Q. President Bush and Secretary of State Rice are organizing an international meeting in Washington in November to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. What is that meeting likely to look like?

A. The idea of the meeting was broached two weeks ago in remarks by President Bush. More recently, Secretary of State Rice has been in the region discussing it with Israeli and Arab leaders. In trying at this early date to assess the likely form and content of the meeting, a number of issues stand out.

First, the broad strategic backdrop. In seven years, the Bush administration has devoted little beyond rhetoric to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while getting deeply immersed in seemingly un-winnable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and in fostering abortive Arab democratization programs. This latest initiative appears to be part of an attempt to take a more comprehensive approach to the heavy Middle East issues on Bush's agenda, in the sense that a demonstration of progress on the Israel-Arab front is deemed vital by Washington to its effort to maintain broad Arab support or at least tolerance for its policies in Iraq and vis-a-vis Iran. The administration's recent initiative to sell or deliver large quantities of sophisticated weapons to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others is also linked in this context to the international meeting idea.

A second key issue with regard to the November meeting is the identity of the participants--two in particular. Will the Saudis (and additional Arab emirates) attend alongside Egypt, Jordan and of course the Palestinians? And will Syria be invited? Rice appeared last week to have coaxed a qualified "yes" from the Saudi foreign minister, while for the moment no one is talking about a Syrian role. Obviously, Saudi participation would reflect not only progress in Israel-Arab peace efforts in general--and particularly in implementing the Arab peace initiative--but also American success in integrating the diverse Middle East conflict scenarios in which it is involved.

Third, and ultimately of the greatest importance: what substantive issues will Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas put before the meeting? Will they, by November, have completed an outline set of principles for Israeli-Palestinian peace, overcoming the many obstacles encountered at Camp David in 2000? Or will they suffice with something less ambitious, as Olmert reportedly prefers: an outline for an interim agreement that avoids discussion of final borders and "existential" issues like Jerusalem and refugees? And will their current efforts at stabilization and confidence-building have borne fruit by then? Rice, who has promised a "substantial and meaningful" meeting, will almost certainly postpone it if the current preparatory stage falls short of her expectations.

Finally, where are the spoilers? Hamas, for one, will likely seek to sabotage any progress registered by Olmert and Abbas, probably through new acts of terrorism. At a minimum, Hamas' leaders will make clear that Abbas does not represent half the citizens of Palestine (Hamas voters) as well as a defined portion of its territory (the Gaza Strip). Moreover Iran, Hezbollah and (if not integrated into a peace process) Syria can be counted on to try to prevent an Arab-Israel breakthrough with all it symbolizes for America's regional position and its alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab states. From this standpoint, the re-launching of Israel-Syria peace negotiations could go a long way toward ensuring a successful peace conference in Washington in November.

Then too, there is Olmert's domestic political situation. The timing of the international meeting appears to coincide more or less with the anticipated publication of the Winograd commission's final report. It could boost Olmert's standing with the Israeli public at a time when he is once again coming under criticism for mismanaging last summer's war in Lebanon. On the other hand, some of Olmert's coalition partners--from Ehud Barak on the left to Avigdor Lieberman and Shas on the right-are almost certain to take exception to aspects of the agreement he hopes to reach with Abbas.

Indeed, in the course of the coming months both Olmert and Abbas will be caught between conflicting pressures. They are weak leaders who have to make the necessary concessions to succeed, but without alienating their existing and future political partners.

Q. Why did Minister of Defense Barak lament last week that the IDF had become "an army of only half the people" and express concern lest combat troops feel like "suckers" for serving?

A. The sad truth is that there is virtually nothing new in the saga of Israeli youth avoiding compulsory military service. Nor, despite Barak's pronouncement and additional comments by IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, is the political establishment likely to do anything about the problem even as it slowly gets worse. The issue is political and religious--not social or economic.

The current spate of soul-searching regarding the commitment of Israel's youth to defend their country began a few weeks ago when the IDF announced that, with the August cohort of inductees (traditionally a quality draft of fresh high school graduates), Israel had reached a point where fully 25 percent of eligible male conscripts would not be called up. The "revelation" launched a media frenzy over the ostensibly dropping motivation of youth to serve that culminated in Barak's statement.

But the dry statistics reveal a reality that is at once reassuring and alarming. The small percentages of 18 year olds who are currently abroad, have criminal records or are not healthy enough to be drafted have not changed over the years. Over the past 17 years, those excused by the army as "unsuitable" have grown from four to five percent of the total. If anyone is looking for eligible young men who might have invented psychological problems in order to avoid serving, this is the sector they should examine. True, it has grown by 25 percent. But in fact, in recent years the IDF has itself chosen to refuse to draft borderline psychological cases rather than risk having to treat their problems or, God forbid, to arm potentially suicidal soldiers.

How, then, did the numbers not signing up rise from 12.1 percent in 1980 to 25 percent today? Mainly because the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) youth who cite their yeshiva studies as legal cause for not serving have increased from 3.7 to 11 percent of the total during this period. There is nothing new here: everyone is aware of the Haredi sector's awesome demographic growth rate. Everyone knows that a Knesset majority made up primarily of secular MKs passed the "Tal law" five years ago and renewed it a few weeks ago, effectively enabling masses of Haredi youth to continue to avoid service as long as they are affiliated with a yeshiva.

This is where the hypocrisy of both the politicians and even the army reaches new heights. It was none other than Ehud Barak who as prime minister appointed the Tal commission that produced the Tal law. Kadima, Likud and Labor compete among themselves to coddle the Haredi parties (one of which, Shas, is in the current coalition) with budgets for their education system that produces generations of draft-dodgers. And it was instructive to hear the IDF general in charge of manpower, Elazar Stern, an Orthodox Jew, berate those who refuse to serve when in fact Orthodox yeshiva students serve in combat units for only about half as long as their secular brothers, and when Orthodox women are given a blanket exemption from service (some do a year of civilian service as teachers).

True, an increasing but still small number of secular youth excused from service have become entertainment celebrities, thereby projecting a negative example for Israel's youth. And true, the secular political and social elite coddle these youth, invite them to perform at official functions and do nothing to constrain their celebrity status. But quantitatively this is a minor problem. Within a decade, fully half of the babies in Israel will be either Haredim or Arabs. Wait 18 more years, and you really have an army of only "half the people".