Q. How do you explain recent polls that show a drop in Israeli public support for disengagement?

A. The polls are not consistent: some show a drop to around 50 percent support, others a steady 60 percent or so, and some a drop that has since rebounded to the 60 percent figure. Still, at a minimum the fluctuations reflect two facts. First, support is no longer 70 percent or more, which characterized the early days of the disengagement plan, preceding the escalation of opposition tactics by the opponents of disengagement. And secondly, majority support for disengagement is no longer a foregone conclusion.

The factors involved in this relative decline appear to be numerous and complex. One, alluded to above, is the settlers' campaign, which is massive and populist in nature, and is taking place in the absence of any significant publicity campaign by the government or non-governmental disengagement advocates.

The settlers are a dynamic, well-funded and highly motivated minority who confront an essentially non-activist majority. The most obvious example of settler success thus far is the proliferation of orange ribbons (orange is the settlers' adopted color) tied to automobile antennas. My own informal survey in the Tel Aviv area indicates that no more than five percent of cars are so adorned. Yet disengagement advocates are sufficiently concerned that they are mounting a counter-campaign, which has thus far not gotten off the ground among the majority, to tie blue ribbons to antennae, thereby signaling support for disengagement.

While alternative settler protest tactics, such as blocking major highways at rush hour, appear to have alienated the public, the overall effect of the settlers' campaign has apparently been to arouse the sympathy, or perhaps just the admiration, of a certain part of the public that is less than fully committed to disengagement and "tests the wind" prior to "voting" in a poll.

A parallel factor is the total absence of a pro-disengagement campaign by PM Sharon and his government. Indeed, Sharon has never directly addressed the nation and provided a detailed defense of disengagement. Many speculate that, because this would oblige him to articulate the demographic argument in more than a passing sentence, thereby calling into question the entire settlement campaign that Sharon himself championed over the past 30 years, he suffices with occasional references to "changing international circumstances" and "improved security", neither of which is a very persuasive rationale for disengagement.

Indeed, in recent weeks, in an effort to shore up support within his own Likud Party, Sharon has repeatedly used right wing rhetoric regarding settlement construction in the Jerusalem area, the Jordan Valley and the settlement blocs. While the implication--that this is the first and last disengagement--is designed to attract skeptical right wingers to the Gaza plan, the overall thrust of this rhetoric could prove confusing for some potential supporters of disengagement from Gaza.

Sharon's entreaties to his own party faithful reflect a broader trend that is probably alienating some disengagement supporters. Barely a third of the Likud roster of 40 MKs supports the prime minister, who is regularly losing Knesset votes (though not by an absolute majority, which could bring down his government) on key political issues. Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, in an obvious appeal to his party's hardliners, has indicated he will vote against disengagement in the next Cabinet vote. While this is no more than a symbolic gesture--Sharon now enjoys a comfortable Cabinet majority--it takes place against a backdrop of persistent rumors that Netanyahu, together with fellow disengagement skeptics Limor Livnat (education) and Sylvan Shalom (foreign affairs) will resign, precipitating a government crisis on the eve of the actual disengagement operation in mid-August. The political scene is already abuzz with talk, fueled by the June 28 Labor Party primaries, about elections that will almost certainly follow disengagement. This overall atmosphere of uncertainty and loss of stability almost certainly affects public support for the ruling coalition's sole raison d'etre, disengagement.

Yet another factor of influence on public attitudes is the impression that the logistics preparations for disengagement are faltering, i.e., that alternative housing, jobs, and schools will not be ready to absorb the Gaza settlers. This is not surprising, given the broad lack of cooperation with resettlement efforts on the part of the majority of the settlers. The government's growing unease over this issue was reflected in a letter sent to the relevant ministries and leaked last week to the press, in which Giora Eiland, head of the National Security Council, expressed frustration with the state of preparations, opined that part of the problem was media spin, and warned against the impression of "bardak" (a slang term meaning "a mess"; the original Russian term designates a whorehouse!) in the public eye. Logically, if the public fears the government is not up to the task of resettlement, then that portion of it that sympathizes with the settlers' plight at the human level might withdraw its support for the project.

Additional factors, such as the government's decision to delay the disengagement by three weeks, reservations and apocalyptic predictions expressed by departing IDF Chief of Staff Yaalon and other former security figures, and the occasional impression that the IDF and the Israel Police are also faltering in their operational preparations, have also undoubtedly contributed to public reservations. To counter these trends the government has begun to go public with its preparations, for example displaying the ample trailer homes being set up as temporary settler housing. And public figures have spoken out to reassure the public: recently retired Shabak (General Security Service) head Avi Dichter negating the apocalyptic theories in a series of interviews, newly installed IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz radiating confidence and issuing a sharp warning to hard line rabbis in his first press conference, and even a former chief rabbi pronouncing against refusal by religious soldiers to obey disengagement orders.

Extrapolating from all these developments, the only real threat to disengagement at this point is probably political, i.e., a government collapse, triggered by key Likud ministers like Netanyahu, and reflected in a sharp drop in public support, well below the 50 percent mark. Sharon would then be in a political situation similar to that of Ehud Barak when he went to Camp David in July 2000 on behalf of what had become a minority government due to right wing defections. Sharon, who obviously does not want to risk ending his political career this way, might then conceivably opt to "delay" disengagement pending new elections--at which point all bets are off. This is still not a probable scenario. But it now appears at least to be possible.

Q. The debate among Israelis over the true size of the Palestinian population isn't going away. Where is it leading?

A. The debate, we recall, broke out in January when an American-Israeli research team, the ABC Demographic Project, none of whose members are demographers and all of whom lean toward the political right, declared that the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistic's figure of 3.8 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza was patently false and reflected political considerations, and that the real figure was a mere 2.4 million. The low figure was recruited to argue against demographic rationales for disengaging from territories and dismantling settlements. (For a discussion and analysis of the low figure, see the January 24 APN Q & A.)

The ensuing discussion of the demographic issue in Israel has provided fodder for numerous seminars as well as at least one Knesset committee meeting. A number of prominent demographers and other researchers have endorsed figures ranging from 2.8 to 3.3 million. Even the Palestinian CBS has lowered its figure to 3.6 million (corrected to 2004). Israel's foremost academic expert, Hebrew University Professor Sergio de la Pergola, who previously endorsed the Palestinian CBS figures, has more recently settled on the figure of 3.3 million.

Apparently the ABC calculations, however inaccurate, unprofessional and political, did have the beneficial effect of encouraging all parties to reexamine the premises of their calculations. Thus even Palestinian CBS President Louis Shabana had to acknowledge that fewer Palestinians abroad had returned to live in Palestine than expected, while many new emigres had left, thus explaining his own decision to subtract 200,000 from the official Palestinian figure.

Beyond this renewed debate lies the more important question: so what? How does this affect the real demographic argument? De la Pergola argues that even if the ABC estimate is right and there are only 2.4 million Palestinians in the territories today, this merely delays the moment of parity between Jews and Arabs in the lands between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean (factoring in the Israeli Palestinian population, including East Jerusalem) from 2010 to 2020.

Indeed, this is an appropriate opportunity to ask why that mythological moment of parity is so important. Can a population that is 55 or even 60 percent Jewish, ruling directly or indirectly over 40 or 45 percent Arabs, enable Israel to remain Jewish and democratic? Can "minority" and autonomous rights be offered to nearly half the population in a stable country?

In other words, even if the ABC survey were accurate, Israel is already in a demographic vicious circle. It can only be broken by withdrawing from most of the West Bank in addition to Gaza, transferring the Arab-populated quarters of Jerusalem to Palestinian rule, and radically altering the socio-economic status of Israel's own Arab population.