Major General (ret.) Shlomo Gazit served for 33 years in the Israel Defense Forces. Following the Six Day War, Gazit served as Coordinator of Israeli Government Operations in the Administered Territories. In this capacity, he was the first Israeli ruler of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He later served as the head of IDF Military Intelligence.

General Gazit has written extensively on Israeli and Middle Eastern military affairs, including a book, "Trapped", which reviews Israel's administration of the West Bank and Gaza.

Let Us Not Miss the Opportunity that the War Created

Fifty-nine years ago, when David Ben-Gurion declared the creation of the state of Israel, we were thrown into a tough and vicious war for our very existence. Today we mark 40 year to the Six Day War. In almost sixty years of existence, living through many wars and hardly any substantial period of calm and quiet, these two wars are the chief milestones in the history of Israel.

The War of Independence made possible the creation of Israel. Paying a heavy price in human life and economic devastation, Israel successfully fought to thwart the Arab attempt to implement the United Nations' November 29 resolution. The Six-Day War prepared the ground to an Arab acceptance of Israel's existence and of the need to reach political agreements with it.

Israel's phenomenal sweeping victory of June 1967 is often discussed. In the course of six days of fighting, Israel defeated the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, occupied the Sinai Peninsula, all of mandatory Palestine and the Syrian Golan Heights. Historically, no less important were the three weeks of Israel's anxious waiting, before the decision was taken in Jerusalem to start the war. These were three weeks that prepared the political ground for the war itself. They also prepared the international ground for Israel's post-war demand to hold on to the territories it occupied during the war as a bargaining chip for negotiating peace accords with its neighbors. This international political backing was what contributed to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, the resolution that talks about an Israeli withdrawal from "territories" it occupied, not from "all the territories" it occupied.

On 19 June 1967, ten days after the fighting ended, the Israeli government passed a decision, which it communicated to Cairo and Damascus, proposing a return to the political borders of Palestine in return for full peace agreements. Egypt and Syria rejected this appeal and responded, at the Khartoum Arab League Summit of September 1967: No peace, no recognition and no negotiations with Israel.

Nevertheless, ten years later and for years after the Yom Kippur war, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem and declared, "No more war!" Then and there began the process of recognizing Israel and reconciling with it.

In order for the Arab states to recognize Israel and reconcile with its existence, for them to swallow what they consider an extremely bitter pill, three conditions had to be fulfilled: a complete conviction on their part that they cannot militarily destroy Israel, a recognition that the international community is not willing to serve the Arab interest and force Israel to withdraw, and a dimension of urgency prodding every Arab state - for its own considerations - to reconcile with achieving a political settlement with Israel rather than postponing the solution to an unforeseeable future.

First was Egypt. The Yom Kippur War, for which Egypt had been preparing for over six years and which started with a complete military surprise, was concluded with Israeli forces situated only a hundred kilometers from Cairo, deep in Egyptian territory, surrounding Egypt's Third Army, one half of the Egyptian land force. For the following four years, Egypt has been attempting to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States, to erode America's political backing for Israel, to no avail. Then, the Egyptian regime faced a set of harsh socio-economic pressures, which pushed President Sadat to find an immediate solution, even if that meant recognition and reconciliation with Israel.

Second was Jordan, which had gone through a similar military, political and domestic process. Jordan, however, could not have publicly stricken a peace agreement with Israel. It had to wait for the Oslo Agreements to receive the Palestinian stamp of approval it needed.

Third was the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Thirty years of fighting brought a resounding failure for the PLO in the territories held by Israel, in the bloody 1970 "Black September" confrontation in Jordan and later in the Lebanon War, which led to the deportation of the PLO to Tunis. The fatigue that followed the first intifada and the political isolation that followed the first Gulf War paved the way to the Oslo talks and subsequently to the Oslo Agreements.

And now we see the Syrian president Bashar Assad facing similar processes in his country. Facing an ongoing political and military standoff with Israel, as well as a severe political, economic and social distress, Assad is persistently calling on Israel to come to the negotiating table.

That's what we see on the Arab side. Alas, it takes two to tango. This process cannot proceed without full participation from the Israeli side. The Israeli public is tired of wars and is striving for a political solution. Israelis aspire to achieve a two-state solution and they know that the price they will have to pay for it includes leaving the Golan Heights, evacuating most of the settlements in the West Bank. Further, Israelis know that the adequate permanent border will follow the historic "green lines," and it is ready to accept such borders.

Not ready, however, is the Israeli political system. A weak, instable coalition-government, squeezed by domestic partners and fearful of political opposition, is hindering Jerusalem's ability to take the necessary decisions.

Forty years after that war, the conditions are now ripe for obtaining an Arab recognition and reconciliation with Israel's existence. It will be tragic and painful if Israel would be the one that is not ready and not ripe for turning the accomplishments of the war into political achievements. More confrontations and more sacrifices - in human life, in political and economic terms would be required - before the accomplishments of that war could be fully exhausted.