Reluctant To Realign: The annual in-depth survey of Israeli Jewish opinion from the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies found that Israelis may be willing for another unilateral move, even a big one, but they ain't necessarily happy about it. The Jaffe poll has been conducted each year since 1988, involves a larger sampling size than most Israeli surveys (700 respondents), and is done through face-to-face interviews, as opposed to over the phone. According to the Jaffe study, only about a quarter of the Jewish public views unilateral withdrawal as a desirable option, down 2% from last year, compared with a third who prefer a withdrawal through an agreement to the Barak-Clinton outline and nearly 40% who oppose any further withdrawal. 64% would support the evacuation of West Bank settlements as part of a final status agreement, while 36% would not. 62% think military action can reduce Palestinian terrorism, but not wipe it out, while 20% think it can eliminate terror, 11% believe it has no effect, and 7% say it increases terror. At the same time, 60% of the Jewish public (3% more than last year) supports the idea that if there is diplomatic progress, Israel should declare the security barrier to be its permanent border and move the settlers who are outside of it to inside Israel.

Analyst Ofer Shelah said that these numbers "can be seen as a delayed reaction by the public to the disengagement from Gaza: beyond the wish to get rid of the Gaza Strip, which led to the popularity of the actual disengagement, a great many Israelis realized that this step, since it was done without any planning for the day after and because of its unilateral aspect, which the other side interpreted as panicked flight, had quite a number of negative results. This approach is not the result of opposition in principle, but of a sober interpretation of the situation. The poll draws a picture of an Israeli public that is tired of ideologies. There is a majority for evacuating settlements, there is unequivocal support for the separation fence, even recognition of the fact that there is no military way to defeat terror. The public simply sees no great merit in a unilateral step.We have a public that is aware of the current situation that it doesn't like and is tired of fighting it. A public that sees no real hope in a unilateral withdrawal, but will accept it-and will be willing to declare its results as an official border. We have, if you like, a people that does not believe there will be a partner in the future either (because, after all, if there is a partner later on, there is no reason to declare the fence a permanent border now), and which accepts, without joy and without hope, a withdrawal from the territories with practically nothing in return."

A separate monthly survey out this week-this one from the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University-echoed the Jaffe Center's findings about the Israeli public's mixed feelings toward Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's "realignment" plan. On one hand, it found that there is strong support for some of the principles behind the initiative. 75.5% of the public think that it is very important for Israel to have permanent borders, a view shared by 94% of Meretz voters, 88% of Labor supporters, 70% of Pensioners voters, and 68% of Kadima supporters. 70% of Israelis also believe that Israel has the moral right to unilaterally decide its permanent borders. But on the other hand, just 47% favor Olmert's "realignment" initiative, while 44% oppose it, a parity that didn't exist regarding Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan even when support for it was at its lowest. Support for the plan is strongest among Meretz voters (94%), followed by Labor (78%), Pensioners (73%), and Kadima (63%). (Yedioth Ahronoth, 6/9/06 & Tami Steinmetz Center Survey, 6/11/06)

Demographic Domination: While these surveys found reluctance to support realignment, they provided a much more definitive picture about what is motivating Israeli Jewish thinking on these matters: demographics. Drawing from the results of the Jaffe Center study, Ofer Shelah wrote, "What has brought the majority of Israelis to the place where once there were only a few? If you like, it was Arafat and his vision of the victory of the Arab womb. More than anything else, the demographic genie disturbs Israelis' sleep. The majority who put a `state with a Jewish majority' as their supreme value, superceding territories and security-above `the greater Land of Israel,' above a `democratic state,' and `a situation of peace'-has grown over time and in 2006 became an absolute majority of over 50%. Demographics is also behind another important datum: almost half of Israelis (and we should again emphasize that the survey was only of Jews) support the idea that Avigdor Lieberman raised in the course of the election campaign, i.e. that Arab towns be moved from Israel to the Palestinian state. About a third even talks about a large scale move of this sort. This becomes even more manifest when the numbers of those who support `transfer through agreement' are added: 29% favor such a step, were the Arab residents of these towns to agree to it.

"Who is opposed? It's hard to know. 24% said they are opposed, but there is no break down on which of them are from the Right and which from the Left, i.e. who is opposed in principle to such a step because they are unwilling to give up territory of the State of Israel (some of whom, we can assume, are willing to transfer the residents without the territory), and those who think the whole idea is wrong. It is clear that Jewish Israelis view the Arab question in terms of demography. To paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, three out of every four of us are Lieberman-now we are only arguing the price.The change in what was once the opinion of a majority of the public, opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state, took longer-but it is absolute. It is strange to remember that just during the Barak government, only six years ago, Israel was heatedly preoccupied with the attempt to prevent Arafat from unilaterally declaring a state. How many debates did Barak and his aides hold over this, how many suggestions for harsh responses, including a declaration of annexing all the territories, were raised. And now, one Intifada and six years later, 70% of Israelis support the solution of `two states for two peoples,' and 58% believe that within five years, a Palestinian state will indeed be established.

"If we add this data to the numbers mentioned earlier on readiness to declare the fence the border and pessimism as to finding a partner, we can summarize the mood as follows: the Jews in Israel view an agreement as something they want, but doubt the ability to reach one. They think the Palestinians will establish a state for themselves even without an agreement, but are much less scared of it than their vision of an Israel in which a growing part is Arab. In short, they have no real dream and no true hope, but they are also fed up with the motto that we must endure for when the day comes."

The latest Tami Steinmetz study also revealed less than lofty Israeli Jewish views towards Israeli Arabs. "Realignment" does not entail Israel swapping any of its territory with the Palestinians in exchange for Israel's retention of West Bank land, as envisioned in the earlier peace negotiations. And, indeed, 51% of the Israeli Jewish public believes it is not important for Israel to compensate the Palestinians with lands of the same size within Israel, while 40% think the Palestinians deserve such compensation. If, however, such a compensation is decided, a high percentage, 46%, favor giving territory from Israel's Triangle area, including Umm al-Fahm and other villages that are populated by Israeli Arabs, and only 15% prefer ceding unpopulated areas of the Western Negev. The rest do not know or oppose any territorial exchange. Even among Meretz voters, for whom support for transferring empty land (29%) is highest among all the parties, a higher rate favors giving up the Triangle (35%).

The desire to increase the Jewish majority's demographic advantage in the state also emerges from responses to two other questions. When asked to choose between permanent borders that preserve as much of the Land of Israel as possible for Jewish sovereignty or reducing as much as possible the Palestinian population remaining under Israeli sovereignty even at the price of relinquishing territory, 59% said they prefer retaining as few Palestinians as possible, even if it means giving up land. Just one-fourth opted to annex more territory, if that meant increasing the Palestinian population living in Israel. Further, 70% of Israeli Jews support the High Court of Justice's decision that Israel is not legally obligated to grant citizenship to Palestinians who have married Israeli Arabs, even if this means the couple cannot live together permanently in Israel or enjoy the rights of citizens. This survey was conducted May 29-31, 2006, and has a margin of error of +/- 4.5%. (Yedioth Ahronoth, 6/9/06 & Tami Steinmetz Center Survey, 6/11/06)

Hairspray: Hon, we're not talking about Baltimore circa 1962-this is about Israel in 2006. A rumor spread in a Jerusalem high school that some of the Jewish girls were dating Arab boys, causing an uproar. After the word got around, the students were told to attend a special class given by the Yad Leahim organization, during the course of which they learned why they should avoid marrying Arabs in general and Arab Muslims in particular. The lesson was given to 11^th graders and was meticulously planned. It began with a lecture by a woman who was described to the students as a "victim," after she married an Arab man who beat her.

After a discussion was held, the students were given a booklet with horror stories about women who married Arabs. For example, the booklet told of a woman who married an Arab man despite her parent's wishes, and now, six years later, she is trying to put her life back together in a hidden apartment "far from the hostile Arab village, the violent husband, and the children left behind." In addition, the booklet includes verses from the Koran that present the woman as a slave, and explained the Muslim male tradition of marrying up to four women. "It doesn't matter how progressive and educated he is, this is the Muslim worldview on which he was raised. Is this what you want?" the booklet asked.

"The main problem is not the messages in the booklet, but the fact that somebody in the school system allowed these people to preach their racist doctrines," said N., a youth counselor who got hold of the booklet. N. relates that the high school students told her about the lecture, during which the lecturers told the boys and girls why they must not marry Arabs. "At first I thought the booklet had been distributed outside school, and while that would make me angry, it is legitimate," says N. But to her astonishment, she found that the school had decided to allocate a special lesson to this subject. N. explains that she is not opposed to talks about domestic violence, but "after I read the booklet I was shocked. I sat with the kids and explained to them that this was racist. Somebody in the Education Ministry has to wake up, because I am sure this is not the only school that preaches these things." Education Ministry officials said the decision to let this group into the school was wrong, and the school inspector said that the ministry will tell all schools that this group and its material are not allowed inside. (Ma'ariv, 6/13/06)

Urban Planning: Kadima is trying to learn from the unsuccessful absorption of some of the Gaza evacuees, and is working on a pilot plan to establish mirror communities inside the Green Line for settlers who live in the southern Hebron hills. The plan calls for six new communities to be built in the southern Hebron hills, inside the Green Line, even before the settlers are evacuated. It is believed that this way most of the settlers will agree to leave voluntarily and be able to stay with their own communities. Knesset Member Shai Hermesh, the leader of Kadima's settlement team, said, "The plan relies on the agreements that I reached with settlers in the southern Hebron hills area, due to the distress they feel and the lack of a future in their settlement." The settlements in question are: Susiya; Metzudat Yehuda; Shama; Tene Omarim; Beit Hagai; Carmel; Maon; and Otniel. The initiative would also serve to create continuous settlement between the Judean Desert and Kiryat Gat, which is sparsely settled with Jews. "If we see that the southern Hebron hills settlers-about half of whom are not ideological settlers-move to nearby communities, the phenomenon of isolated settlements in Judea and Samaria will fall like a house of cards," added Hermesh. (Ma'ariv, 6/13/06)

Tale Of The Tapes: Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin has asked Attorney General Menachem Mazuz to investigate whether Israeli police officers are in the pocket of the Ateret Cohanim settlers association, a group that buys East Jerusalem properties from Arabs so that Jewish settlers can live in them. Beilin asked Mazuz to find out if officers helped obtain a "silence agreement" to prevent damaging material against the association from surfacing and why a specific request by the state prosecutor to the head of the Police Investigations Division went unanswered. He also asked Mazuz to look into suspicions about Ateret Cohanim's property purchases in East Jerusalem.

Beilin's requests came in the wake of the publication of an extensive report about Ateret Cohanim in a recent issue of the Ha'aretz Friday Magazine. Ha'aretz reporter Meron Rapoport revealed that about a month ago, State Prosecutor Eran Shendar met with the head of the Police Investigations Division, Yohanan Danino. Shendar directed Danino to check whether to grant state's witness status to Mohammed Maraga, an East Jerusalem resident who works with Ateret Cohanim and claims to be in possession of material about it. The evidence in question seems to be strong: direct, first-person testimony, documents, sworn statements by attorneys, and a host of tape recordings. Shendar thought the information justified launching a covert investigation to examine whether the state ought to sign an agreement with Maraga in which Maraga would continue working with Ateret Cohanim while documenting the activities he witnessed or was asked to carry out. In return, he would receive immunity, physical protection, and maybe money. Shendar didn't make Maraga any promises at the outset, except one thing: that the police investigation would be conducted by a national unit, and the police's Jerusalem District, especially its Minorities Branch, would not be let in on the secret investigation. Shendar was told explicitly that there was strong and independent evidence that people in the Minorities Branch were in close contact with Ateret Cohanim. If they were to find out about the investigation, the group would likely be tipped off.

Shendar met with Danino on a Wednesday evening. The following afternoon, Maraga got a call on his cell phone. On the line was none other than Shlomi Peretz, the intelligence officer in the Minorities Branch of the Jerusalem District Police. Maraga says that Peretz was very angry and yelled at him: How dare he go to the state prosecutor and the police, and then ask that they, in the Minorities Branch, not hear about it? That evening, Maraga spoke with the head of Ateret Cohanim, Matti Dan, supposedly the key figure in the affair, and thanked him for the money he had transferred to him. I didn't transfer anything to you, said Dan, who just a month earlier, when asking Maraga to do more jobs for him, had been taped by him. Maraga had no doubts: The director already knew about the complaint and was keeping his distance. The secret investigation into the settler group was over just 12 hours after it began. Maraga panicked and went to the state prosecutor about being exposed. He was called later that night by someone representing Danino, who tried to reassure him that Danino was personally dealing with the matter. Maraga hasn't heard from the Investigations Division since then. He did get another call, however, from Peretz, who told Maraga that his branch knew about Maraga's request to testify as state's witness.

Transcripts of Maraga's tapes read like a lost episode of The Sopranos. For example, Asaf Baruchi, Dan's right-hand man, says to a contractor who works for Ateret Cohanim, with respect to a member of the municipal planning committee, "How much do we need to pay him so he'll support the plan?...According to what you say, he's one who can be bought by money or connections." In a different conversation, this one about a Palestinian who would be ready to talk about selling property in exchange for help with the police, Baruchi brags of Ateret Cohanim's good connections with the cops. Maraga: "The guy asked me to ask whether you're ready to get the police and the municipality off his back and to close his file. He's ready to sit down and talk." Baruchi: "Let him talk first." Maraga: "Of course, of course. But is there a possibility of getting his case closed?" Baruchi: "Sure, there's a possibility." Maraga: "And you promise that the police will close his file, and the municipality, too?" Baruchi: "We can close all of the files, because we opened them." Maraga: "You opened them-or the municipality and the police did?" Baruchi: "We can close everything." Maraga: "The police opened [a file] and the municipality opened [a file], and you're promising [to close them]?" Baruchi: "Yes, because it's not exactly that they opened them. I'm telling you yes." Maraga: "That's Matti's word?" Baruchi: "My word, first of all." Maraga: "And then from Matti?" Baruchi: "Yes."

Ateret Cohanim has been actively involved in the affairs surrounding Irineos, who was elected to be Greek Orthodox patriarch by the Church's Council of Archbishops in Jerusalem's Old City, but could not assume the post for four years because Israel withheld its approval. A little over a year ago, Irineos' appointment was approved. Shortly thereafter, it was reported that he sold two hotels in the Old City to Jewish organizations. Irineos denied it, but a major uproar ensued, and the Council of Archbishops decided to remove him from the Patriarchate and to appoint Theopilos in his place. But the Israeli government refuses to approve the new appointment. The Greek Orthodox Church owns numerous properties in Israel, including several in the Old City. Ateret Cohanim is very interested in these properties. In taped conversations, it was explained to Maraga that Matti Dan has a sort of veto over the appointment of the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Baruchi: ".Everyone knows that if the patriarch wants to be patriarch, (he) has to be approved by Matti." Maraga: "What do you mean? Why?" Baruchi: "He has power. Matti will decide if the patriarch will be patriarch. That's how it is. Matti hasn't agreed yet. He's collecting information, building the possibilities to make deals." Maraga: "Anyone who wants to be patriarch has to be approved by Matti?" Baruchi: "I'm saying it in my own words, but the patriarchs, I think they know it.The previous patriarch (Irineos)-four years he wasn't patriarch. Why? Because Matti hadn't given his agreement. Because we hadn't agreed that he would be.There are a thousand intrigues, and Matti's in all of them. You know how long we've been dealing with the Church? Years. When he (Irineos) sold to us, he became patriarch and right after that they tossed him out. Now the second one (Theopilos) wants to be patriarch. And the second one hasn't become patriarch-why? Who's fighting him?" Maraga: "You are." Baruchi: "You've got it. In the meantime, we're still with the first one, because he sold to us." (Ha'aretz, 6/9 & 11/06)