Q. In a week, on November 13, PM Ehud Olmert is scheduled to meet with US President George W. Bush. In anticipation of the visit, Israel is reportedly looking at the possibility of some sort of new peace initiative toward the Palestinians. What is behind this? What might such an initiative entail?

A. The Olmert government is aware that a number of parties are discussing possible peace initiatives, and wants to demonstrate that it, too, is active in this regard, particularly as the meeting with Bush approaches.

One of those parties is the moderate Arab bloc, led by Saudi Arabia. In recent weeks it has been trying to interest the administration in reviving the March 2002 Arab League initiative, perhaps with modifications such as an American-proposed border and a readiness to discuss additional modalities with Israel. Another is Hamas, which in recent weeks has sought to portray its hudna (ceasefire) approach, including in a New York Times op-ed, as a moderate, stabilizing long-term confidence-building measure.

Then, too, the Baker-Hamilton commission appointed by Bush is scheduled to report shortly after this week's interim elections. The commission is expected to focus its recommendations on the Iran and Iraq arenas. But there is speculation that they might deal with Arab-Israel issues as well. For example, based on Baker's remarks to the media it is anticipated that the commission will recommend that the Bush administration open up direct channels of communication with Iran and Syria. This almost certainly presupposes discussion of those country's links to Hamas, the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli peace channel, and the like.

Speculation is also rife in Israel regarding the possibility that Bush will decide he has much to gain and little to lose by devoting his last two years in office to advancing Israeli-Arab peace, including an Israeli-Palestinian solution. One report suggests that the administration might initiate another Madrid-type international peace conference.

On the other hand, many indicators point to the administration's ongoing preoccupation with Iran and Iraq as a heavy enough Middle East agenda for the coming two years. US Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte's recent visit to Israel focused almost entirely on those issues. And then, of course, there is the reality of Bush's conscious avoidance of deep involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the past six years. Hence the suspicion in Israel that, without active administration participation, most of the talk of a peace initiative is groundless.

It is against this mixed backdrop that Olmert reportedly approved the administration's recent requests that Israel allow Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to beef up Fateh forces loyal to him with additional manpower (the Palestine Liberation Army's Badr Brigade from Jordan), weaponry and training. In parallel, the Israel Foreign Ministry allowed that it was examining a broad variety of ways to rejuvenate a peace process. This, despite heavy Israeli doubts regarding Abbas' capacity to grasp control over territory and institutions in Gaza from Hamas, and at a time when an Israeli offensive into the northern Strip has left dozens of Palestinians dead and enabled Hamas to portray its forces as defenders of Palestine.

As the Olmert-Bush meeting approaches, it is fairly certain that Bush will press Olmert to find additional ways to strengthen Abbas' hand against Hamas. Olmert will be ready with new ideas and schemes that ostensibly demonstrate that, having at least temporarily abandoned his unilateral convergence plan for removing West Bank settlements, he nevertheless has a Palestinian "agenda". But how much of this will survive the Washington visit and actually be implemented in the field remains very much in doubt.

Q. In parallel to these preparations for an Olmert-Bush summit, the Israeli Security Cabinet last week reportedly rejected an IDF plan for a major Gaza offensive. Is this also a consequence of the upcoming Washington visit?

A. Only in part. The Security Cabinet's decision of November 1 actually approved IDF plans to prepare forces for a more expansive operation in Gaza "if necessary", thereby implying that the offensive could take place at a later date. We recall that the rationale for such an offensive is the alarmingly high rate of weapons smuggling into Gaza by means of dozens of tunnels dug under the Gaza-Sinai border fence since Israel withdrew over a year ago, and the fear--in the aftermath of this summer's war with a well-armed Hizballah--that allowing the smuggling to continue could cost Israel dearly in the future.

Herein lie some of the Israeli considerations regarding timing. It makes no sense to commence a prolonged operation in Gaza that will almost certainly involve heavy losses and negative global media coverage on the eve of the Olmert visit to Washington. A second immediate consideration is the possibility, hinted at repeatedly last week by Hamas and other Palestinian spokesmen, that a prisoner exchange involving the release of Gilad Shalit will take place soon; an IDF offensive would almost certainly cause the Palestinians to postpone Shalit's release. Already, Palestinian militants are hinting that Israeli attacks in Gaza could "endanger" Shalit in his Palestinian prison.

But there are also weighty considerations that mitigate against a major offensive. For one, this summer's losses in Lebanon are still fresh in the minds and hearts of the Israeli public, thereby rendering it difficult for the Olmert government to contemplate the possible additional heavy losses involved in an operation that reportedly would seek to reoccupy the philadelphi strip and possibly Rafah.

Then too, Egypt's sensitivities have to be taken into account. Cairo reportedly just added several thousand policemen to the 750 elite border patrol troops sent to the Egyptian side of the strip last August. Israel, which has muffled its criticism of Egypt's lackluster performance in stopping the smuggling in the interests of long-term collaboration against militant Islamist terrorism, now has to give the reinforced Egyptian contingent a chance to prove itself before taking matters into its own hands.

Another factor is the IDF's medium-term assessment that war could again break out with Hizballah, and possibly Syria as well, by the summer of 2007.

Finally, there is the political-military cost-benefit calculation. On the one hand, no matter how successful an Israeli anti-smuggling operation, if the IDF withdraws its forces after a brief reoccupation of southern Gaza the tunnels and the smuggling will return. On the other, the Israeli public will insist that any major new IDF operation in Gaza include a fool-proof exit strategy that ensures that Israeli troops do not again become an occupying force there. The possible exception is the philadelphi strip--but only if the public is persuaded of the absolute necessity of the reoccupation, the territory involved is narrow and unpopulated, Israeli losses are kept low and the Egyptians pledge to continue to cooperate across the border.

Meanwhile it is important to watch not only what Israel says about a Gaza offensive, but also what it does. Recent weeks have witnessed a significant escalation of IDF operations in the Strip, beginning with a limited penetration along philadelphi that uncovered and destroyed 15 tunnels, and culminating in the current operation in Beit Hanoun in the north. In this regard, it is entirely possible that the "major offensive" is actually underway and will continue, piecemeal, over the coming weeks. As long as IDF losses are low and the world remains both indifferent to the inevitable Palestinian civilian casualties and accepting of Israel's military requirements in dealing with Hamas, this formula might work.

But either way--stealth offensive now or major "official" offensive later--it is certain that Israel's military operations in Gaza will neither topple the Hamas government there nor, over the long term, stop terrorist attacks on Israelis by Hamas and others. Only a political process can conceivably bring about a genuine ceasefire in Gaza.