Q. Now that the Olmert government has finally settled on a format for investigating the mistakes of the Lebanon war, how is this likely to affect Israeli public life?

A. Profoundly. During the coming months the public agenda will probably be dominated by the hearings, and then the findings, of the Winograd Committee. The entire process of investigating the war is likely to play itself out in a number of different public contexts.

First, those who campaigned for a state or judicial commission of inquiry appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court will continue to attack the entire process. The main difference between a state commission of inquiry and the Winograd Committee is that the latter was appointed by the prime minister himself and ratified by the Cabinet. Any indication that Winograd is going easy on Olmert or Defense Minister Amir Peretz is likely to be greeted with wide-scale protests. Some will object to any concluding recommendation short of a demand that the two senior leaders accept responsibility and resign.

On the other hand, if Olmert and/or Peretz are asked to resign, or for that matter the moment the proceedings of the investigating committee cast them in a negative light, Israeli politics will be turned on its head. Kadima will be hard put to nominate a successor to Olmert who can keep the party and the government together. Labor is already squabbling over a possible successor to Peretz. If the coalition doesn't hold, the primary candidate to form a new one will probably be Likud's Binyamin Netanyahu, who would have to win back the support of former Likudniks now in Kadima in order to hold a majority. The alternative would be new elections.

Third, even before the Winograd Committee was approved, a "war of the generals" began. Major General Udi Adam, commander of the Northern Command, resigned last week, citing his inability to work with General Staff Headquarters during the war. Former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon gave an extensive interview in Haaretz criticizing his successor, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, and calling for his resignation along with that of Olmert and Peretz. Shaul Mofaz, former chief of staff and defense minister and now transportation minister and a member of Olmert's Kadima Party, also sharply criticized the management of the war in media interviews. Yaalon and Mofaz were undoubtedly anticipating the Winograd Committee's investigation into those roots of the war that lie in the security policies of the past six years, when they themselves were in national security decision-making positions. Channel 10 TV even aired a clip of a senior officer in the Northern Command criticizing another in devastating language during the war.

Fourth, the Winograd Committee's work will be paralleled by that of State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss and a number of internal IDF investigations. While the IDF can be expected to draw and apply lessons at the operative level, only Winograd is likely, if at all, to recommend changes in the senior command. Lindenstrauss, on the other hand, is something of a loose cannon, usually working very quickly and with a hunger for publicity. His findings could yet be used by the Knesset to demand a judicial commission of inquiry.

At a broader national strategic level, the Winograd investigation is likely to confront the Israeli public with both the stark reality of the Iranian threat looming behind Hizballah and the question whether Israel can afford to be led at the highest political level in the years ahead by politicians like Olmert and Peretz who have little or no experience in national security decision-making. In this regard, nothing in Israel's previous wartime leadership experience approximates the current dilemma. PM Levi Eshkol, who was replaced as minister of defense (but not prime minister) by Moshe Dayan in May 1967 because the public had lost confidence in him, had years of exposure to national security issues earlier as minister of finance. PM Golda Meir, who fully admitted her lack of expertise and experience in 1973 and was ultimately blamed by the public, had Dayan as minister of defense (yet he too was blamed). In this regard, the outcome of the Winograd investigation could possibly favor generals-turned-politician like Ehud Barak, Shaul Mofaz, (former General Security Services heads) Avi Dichter and Ami Ayalon, rather than, say, Netanyahu.

Q. The Palestinian Authority appears to be moving toward the establishment of a government of national unity. To what extent might this development facilitate the renewal of a peace process?

A. The Palestinian unity government has not yet been formed. We must be careful not to confuse Palestinian politicians' hype with the real thing. But assuming it does come into existence, a genuine Israeli-Palestinian peace process is doubtful, if only because the requisite leadership strengths and commitment to concessions do not appear to exist.

President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has proven incapable of exercising strong authority to stop violence, and in any case is not likely to concede more on issues like the right of return than did Yasser Arafat in 2000. Hamas, which will continue to share the leadership, is against peace with Israel. Ehud Olmert's leadership status is in jeopardy as a result of the recent war, and his coalition is not built to support a genuine peace process (Shas would defect, as might some Kadima MKs).

And finally, the Bush administration is currently busy with mid-term elections. While there are some indications that it now recognizes the need for an energetic Israeli-Palestinian peace process in order to bolster moderate Arab and European support for its campaign against Iran, it is not at all certain that it would risk its legacy in its last two years in office by sponsoring such a process, particularly in view of the doubtful chances of success and its heavy commitment in Iraq.

Moreover, as currently understood to be contemplated by Abbas and Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, a Palestinian unity government would not be seen by the Olmert government or the Bush administration to have accepted the Quartet's three preconditions for dealing with it. Its draft guidelines reportedly declare that it would "recognize the existing regional political reality", which Hamas would like us to believe ostensibly constitutes de facto recognition of Israel. Nor does it accept all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements as demanded--only those deemed to "serve the Palestinian interest". As for ceasing violence, the third precondition, the guidelines, based on the "prisoners' document", continue to support violence against Israelis in the West Bank.

On the other hand, the unity government is only one aspect of a larger package that will reputedly include a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange that sees the return to Israel of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit. These are confidence-building measures that could facilitate a new attempt at Israeli-Palestinian political negotiations. Olmert and Abbas, at any rate, are at least committed to meet and begin talking once this process begins, with the roadmap once again on their agenda.
Yet neither the unity government nor the prisoner exchange/ceasefire is a done deal. Abbas, who suspended talks with Haniyeh in order to attend the UN General Assembly and possibly meet with President George W. Bush, is reportedly unhappy with Haniyeh's inability to compromise further regarding the preconditions. He may also take pause from polling results released today by the reliable PSR Center in Ramallah that show that a majority of Palestinians (66%) does not think that Hamas should accept the demand of the donor community to recognize Israel, while only a quarter supports the formation of a national unity government composed of all factions but under the leadership of Hamas.
Abbas will have to explain all this to President Bush and/or Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in their approaching meeting in the United States. He will undoubtedly argue that Haniyeh needs the approval from Damascus of Khaled Meshaal for any new concessions in Hamas' position regarding Israel, and that those concessions Hamas has made regarding Israel and its willingness to share power with Fateh are a positive sign that the organization is adjusting to reality, and deserves encouragement.

There is merit to this argument. The question is whether now is the time to offer concessions to Hamas or to press harder for full compliance. While Bush is likely to hang tough on the Quartet's conditions, there are initial signs that the European Union, another member of the Quartet, will prove more accommodating toward the new PA government and more flexible regarding the three preconditions, at least with regard to the transfer of financial aid.

This poses the potential for Israeli-European tensions. Olmert presumably hopes to defuse them by being forthcoming in his willingness to meet with Abbas. Talks with Abu Mazen also reflect the Olmert government's desperate need to present the Israeli public with a positive-sounding (Palestinian) agenda as the Winograd Committee hearings begin.