Q. PM Ehud Olmert delivered what was billed as a major policy speech on the Palestinian issue at Sde Boker on November 27. But was there anything really new here?

A. My initial inclination was to view the speech as yet another weekly "hype" on the part of Olmert's PR people, following upon his earlier, much ballyhooed plans to rebuild the North, then the South, then reform the structure of the government, then invade Gaza, etc., etc.--all projects that never reached fruition and were seen as designed to maintain the vestiges of public support for a failed prime minister. In the case of his Sde Boker speech, Olmert clearly had a second motive that was also less than substantive: signaling President Bush, who was visiting neighboring Jordan without dropping by in Jerusalem, that the government of Israel had an "agenda" and should not be ignored.

Why, I asked myself, would Olmert present a fairly elaborate vision of peace on the basis of a two-day old ceasefire that was delivered by the Palestinians without any prior negotiation, that was still punctuated by Qassam launchings from Gaza, and when his potential Palestinian partner, President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was abandoning attempts to form the unity government without which there was no chance at all for any kind of renewed negotiations? I was reminded of the time, two weeks into last summer's war in Lebanon, when Olmert delivered a victory speech in the Knesset--only to be greeted the next day by a record 240 katyushas hitting the Galilee.

Then I heard from reliable sources that Olmert himself had written the speech, against the wisdom of his spin-masters, that FM Tzipi Livni had contributed to it, and that Abu Mazen praised the speech. And I read an op-ed in the Jordanian al-Ra'i daily by Fahd al-Fanek, a very senior commentator who is usually critical of the Hashemite regime's close relations with Israel, which he himself refuses to visit. Fanek, to my surprise, judged that Olmert's "peace initiative" was not far from the March 2002 Beirut Arab summit initiative (the Saudi peace initiative), and that "the gap between the two sides is not that great."

I concluded that, beyond the cynicism inspired by Olmert's overall political behavior, and given that his vision has little chance to reach fruition under current circumstances, his Sde Boker speech merits a closer look. The prime minister really was perceived in parts of the Arab world as trying to lay out a feasible and innovative plan for future progress. At a minimum, his speech--with its invocation of David Ben Gurion's historic decision to prefer a Jewish state in only part of the Land of Israel over holding all of the land but ending up with a bi-national state--has returned his government to its original rationale of withdrawing from additional territory for demographic reasons, after the shock of this summer's war. And in a best case scenario it could bespeak some substantive progress, if not with the Palestinians then with the Arab world-at-large.

Indeed, Olmert places heavy emphasis in his speech on the possibility of closer Israeli-moderate Arab collaboration: "We will seek the assistance of . . . Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. . . to benefit from their experience and receive backing for direct negotiations." Abandoning the cynicism of his predecessor, Ariel Sharon, and acceding to the encouragement of ministers like Meir Sheetrit, Olmert even praised "some parts of the Saudi peace initiative". Here Olmert is wisely seeking to position Israel to enter into closer regional cooperation against Iran and its hegemonic aspirations by showing the Saudis and others that he is trying to provide what he knows they require as a precondition for working with Israel: progress with the Palestinians.

But Olmert's speech also offers the Palestinians a more nuanced version of the road to peace. They have not only to stop the terrorism and violence and establish a new government that accepts the principles of the Quartet, but also to "relinquish your demand for the realization of the right of return". In return Olmert offers, first, greater freedom of movement of people and goods and the release of Palestinian funds, then, once Gilad Shalit is released, the release of "numerous Palestinian prisoners--including ones who were sentenced to lengthy prison terms". Finally, he promises "an independent and viable Palestinian state, with territorial contiguity in Judea and Samaria--a state with full sovereignty and defined borders" that is created by Israeli agreement "to the evacuation of many territories and communities".

Olmert is, for the first time, offering to release Palestinian prisoners with Jewish blood on their hands (the only explanation for invoking the term "lengthy prison terms"). This is a major incentive for Palestinians. He is also offering what appears to be a final status state ("territorial contiguity. . . full sovereignty and defined borders") rather than an interim agreement or state with provisional borders (phase II of the roadmap), which Palestinians treat with great suspicion.

In return, and in order to reassure suspicious Israelis, he insists that the Palestinians in effect abandon the right of return of 1948 refugees to Israel and that they do so at the start of a peace process rather than at its conclusion. Here he is incorporating what is perhaps the major substantive conclusion drawn by many Israelis from the failure of the Oslo process: that Palestinian insistence on the right of return harbors a long-term strategic desire to "Palestinize" Israel and a refusal to accept it as a Jewish state. On the other hand, in an apparent gesture to Palestinians, he indirectly acknowledges the ethos behind the right of return by calling only for abandoning "realization" of that right.

Whether Olmert's Sde Boker speech can succeed in establishing new terms of reference for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations remains to be seen. There are at present no such negotiations on the horizon; in this sense, his speech might have been premature and his timing ill-advised. On the other hand, he may have been right in identifying the ceasefire, problematic as it is, as a rare opportunity to put his government back on track.

Q. How can Israel help the Siniora government in Lebanon survive?

A. Based on Lebanese government demands, Israeli willingness to accede to Lebanese government demands, declare the contentious Shebaa Farms to be Lebanese (rather than Syrian) territory, back out of the part of Ghajar village that lies in Lebanese territory and cease intelligence-gathering over-flights in Lebanese airspace, would ostensibly serve to boost the prestige and authority of the beleagured Siniora government.

In reality the situation is far more complex. The Lebanese government's detractors, led by Hizballah and the camp of pro-Syrian Maronite General Michel Aoun, want to achieve veto power over its decisions in order to prevent the creation and functioning of an international tribunal that is likely to accuse the Asad government in Syria of assassinating former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. This has nothing to do with Israeli-Lebanese border problems and is only tangentially related to Syria's arms smuggling to Hizballah-the rationale for the IAF's over-flights.

Moreover, Israeli gestures such as those demanded on the border and in the air, if made without careful choreographing, could easily be "claimed" by Hizballah as fruits of its war on Israel this summer ("the Zionists understand only force"), thereby further weakening the Siniora government rather than strengthening it. Note that Hizballah already excoriates Siniora as "Israel's prime minister".

The answer, according to knowledgeable and moderate Lebanese, appears to lie with the Lebanese Army. The army has functioned surprising well in the post-war era, maintaining its unity and professionalism even as it deployed along Lebanon's borders with Israel and Syria, cooperated with UNIFIL and, here and there, directly confronted Hizballah. Anything accomplished by the army vis-a-vis Israel and Hizballah is understood by the public-at-large to strengthen the country in general and the government in particular, and cannot easily be "poached" by Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

The army's predicament is double: it lacks adequate weaponry to do the job assigned it along Lebanon's borders, and it requires a politically-acceptable framework within which to work with Israel on solving mutually-recognized problems. It has discussed its arms needs with the United States government, which is willing to help, but the Lebanese requests are urgent and the US arms supply process slow. Many of the arms needed by the Lebanese army, such as armored patrol vehicles, are defensive and can in no way be construed as potential threats to Israel.

As for a politically-correct means of liaising with Israel and working together against Hizballah, the Siniora government has proposed reviving the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, a UN-sponsored body that effectively ceased functioning decades ago when first Fateh and then Hizballah took over control of Lebanon's border zone with Israel. Israel has in the past balked at the idea, judging it a regressive throwback to the post-1949 era when peace was not an option.

But the Lebanese point out that peace is not an option now, either, and that the demise of the Siniora government would set back peace even further. Revival of the armistice commission, they argue, is one of Siniora's "seven points", proposed during the war, to which Hizballah agreed. Hence cooperation between the IDF and the Lebanese Army would, if channeled through the mixed armistice commission, be understood as a solid Lebanese government achievement to which Hizballah could not object. Meanwhile, the Olmert government decided yesterday to turn the northern part of Ghajar, which lies in Lebanese territory, over to UNIFIL rather than to the Lebanese Army. It is not clear whether or not the Siniora government can exploit this to its advantage.

In view of the severity of the current Lebanese government crisis, the Bush administration might wish to consider ways to accelerate appropriate arms supply to the Lebanese Army. Perhaps the pro-Israel lobby in Washington can be helpful here.