Yet Israel has peace and even a strategic coordination relationship with Jordan. In short, when it comes to the viability of a Palestinian state, the admonition about people who live in glass houses appears relevant.

Yet the reality of a separately governed and geographically distinct Palestinian entity in Gaza has prompted a "viability" discussion among Palestinians. The West Bank alone, many Palestinians argue in dismissing the possible eventuality of a "three-state solution", would not be viable. The reason does not appear to be economic. After all, when relieved of the economic burden of the Gaza Strip with its huge refugee population and wrecked economy, the West Bank appears more economically viable than ever. Indeed, it is currently proving precisely this point with its stability, high growth rate and high rate of investment. Moreover, the notion of a "split state" whose two parts are linked by a road/rail connection that crosses Israeli territory has never seemed particularly conducive to long-term cohesion. 

Rather, the absence of the Gaza Strip from a Palestinian state is deemed by Palestinians to render the latter non-viable because it tears at the fabric of the 20-year old Palestinian narrative that forms the foundation of a two-state solution: a state encompassing the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 22-23 percent of Mandatory Palestine. Cripple this narrative by removing Gaza and there is nothing left to negotiate. This explains why any agreement reached in the near term between Israel and the PLO will specify a series of territorial and security understandings to be applied to Gaza and the Gaza-West Bank land-link once Gaza returns to the fold and is reunited politically with the West Bank.

Returning to Israeli notions of Palestinian state viability, it would appear that there is only one viability "condition" that Israel can legitimately specify: that no security threats to Israel or Israelis emanate from the territory of the Palestinian state. As noted by the Israeli security authority at the INSS conference, at present the authorities in both the West Bank and Gaza are moving toward satisfying this criterion. 

That this implies a state that maintains internal law and order goes without saying. But that addendum can hardly constitute an Israeli pre-condition. Israel itself, we must note with regret, can no longer be said to fully control law and order among all its citizens in the West Bank.