Q. Two weeks ago, you looked at the prospective appointment of Yisrael Beteinu party leader Avigdor Lieberman as deputy prime minister and minister for strategic threats. Now that this is a certainty, and with Labor nevertheless opting to remain in the coalition, how will the Olmert government function regarding strategic security issues?

A. Two weeks ago, we discussed Lieberman's record for making dangerous racist threats to use force against Egypt, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians and others, bemoaned PM Ehud Olmert's apparent cynical politicized approach to security issues, and queried whether a strategic security post might not provide Lieberman with the knowledge and even the authority to plunge Israel into deep trouble with its neighbors. Now, Lieberman is indeed about to become minister for strategic threats (a ludicrous, Monty Python-like title, regardless of the ministry's real authority or lack thereof) with the concurrence of Olmert's principal coalition partner, the Labor party.

Labor leader and Minister of Defense Amir Peretz was able to persuade a majority of his party's Central Committee yesterday that Lieberman would be easier to control or even neutralize from inside the government than from beyond. He could argue that the appointment of Ephraim Sneh as deputy defense minister--the principal quid pro quo that Lieberman extracted from PM Ehud Olmert in return for agreeing to the Lieberman appointment--constitutes a bigger contribution to Israel's security than Lieberman's new position. But mainly, the Labor decision to remain in the coalition reflected realpolitik considerations regarding the way voters would see the party in the opposition if it chose to boycott Lieberman, and the usual cynical calculations of serving ministers loath to abandon the perks of power.

It also reflected the sorry state of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the near total lack of near-term prospects for the Olmert government to develop a "Palestinian agenda". With Olmert's unilateral convergence plan shelved in the aftermath of the Lebanon war and the prospects for developing some sort of negotiating process with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) close to nil, Lieberman's hawkish and racist views within the coalition cannot be said to endanger plans for a peace process. This ostensibly gives Labor another rationale for remaining in the government.

How much damage can Lieberman do in his new post? Labor and Kadima officials hastened to offer reassurances that the new minister for strategic threats (meaning, everyone agrees, the Iranian threat) would not be allowed to usurp the authority of the foreign or defense ministries to deal with Iran-related issues or to coopt Mossad head Meir Dagan, who coordinates Israel's effort to counter Iran's nuclear program by virtue of an appointment made by then-prime minister Ariel Sharon. For example, noted a senior Labor security official, Lieberman would not be authorized to consult with IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, who reports to Peretz. Then, too, there were hints in the media that Lieberman's access to highly sensitive intelligence and operational (read: nuclear) data would be restricted.

This last item refers indirectly to concerns apparently expressed to Olmert by the General Security Service (Shabak, or "Shin Bet") with regard to Lieberman's indirect ties with Russian intelligence. Allegedly, many of Lieberman's numerous business contacts in Russia are ex-KGB personnel; there are also concerns that his party, Yisrael Beteinu, with its heavy Russian immigrant electoral base, has been infiltrated by Russian intelligence. (Note that these allegations are in no way intended to question Lieberman's personal loyalty to Israel.) Russia, needless to say, maintains a strong commercial interest in the Iranian nuclear program. The Israel Police, too, have been investigating Lieberman for alleged financial improprieties--an inquiry that has gone on for six years without an outcome but that barred Lieberman from taking up the post of minister of internal security when Olmert formed his government last March.

Yet knowing Lieberman's energy level, and in view of his appointment as deputy prime minister and his close relationship with Olmert, concern has nevertheless been expressed lest he succeed in positioning himself as, in effect, the prime minister's coordinator regarding the Iran issue. This brings the issue back to Olmert. On the one hand, if the prime minister restricts Lieberman's access and authority too much, the latter could resign, thereby upsetting Olmert's coalition calculations. On the other, by appointing first the inexperienced Peretz and now the inexperienced and dangerous Lieberman to security portfolios and by his management of the recent Lebanon war, Olmert has already shown such ignorance of and cynicism about security issues, that anything appears possible.

Q. The debate in the US regarding the future of the American military presence in Iraq is a dominant theme in the current midterm elections. The issue appears likely to be a focus of President Bush's last two years in office. Where do Israel's strategic interests lie with regard to the timing, scope and nature of a US withdrawal from Iraq?

A. Obviously, this issue can only be looked at speculatively for the moment. The situation in and around Iraq is in flux, and Israel's interests could change. Nor will Israel necessarily be able to influence--or be interested in influencing--America's strategic calculations in Iraq. Since the US occupation there, prime ministers Sharon and Olmert have at least publicly avoided expressing any view on this issue, and it is certainly possible that the Israeli leadership will continue to defer to the administration on Iraq-related issues.

Yet such deference may not be wise. Events in Iraq over the past three years have both benefited and harmed Israel, and there is no reason to believe that an American withdrawal will not have similar effects. For the present, Israel's strategic interests would appear to call for the following calculations.

First, the purpose of the American military presence in Iraq, hence the context of any decision to end or reduce it, should be to fight terrorism rather than to support the Bush democratic reform plan in the region. That plan, by empowering militant Islamists in Lebanon and Palestine, has hurt Israel. In Iraq it has empowered militant Islamists as well, and when the US leaves they are likely to form an alliance with Iran that further empowers that country and directly endangers Jordan, Israel's strategic ally.

In this respect, from Israel's standpoint the Shi'ite-dominated nature of the future Iraqi regime (or, if Iraq breaks up, the regime of the southern two-thirds of Iraq) with its heavy reliance on pro-Iranian militia is a negative fait accompli, regardless of the American military presence. Unless--an unlikely option--Washington is prepared to carry out a complete policy reversal and install a friendly strongman in power before it leaves, thereby striking a devastating blow to the Arab democracy advocates the US has cultivated encouraged.

It is of course fair to argue that the US military presence has itself been the main factor in encouraging jihadi terrorists to set up a regional base in Iraq. That contention nevertheless does not detract from the present requirement for Washington to adjust its troop presence in Iraq based on considerations of fighting terrorism rather than building democracy. In this respect, one could of course argue legitimately that the best way for the US to combat terrorism in Iraq is to remove its armed forces.

Secondly, Israel has an interest in avoiding a collapse of the Iraqi state apparatus that would draw neighboring countries into a regional conflagration. Such a development might destabilize the entire region, endanger relatively moderate regimes and benefit militant regimes, particularly Iran and Syria, which are already deeply involved in collaboration with factions in Iraq and have a head start toward exercising influence in the post-US era. If a US withdrawal were deemed likely to precipitate such a development, Israel (as well as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the emirates and Turkey) would presumably counsel against it.

Third, Israel would wish to see a semi-independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq survive the aftermath of an American withdrawal. The Kurds are only the second non-Arab minority in the Arab Middle East (after the Jews in Israel) that has achieved self-determination. This is an important development for Israel's status in the region. It advances the cause of Israel's legitimacy in Arab eyes--a necessary component of a stable peace.

Then, too, regardless of the status of the American occupation force in Iraq, Israel would have an interest in the handful of ostensibly permanent air bases that the US has quietly established on Iraqi soil since 2003. The American interests those bases are presumably positioned to guarantee--access to oil, regional stability, and especially deterrence of Iran and possibly Syria--are shared by Israel.

Presumably, the US will seek guarantees regarding the permanence of the bases from the Iraqi regime it leaves behind as a condition for removing its occupying force. Yet by the same token, Washington would ultimately have to yield to the demand of an unfriendly post-occupation regime in Baghdad to remove the bases. Israeli security planners would want to know whether the American military presence elsewhere in the region--Bahrain, Qatar, the waters of the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan--would be sufficient to ensure its interests with regard to Iran.

Finally, the interests of Israel and other friends of the US in the region are liable to be hurt by a US withdrawal that looks like a defeat and that reflects a strategic decision by Washington to initiate another radical change in its traditional approach to Middle East issues. (Note that Bush's decision to occupy Iraq itself constituted such a radical change, with negative consequences for the region.) One example of such a potential policy reversal could be a collapse of traditional US support for Israel, to the extent of seeking to impose a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict that ignores Israel's interests, presumably on the mistaken assumption that this would end Arab and Islamist hostility to the US. Another might be a sharp reduction in American political involvement in Arab-Israel issues, thereby denying the region the one peace facilitator with a proven record of sufficient clout and occasional acumen to pressure the parties to make reasonable compromises.

Inevitably, the timing and nature of a US withdrawal will be determined primarily by domestic American factors. In any case, as noted, recent Israeli governments have not necessarily always served Israel's interests well in maintaining a pose of quiet support for all of Washington's decisions regarding Iraq and regional democratization. Then, too, any American decision regarding Iraq is likely to have both negative and positive consequences for Israel, just as did the occupation of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein.

Americans interested in encouraging a more dynamic US administration role in Arab-Israel and particularly Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking can justifiably point to the Iraq war as a disastrous distraction. But by the same token, an untimely or ill-conceived American withdrawal could have an equally negative effect on Israel and on the prospects for Arab-Israel peace.