Q. Why is National Security Adviser Ilan Mizrachi resigning?

A. Mizrachi's resignation, which comes a mere 18 months after he took up the national security position, takes effect in early November. At the official level, Mizrachi offered the media the usual platitudes: he "feels he has completed the tasks he set out for himself at the National Security Council", and after nearly three decades of security service (he is a former deputy head of the Mossad) he "wants to devote more time to his family".

Behind the scenes, colleagues in the Prime Minister's Office related that Mizrachi was unhappy with his inability to upgrade the NSC in the national security pecking order and to exercise more influence over national security decision-making. There is nothing new in these complaints: all of Mizrachi's distinguished predecessors resigned under similar circumstances, for similar reasons and after similarly short terms of office (David Ivri--who established the post--March 1999-January 2000; Uzi Dayan, September 2000-September 2002; Ephraim HaLevi, September 2002-August 2003; Giora Eyland, January 2004-June 2006).

Mizrachi's resignation comes in the wake of the Winograd commission's recommendations to improve the government of Israel's national security decision-making capabilities by, among other steps, upgrading the NSC, which is directly under the prime minister. Ehud Olmert, in rebuffing demands that he step down based on the commission's criticism of his performance during the July-August 2006 war in the north, has made considerable efforts to implement those recommendations, if only to justify his insistence that he should remain in office in order to correct the deficiencies spotlighted by Winograd. Accordingly, Olmert points with pride to new in-depth security cabinet briefings, tighter controls on leaks to the press and expanded discussions of security options (for operations like the IAF attack at Deir a-Zour in northeast Syria a month ago) that he has instituted.

The primary problem all the NSC chiefs have experienced is operationalizing the "primus inter pares" role envisioned by the Knesset for the NSC vis-a-vis the IDF and the other security services. The IDF chief of staff and the heads of the Mossad, General Security Service and Atomic Energy Commission all continue to insist on working directly with the prime minister and defense minister and minimizing the NSC as an intelligence and policy coordinating body that would reduce the IDF's primacy in presenting options, create more balance and give the prime minister more independence in national security decision-making. At no point throughout the eight years of the NSC's existence has the prime minister been both willing and able to confront the security chiefs and promote the NSC and its chief to their designated role, despite the recommendation of commissions of inquiry going back to the 1960s.

Mizrachi's resignation apparently reflects a degree of continuity in this lacuna--unless, of course, Olmert has in mind appointing someone else to an upgraded NSC post. But that would require a decision-making capacity in the realm of national security affairs that Olmert does not appear to have. As Mizrachi put it, in a kind of throw-away, left-handed complement that no NSC chief should be called on to offer, the prime minister's "decision-making ability is good and [he] knows how to distinguish between the important and the unimportant".

Q. Looking back at the intra-Palestinian violence from June and the resulting schism in Palestinian politics, how stable is the current status quo: Abbas/Fayyad rule over the West Bank and Hamas' rule over Gaza? How does this dynamic influence the ongoing negotiations with Israel?

A. There is no easy answer to these questions. On the one hand, the outcome of the current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and beyond them of the Annapolis conference now tentatively scheduled for late November could directly affect West Bank stability and Hamas' chances for taking over there, too. Ostensibly, a successful conference and launching of a peace process would strengthen President Mahmoud Abbas and Fateh, both in the West Bank and in Gaza; a failed conference would strengthen Hamas and endanger Abbas' rule in the West Bank.

Unless, of course, Abbas were perceived to have caved in to Israeli negotiating demands, in which case his "success" could be rejected by the Palestinian public. Conversely, were the conference to "fail" because of Palestinian insistence on core positions regarding, for example, refugees and Jerusalem, this might bolster Abbas' prestige, at least in the short term.

Finally, were the pre-Annapolis negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian teams that begin officially today to go up in smoke and be broken off tomorrow, this could also affect the stability of the Abbas/Fayyad government in Ramallah, in the sense that without a "political horizon" the current PA government in the West Bank might be hard put to maintain public support.

One thing is clear. At present, Abbas' rule in the West Bank is to a large extent dependent on the IDF. Without Israeli security support, Abbas and the Fayyad government would be endangered by Hamas elements in the West Bank. This is a reflection of the sad fact that, thus far, efforts to reconstitute Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank on a firm footing, which began in earnest after PA/Fateh forces in Gaza were defeated by Hamas last June, have been less than successful.

In stark contrast with the West Bank situation, were Israel to launch a major military offensive into the Gaza Strip to stop the rocket-firing and armed buildup there, the most extreme objective imaginable would be to destroy the Hamas regime. In view of the IDF and Palestinian civilian losses this would entail, this is not a likely prospect. On the contrary, there are growing public pressures in Israel for the Olmert government to move toward greater interaction with Hamas in Gaza, in particular to more energetically negotiate a prisoner exchange and secure the release of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit, but also to discuss a ceasefire.

These pressures are currently being rebuffed or ignored by Olmert, lest more active contacts with Hamas undermine his fragile pre-Annapolis negotiations with Abbas. By the same token, Israel is withholding its response to yesterday's Grad/Katyusha rocket (20 km range) fired from Gaza at Netivot. As with other recent rocket and mortar attacks, Olmert apparently hopes to avoid an armed escalation that could torpedo the Annapolis meeting--which is presumably Hamas' objective in permitting the attacks.

Conceivably, Abbas' and Fateh's political and even physical future rests on the outcome of the Annapolis initiative--particularly if the effort to reconstitute Fateh-based PA security forces in the West Bank continues to lag. While institution-building in the West Bank may require a political horizon, the reverse is definitely true: the Annapolis conference project will be at best meaningless and at worst destructive of Israeli and American interests unless Abbas enjoys the means and the skills to exercise his authority toward achieving constructive goals.

What do Palestinians on the street think about these interlocking issues? Palestinian opinion polling seemingly reflects too many contradictory views to be of much use in predicting the public's response to the diverse scenarios regarding Annapolis. Generally speaking, Abbas and his negotiating readiness get high marks from the Palestinian public. Yet that same public rejects the concessions he would have to make regarding the right of return and Jerusalem in order to reach an agreement (see for example last month's JMCC poll).

A poll conducted among Gazans at the end of September is equally confusing. According to NEC's Gaza Monitoring Survey, Gazans are more concerned about the collapsing economy than their physical security. They support the Hamas government yet prefer the policies of the Ramallah-based Salam Fayyad government. They would vote for Abbas and Fayyad, yet favor Hamas' hardline positions regarding Israel. The NEC poll, incidentally, is the only Palestinian poll conducted by phone, thereby conceivably skewing the results in favor of more economically well-off, hence possibly more moderate Gazans (only 50 percent of Palestinians have land lines).

Finally, in reviewing the options of the split Palestinian leadership in a variety of post-Annapolis scenarios, we must also keep in mind that the current situation--Fateh ruling the West Bank, Hamas ruling Gaza--represents for most Palestinians an anomaly. The norm is unity. Anything less than a spectacular success at Annapolis might well propel Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh back together again, in some sort of new unity government.