Q. How do you assess the ramifications of the Lebanon ceasefire for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

A. First we need to look briefly at the military strategic backdrop: the regional map that has emerged over the past six months, wherein Israel found itself suddenly confronting militant and aggressive Islamist enemies on two fronts, in Lebanon and Gaza. Both Hizballah and Hamas are combinations of militia, terrorist band and political party enfranchised partly by misguided American democratic reform schemes for the region. Both are backed by Iran and its client state, Syria, reject Israel's very existence, refuse to negotiate with it, and feed on failed Arab political entities. Three weeks ago, a ceasefire ended more than a month's fighting between Israel and Hizballah, although Israel is still blockading access to Lebanon in an effort to interdict arms supplies to Hizballah. In Gaza, conflict continues after more than two months.

One important Palestinian corollary to the fighting in Lebanon and Gaza is the shelving by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of his plan to withdraw unilaterally from parts of the West Bank. Israel was attacked unprovoked across two internationally-recognized boundaries after having withdrawn unilaterally across them; this calls into question at least the Gaza model of withdrawing both the settlements and the army without prior agreement with a viable Palestinian government.

In terms of Israel's interests in the Palestinian arena, many of the ramifications of the ceasefire are negative, both militarily and politically, while a few appear to open prospects for possible new diplomatic departures.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 at least temporarily ended the fighting in the Lebanese arena. In the absence of any sizable new UNIFIL contingent and greater resolve on the part of the Lebanese government, the provisions of 1701 initially appeared difficult to enforce. In recent days, with the arrival of an Italian military contingent and the visit by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the way appears to have been cleared for Israel to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon and end its embargo of Lebanese ports.

Still, 1701 appears to be a poor model for an Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire in Gaza. In Lebanon, an international force is being introduced to support a weak government that at least has good intentions, even as it hesitates to comply with UN demands to disarm Hizballah. A similar measure in Gaza would support an equally weak--but extremist--Hamas government that is boycotted by the international community. Nor is the geography of tiny, overpopulated Gaza conducive to deploying international forces on a large scale. Finally, non-UN forces such as the MFO in Sinai and the European Union monitors in Gaza appear to have a greater chance of success in the Israel-Arab context than UN forces like UNIFIL, whether enhanced or not.

On the other hand, Israel's recent military achievements in Gaza (Qassam rocket firings have been radically reduced; large numbers of militants have been killed, against few Israeli casualties) and the growing prospect of a ceasefire/prisoner exchange would appear to obviate the immediate need for anything but humanitarian international intervention there. Nor have Israeli forces reoccupied Gaza as they have southern Lebanon. Moreover, 1701 blames Hizballah for starting the war and does not in any way criticize Israel for its offensive in Lebanon and the damage and loss of life it caused in its response. This is a helpful precedent for Gaza, where the IDF is now free--assuming peace and quiet in Lebanon--to deploy more forces if needed. In other words, from Israel's standpoint an internationally-mandated ceasefire is not needed in Gaza, and in any case probably would not work even as well as in Lebanon because of the ideological positions of the Hamas government.

Broadly speaking, it is not at all clear whether the war fought by Israel in Lebanon to restore its deterrent profile has actually done so. This could have negative repercussions for the way Palestinian militants view Israel. The most obvious example is the failure of 1701 to return Israel's two abducted soldiers from Lebanon; this hardly bodes well for a resolution of the hostage affair in Gaza on terms congenial to Israel. More important is the warning by senior Israeli security officials that Hamas will now redouble its efforts to obtain a rocket arsenal similar to that deployed so effectively by Hizballah in Lebanon.

On the other hand, Palestinian militants in Gaza are aware after Lebanon that Israel could do far more damage to the Gazan infrastructure than it has actually done. They also express apprehension lest Israel "take out its frustrations" from its latest Lebanon experience by stepping up its attacks on Gaza. And the humanitarian situation in Gaza is disastrous. Yet the lessons of Lebanon do not appear to have hastened progress toward forming any sort of unity or technocrat government in the Palestinian Authority that might conceivably restore lines of communication between the PA and Israel and the West. Indeed, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has spent most of the past weeks of war outside the country, while talk among Palestinian leaders of dismantling the entire PA has increased.

Nor does the conclusion of the war in Lebanon appear to improve prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Some on the Israeli left are calling for the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference to be reconvened, or some other multilateral process invoked, as a means of using the outcome of this war to leverage a renewed political process. But Madrid followed an American-led military triumph that ostensibly ushered in a regional pax Americana, which in turn helped generate a peace process. In contrast, the United States is now in deep trouble in the Middle East, while the Lebanon conflict ended without a decisive victory for either side. Many see these circumstances as an achievement for Islamist forces in the region that have no interest in peace with Israel.

Certainly no new American initiative appears likely until after the November 2006 midterm elections. Even then, Washington's heavy commitments regarding Iraq and Iran and the Bush administration's traditional reluctance to engage intensively in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appear to preclude serious action. On the other hand, the United Nations, the European Union and the moderate Arab states all appear to be increasingly resolved to try to do something, after Lebanon, on the Palestinian front as well. Note, for example, Arab discussion of a new attempt to advance the March 2002 Saudi/Arab League formula for Arab-Israel peace, and Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema's suggestion that a UNIFIL success in Lebanon could prompt an international force initiative for Gaza as well.

At present, however, the Palestinian Authority remains at least as weak and anarchic as before the war, and no one is pressuring Israel to consider it a viable partner for negotiations, though various politicians on the Israeli left are urging Olmert to meet with Abu Mazen and this appears to be likely as part of a prisoner exchange and ceasefire agreement. As for Olmert, he has emerged from this war (and from 1701) weakened politically, with his disengagement initiative discredited.

Apropos international initiatives, Israel appears to be increasingly comfortable with them, and to welcome an international presence on its borders with troublesome Islamist neighbors in whose territory the option of renewing Israeli military occupation is rejected out of hand by the Israeli public. Two months ago, few in Israel would have wished for an enhanced UNIFIL in Lebanon. Two years ago, few would have imagined that Egypt and the EU would play their current constructive role in Gaza, or that (as recently announced) the Karni crossing would be expanded to integrate additional European security monitors.

Under these circumstances, if any Israeli peace initiative at all is conceivable at this point, it is likely to be directed toward Lebanon and Syria, not the Palestinians. Damascus is perceived as the weak link in the Iranian-led front against Israel--and the Iranian threat now takes unequivocal precedence in Israeli strategic thinking over the Palestinian problem. This means that giving up the Golan Heights within the framework of peace with Syria and Lebanon may now be perceived by the Israeli public as a fair price to pay for even a cold peace if it also radically reduces Iranian access to the Levant region. Whether renewed talks with the Bashar Assad regime in Damascus could yield a viable peace process is another question; but more and more Israelis appear to be prepared to try again if Washington can be persuaded to set aside its unrealistic "new Middle East" aspirations regarding Syria.

Such a departure might also have the effect of contributing to the political stalemate on the anarchic Palestinian front, where the struggle for power between Hamas and Fateh could take years. Optimists might hope that a successful prisoner exchange deal with Hamas would pave the way for a Palestinian unity or technocrat government that increases stability and moderation and introduces a peace process. But this does not appear to be a probable chain of events. More likely, stalemate and anarchy in Palestine could generate new military and terrorist escalation or the collapse of the Palestinian Authority--all eventualities that would benefit neither Palestinians nor Israelis.

Q. Can you make sense out of the various post-Lebanon commission of inquiry initiatives by the Olmert government and the IDF?

A. Olmert wants a government-appointed commission, led by a former head of Mossad, Nahum Admoni, to investigate the political decision-making behind the war. At last report he intended to ask the Cabinet ministers to approve it on Sunday, September 10. Some of the Labor ministers, led by Minister of Defense Amir Peretz, plan to propose instead a judicial commission of inquiry headed and manned not by government appointees but by a supreme court justice and his/her appointees. Olmert has also asked the State Comptroller, Judge Micha Lindenstrauss, to look at the way the civilian rear was dealt with; the latter has responded that he intends to stage an independent inquiry into additional aspects of the war as well.

In parallel, the IDF has established ten diverse in-house investigative commissions at the general staff level and 50 technical committees to look at specific aspects of the military campaign. They will be coordinated by Major General Moshe Kaplinsky, deputy chief of staff. The Knesset Foreign and Security Affairs Committee has set up six investigative subcommittees. And a move is afoot in the Knesset to present the Comptroller's eventual report or reports to the Knesset Affairs Committee, which is then empowered to mandate the establishment of a judicial commission of inquiry.

Meanwhile, a commission to investigate military-security aspects of the war, established by Defense Minister Peretz and led by former IDF Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shachak, has disbanded itself in view of the multiplicity of investigative initiatives from other directions. And public and media protests continue, condemning government and IDF schemes to "investigate themselves" and demanding an independent judicial commission.

There are serious arguments for and against the diverse avenues of investigating what went wrong in this war. A judicial commission of inquiry would be more demonstrably impartial than the other options, but would take longer and would plunge the entire security establishment into long months of legal wrangling, with generals accompanied everywhere by lawyers and with no guarantee (based on past precedent) that its findings would ever be implemented --except for recommendations that civilian and military office holders found at fault step down.

This might explain Olmert's objections, though in making his decision to establish a government-appointed non-judicial commission the prime minister emphasized the need for speed and efficiency. Peretz, for his part, appears to have joined the judicial commission bandwagon only when he confirmed he would be in a minority in the Cabinet vote, thereby demonstrating his populist credentials without really risking anything at a time when a growing tide within his own party seeks to remove him. Meanwhile IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, who is usually singled out by the critics along with Olmert and Peretz as a candidate to step down in atonement for having managed the war so poorly, is busy explaining his war-time decisions to assembled groups of senior officers, serving and retired, in the apparent hope of dispelling the argument that he has lost the trust of his own rank-and-file.

Time may be on the side of the establishment. As UNIFIL deploys in southern Lebanon with a toughened mandate and Hizballah's leaders seek to placate Lebanese angry over the damage they caused the country, Israeli perspectives on the cost/benefit scale of the war may be changing. Protesting reservists outside the Prime Minister's Office have to return to jobs and studies. The High Holidays are approaching. If no major new violence breaks out and a prisoner exchange (at least in Gaza) moves from rumor to reality, and as the already appointed commissions and committees commence their inquiries, this particular crisis may be over for Olmert, Peretz and Halutz.

At least, that is, until the commissions report back. The Admoni commission may behave as anticipated and not call for resignations-although delays in publishing its mandate may also indicate that it seeks more aggressive terms of reference. But Comptroller Lindenstrauss, who is already investigating Olmert for financial irregularities and improper appointments when he was minister of commerce and industry under Sharon, may be far tougher in his conclusions.

Issue Briefs

Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - August 13, 2006

Q. In your last APN briefing (Friday, August 11) you laid out a set of criteria for judging the utility for Israel of a UN ceasefire resolution. Now that the resolution (UNSCR 1701) has passed, how does it stand up to those criteria?

A. Following are each of the fourteen questions, followed by a preliminary assessment of 1701's ramifications for Israel.

1. Does the ceasefire resolution completely and immediately stop Hezbollah aggression, meaning primarily rocket fire, against Israel? In other words, does Hassan Nasrallah respect it? The resolution traces the outbreak of the war to "Hezbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006", ends all hostilities and even gives Israel the right to defend itself against any new hostility--meaning, to continue clearing out pockets of Hezbollah fighters in the area under its occupation south of the Litani River. But Nasrallah has declared that while he accepts the resolution, Hezbollah will continue to attack Israeli forces as long as they are on Lebanese soil. This, at the declarative level at least, is a blatant challenge to the resolution and those charged with enforcing it.

2. Does it remove Hezbollah military personnel far from the border with Israel and demilitarize southern Lebanon, with the exception of the Lebanese Army and international forces? Yes.

3. To what extent does it put into place a process for weakening Hezbollah militarily by a) effectively preventing new arms supplies from Syria and Iran; and b) disarming Hezbollah in accordance with UNSCR 1559? The new resolution places responsibility for disarming Hezbollah and preventing new arms supplies to it on the Lebanese government, which can call on the expanded UNIFIL to assist it. Whether and to what extent the government will undertake these tasks, with or without UNIFIL, is a key test of the capacity of Lebanon's moderate forces to compel Hezbollah to do anything. Note that the Lebanese government effectively shirked its responsibility under 1559 to disarm Hezbollah by declaring it a legitimate resistance movement. The easy way out for the government under 1701 could be to simply incorporate Hezbollah into the national army. This would constitute a bad outcome for Israel.

4. Do the provisions of the agreement have the effect of strengthening the Lebanese central government under PM Fuad Siniora at the expense of Hezbollah, or the opposite? Are Lebanese Army units deployed in southern Lebanon a positive contribution to peace and stability? Clearly, the government is strengthened by this resolution and Hezbollah weakened. And the deployment of Lebanese Army units in the South reflects a key Israeli demand.

5. What sort of international force or forces are introduced, and how quickly? How powerful is their mandate? If a new international force is to be preceded by a reinforced UNIFIL, will they have the same mandate? Under 1701 a reinforced UNIFIL is the only international force. Its mandate has "teeth", but its use of force is generally conditioned on the request of the Lebanese government, which may be afraid to confront Hezbollah. And it is a UN force rather than a UN-sanctioned force. In Israel's experience, the uses and abuses of UN forces in the region, especially in Lebanon, all too often reflect UN political considerations that have little to do with Israel's welfare.

6. (Corollary to 4 and 5, above), does an Israeli withdrawal mandated by the agreement leave a power vacuum that can be exploited by Hezbollah? Under the resolution, Israel will only withdraw if and as Lebanese and UNIFIL troops replace them and Hezbollah armed units leave the South. But it is not clear how the Lebanese Army and an enhanced UNIFIL will be able to advance into the South given Nasrallah's insistence on continuing to fight Israelis on Lebanese soil and Israel's right, under 1701, to resist. Will UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army simply step into the midst of this fighting, if it occurs?

7. To what extent does the agreement weaken Syria's and Iran's capacity to manipulate Lebanese affairs? Key provisions of the resolution authorize the Lebanese government to disarm all armed groups and prevent supply of weapons to them, and require all states to act to prevent arms supplies to Lebanon that are not authorized by the government. One of these provisions to a large extent reiterates previous, unfulfilled UNSC resolutions (1559 and 1680) from recent years. Now that Hezbollah has been weakened and the Lebanese government strengthened by the UNIFIL force, will the government--of which Hezbollah is a member, and which seeks to act by consensus in order to prevent civil war--take more forceful action on these issues than in the past?

8. Does the ceasefire return Israel's two abducted soldiers (the original casus belli) without linking their return to the release of veteran Lebanese or other prisoners in Israeli jails (linking their return to Hezbollah fighters captured over the past month would be difficult to reject)? No. A call for the return of the soldiers unconditionally is included in the preamble, not the operative paragraphs. Israel invested considerable diplomatic capital merely to ensure that the same clause did not contain a reference to Lebanese prisoners it holds (that reference was moved one clause down, with softer language). The non-release of the soldiers under 1701 presumably reflects the argument of PM Fuad Siniora that he could not force Hezbollah to give them up. But if this is the case, how will he force Hezbollah to undertake far more demanding requirements of the resolution, such as disarming and ceasing to import weaponry? Hassan Nasrallah has already intimated that he takes exception to these UN demands, arguing that they are internal Lebanese issues.

9. Does the agreement require Israel to make concessions regarding the Shebaa Farms that could be interpreted as an achievement for Hezbollah? No. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is authorized to look into this issue and report back within a month. Israel also succeeded in introducing mention of UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, which reaffirm the territories for peace principle, thereby implying that any concession by it regarding the Shebaa Farms will be part of a peace agreement with either Syria or Lebanon.

10. Is this a helpful model for ending the fighting with Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups on the Gaza front? Generally, it is a very problematic model. In Lebanon, an international force is being introduced to support a moderate but weak government. A similar measure in Gaza would support an extremist (and weak) Hamas government that is liable to draw encouragement from Hezbollah's successes over the past month. And the failure of 1701 to return Israel's two abducted soldiers from Lebanon does not bode well for a resolution of the hostage affair in Gaza. Then, too, Israel's increasingly obvious military achievements in Gaza (Qassam rocket firings were down to about a dozen last week) appear to obviate the need for a UN resolution, though undoubtedly the international community will now again pay close attention to what is happening there. Israeli forces, incidentally, have not reoccupied Gaza as they have southern Lebanon. Finally, UNSCR 1701 does not in any way criticize Israel for its offensive in Lebanon and the damage and loss of life it caused. This is a positive precedent for Gaza, where the IDF will now be free--assuming peace and quiet in Lebanon--to deploy more forces if needed.

11. Does the ceasefire contribute to launching new peace initiatives in the region or even another unilateral withdrawal on the West Bank by Israel, or does it lay the foundations for another round of fighting? Theoretically, 1701 could lay the foundation for an Israel-Lebanon peace process of some sort. But this would almost certainly still depend on Syrian approval, which will not be forthcoming unless a parallel process is initiated with Damascus. Some on the Israeli left are calling for the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference to be reconvened as a means of using the outcome of this war to leverage a renewed political process. As for PM Ehud Olmert's disengagement initiative on the West Bank, it will almost certainly have to be shelved now, insofar as Olmert will emerge from this war (and from 1701) weakened politically, with his initiative discredited.

12. If there is another round of fighting, to what extent will the ceasefire constrain Israel's freedom of maneuver next time around? One of the reasons Israel may be better off without Chapter 7 of the UN Charter being invoked by 1701 are its fears that if and when a failed ceasefire leads it to renew its offensive, it would be constrained by the readiness of the international force to employ military means to stop all aggression. Yet the "teeth" given UNIFIL by 1701 (conditioned broadly but not entirely on Lebanese government backing) could have the same effect.

13. Israelis will argue long and hard as to whether Israel "won" this war. But more important, how is the ceasefire agreement viewed by others in the Middle East? Does this outcome strengthen or weaken Israel's deterrent image in Arab and Iranian eyes? It's too early to answer this question authoritatively. But the concern expressed in Israel and by friends of Israel lest its deterrent profile be radically eroded by its failings in this war appears to be exaggerated. Worried military experts have been bemoaning Israel's depleted deterrent capability for decades. During that period the only enemies not deterred effectively have been terrorists, especially suicide terrorists, popular uprisings (the first intifada) and Saddam Hussein and his ineffective missiles in 1991. The former are by definition non-deterrable by military means alone; as for Saddam, he paid a very heavy price. Meanwhile, Israel made peace with two of its neighbors. In any event, one aim of Israel's last-minute offensive in southern Lebanon is to prove to the doubters in the Arab world and Iran that Israel's main problems in this war were the synchronization of political and military decision-making rather than reduced war-fighting capabilities.

14. How does the outcome of the war affect Israeli-American relations? Some conservatives in Washington (and Israel) are unhappy that Israel didn't strike a stronger and more resolute blow against an important Iranian proxy, or even against Syria. And the management of Israeli-American relations during the war left a lot to be desired, reflecting the lack of experience of the Olmert team as well as real gaps between Middle East realities and the Bush-Rice "New Middle East" vision. But 1701 was ultimately a product of close Israeli-American consultation. The strategic relationship will survive this war.

From Israel's standpoint, I would give this resolution a "five" on a scale of one to ten. On the negative side, 1701 relies on a still weak Lebanese government--the core cause of this war--and bolsters it with a problematic UN force. And it doesn't deal with the issue of the abducted Israeli soldiers--a very worrisome lacuna. On the positive side, it removes Hezbollah from the South and strengthens the Lebanese government's capacity to suppress that movement. And no Israeli concession on Shebaa--which would have been seen as an achievement for Hezbollah--was included.

At this point, the fate of 1701 rests to an overriding extent with Fuad Siniora and his government. The likelihood of another round of fighting breaking out in the months and years ahead is about 50-50. At the strategic military level, the key question is: if Hezbollah successfully evades carrying out its obligations and another round becomes necessary, will Israel be better or worse off? As matters currently stand, it should be better off in terms of manpower, ordnance, intelligence and lessons drawn regarding tactics--as long as it acts the moment it becomes clear the Lebanese government still cannot control Hezbollah, despite 1559 and 1701. But it may be seriously constrained by the expanded UNIFIL force that it has agreed be deployed in southern Lebanon.

Hard Questions, Tough Answers is an internet publication of Americans for Peace Now. It is written by Yossi Alpher, whose views do not necessarily reflect those of Americans for Peace Now or Peace Now.