3/5/08

The coming days will show whether the IDF activity in the Gaza Strip has achieved anything. In other words, will there be any decrease in the rocket fire, either because the other side has "learned a lesson" from Operation Hot Winter, as Israel would like to believe, or because of Hamas's interests. The larger goals were certainly not achieved by this activity, and cannot actually be achieved by such a limited operation.

Hamas's firepower and weaponry were not destroyed. Their activation now depends solely on the will and considerations of the organization-not only has Hamas's hold on the Gaza Strip not been weakened by the Israeli operation, it has actually been strengthened. Anyone who was counting on the fact that the massive attacks would lead to an uprising against Hamas, perhaps to the point of toppling it, was dreaming, even if these were officials in Jerusalem. These attacks increased support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, the IDF offensive also broadened Hamas's influence to the West Bank, where it enjoyed the benefit of solidarity, which was expressed in a general strike that was staged at its instructions, and a mini-Intifada, which is liable to develop further under its instigation. Hamas scored points in the West Bank versus its rival, the Palestinian Authority, which was pushed into a corner and was forced to announce that it was stopping the talks with Israel. One might wonder what this means regarding Hamas's chances of taking control of the West Bank in the future.

It is no wonder, then, that Hamas is celebrating a victory, despite the destruction and the losses it suffered. It has greater staying power than we do, and it too, like Hizbullah, does not need a real victory in order to celebrate. It does not count its fatalities, it counts rockets that hit Israel, and it measures the support for itself in Gaza and the West Bank versus the stress and hysteria in Sderot and Ashkelon.

This "victory" also helps it lower the flames, as it appears at the time of writing these lines yesterday, and may later help in achieving a cease-fire agreement. Does it already ensure quiet without an agreement at the present stage? This is very doubtful. The fire, even though at a decreased rate, continued yesterday and will continue even if Hamas instructs its men to hold their fire. There will always be people who will not accept its authority and will continue to fire. Will Israel restrain itself and not respond? Perhaps up to a certain limit. And if and when it responds, the sides may be caught up again in a lethal maelstrom of fire-response-fire on a large scale.

So what is the solution? One solution, which is my opinion is completely wrong and also foolish and dangerous, is to reoccupy the Gaza Strip and clean it up. I hope that even those who favor this solution-in the political and security establishment and the IDF-do not think for a moment that the army should return to permanent control and presence in the Gaza Strip. If so, what good have they done? For the minute we leave there, everything will return to its previous state.

The other, more realistic solution, although not without its own problems, is a dialogue and agreement with Hamas for a long-term cease-fire. What is known as an "ongoing temporary arrangement." Hamas's consent to this, from its own considerations, would be a real achievement for Operation Hot Winter. There are indications that it consents.

Such an agreement may not hold up, and even if it does, it is reasonable to assume that Hamas will take advantage of this respite to build up its military strength. But Israel can also complete its defense system against Kassam rockets in this time. Indeed, it would be a limited achievement, a poor man's joy, based on the discouraging assumption that we are fated to a permanent exchange of fire with Hamas in the south, and the goal is only to obtain protection against its fire. But this is still better than nothing. It is certainly better than a large-scale ground operation, which will both cost many casualties and has very low chances of achieving the goal of toppling Hamas, which people are trying to pin on it. We have already learned in Lebanon, the hard way, that we cannot enthrone anyone by means of our bayonets.

To talk now, before we get entangled and sink into the mud-that is the way.