Q. Last week you discussed the Likud, Shinui and Meretz primaries. Since then, Labor has completed its candidate selection. What can we learn from it concerning political prospects in Israel?

A. Tens of thousands of Labor Party members selected a rather remarkable list: at the top (after Amir Peretz) are relative newcomers and political doves, followed by a larger number of generals and women than any other party. All in all, this is a list that reflects Peretz's preferences and priorities and will enable him, if he can shrink his ego a bit, to present voters with a challenging collective leadership. The post-primary polls immediately rewarded Labor with another 3-4 mandates.

The numbers two and three slots in the primary vote were gained by Yitzhak Herzog and Ophir Pines, two relatively young and promising MKs who were awarded the senior Labor ministerial positions in the recent Labor-Likud coalition and won high marks for their brief ministerial performance. Among those following them in the top ten are Prof. Avishai Braverman, former president of Ben Gurion University, Admiral (ret.) Ami Ayalon, former head of Shabak, and broadcaster Shelli Yehimovitch. Additional women in the top 20 include Yuli Tamir, MK Colette Avital, and Nadia Hilu, who is likely to be the first Arab woman elected to the Knesset. Ayalon is the top general (or admiral), but he is followed in the first 20 by MKs Binyamin Ben Eliezer, Matan Vilnai, Ephraim Sneh and Dani Yatom-all former generals, the last three pushed below number 10 by the newcomers. Significantly, there are two Arabs and a Druze among Labor's first 22 candidates. The list features strong "socio-economic" candidates like Braverman and Yehimovitch who can speak for Peretz's left wing economic agenda. But missing prominently among the top 20 is a Russian immigrant candidate.

Peretz appeared sufficiently satisfied with the list to declare almost immediately that he would not ask the Central Committee to reserve a senior slot for former-PM Ehud Barak, who has stood on the sidelines waiting to be invited. Polls and focus groups run by Labor and Kadima indicate that Barak, unlike another former Labor prime minister, Shimon Peres, does not constitute an attraction for voters. Barak has been extremely critical of Peretz, and the latter was happy to dispense with his services.

The dovish views of figures like Ayalon and Yehimovitch (and Peretz himself) mean that some voters will perceive a genuine choice between left (Labor and Meretz), center (Kadima) and right (Likud). The Labor platform states, for example, that Jerusalem, "including all its Jewish neighborhoods, will be the eternal capital of Israel", thereby signaling indirect support for withdrawal from the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem--an ostensibly left-wing position now supported in polls by about half the electorate. But Labor can also be expected to campaign with an eye on the center, where Israel's floating and undecided votes lie, and where fully one-fourth of all voters testify they have moved recently from the right. Thus, the platform Peretz unveiled at the beginning of this week asserts that Labor supports negotiations with the PLO but would, in the event of stalemate, back "independent" (i.e., unilateral) steps.

Peretz remains largely unknown to the voters, and not trusted. When polls ask voters which party leaders they know, which are credible and which is best suited for the premiership, Peretz scores a very low one and two percent, trailing far behind Olmert and Netanyahu. Thus the challenge facing Peretz now is to persuade the voters that the team he fields is the most dynamic and most qualified, not only on economic issues but in the security realm as well, and that its qualities compensate for his own relative lack of experience and exposure.

Q. Palestinian Legislative Council elections are to be held on January 25. What if Hamas wins outright, or even gains sufficient strength to wield influence over Palestinian policy toward Israel. What will this mean for Israeli-Palestinian relations?

A. No comprehensive assessment of Israel's options vis-a-vis PA/PLO institutions in which Hamas has achieved a significant foothold can even begin to be made until we know what percentage of the vote Hamas has won and what sort of Palestinian government emerges from the elections. The most recent Palestinian polls give Fateh a 7-8 percent lead over Hamas, but this figure covers only the 50 percent of the Legislative Council that is chosen on a single national list; Hamas appears to have better chances to win a majority of the other 50 percent, who are locally elected. Hence, at this point we can only pose a long list of relevant questions to be addressed once the smoke has cleared, the results are known and Palestinians address the question of what kind of government they want.

First, is Hamas heading the coalition, a junior partner, or occupying the opposition benches? Some Hamas spokesmen have indicated that even if they emerge the largest party they would prefer to be junior coalition partners, precisely in order to avoid any sort of "showdown" with Israel over acceptability as a negotiating partner as well as the responsibility of representing the PA/PLO (i.e., making concessions) in negotiations. On the other hand, if Hamas gets, say, 30 percent of the vote or less, it could conceivably be left out of a coalition led by Fateh. An additional alternative could be Hamas support for a technocrat or non-party government in order to ensure that international aid doesn't cease, with both Hamas and Fateh ostensibly on the sidelines but competing to exercise influence. One "safe" candidate mentioned as head of such a government is Marwan Barghouti--"safe" because he could have the support of both Fateh and Hamas and because he is in an Israeli jail.

One parallel issue that Hamas will have to address after the elections is its attitude both toward Israel--recognition? ongoing "armed struggle"?--and toward disbanding its armed militias. Hamas has informally extended the ceasefire-like "calm" (tahdiya) of 2005 until the elections. One of the first issues it will have to address is whether to extend the pause yet again, or return to terrorist attacks. Moreover, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly indicated that he intends to demand that Hamas disarm once it enters the Legislative Assembly.

Hamas spokesmen have thus far rejected Abbas' demand and hedged on the ceasefire issue. Some Hamas thinkers have alluded to the Hizballah model in Lebanon--representation in the parliament, government portfolios, a refusal to disarm, but for the most part a willingness to maintain a ceasefire with Israel--as the ideal they aspire to. But they are not of one mind (at least at the level of public declarations) regarding negotiating with Israel or even finding some way to recognize Israel: generally, "local" Hamas leaders like Sheikh Abu Tayr in East Jerusalem and Hassan Yusuf in Hebron tend to make moderate pronouncements on these issues, while the exile leadership, led by Khaled Mashal in Damascus, is more hard-line. The Hamas election platform, too, offers softened formulations of Hamas charter principles--for example, the charter's "Palestine from the river to the sea" is rendered by the platform "historic Palestine is part of the Arab land"--apparently in an effort to appeal to the majority of voters who favor a two-state solution. How will these statements be interpreted and understood if Hamas enters coalition negotiations with Fateh after the elections?

A second set of questions concerns the American reaction. Washington has championed democratic elections in Palestine and recognized the PA's right to include Hamas, but it has warned that a Hamas role in Palestinian government would be extremely problematic unless the organization changes. How will it now deal with the key elements of its relationship with the PA--financial aid, a roadmap-based peace process, economic assistance in Gaza--once Hamas is part of the Palestinian polity. The same question applies to the European Union, which has also warned the Palestinians that aid could cease.

The overwhelming impression at this point in time is that neither the EU nor the US has made up its mind what to do, and both are waiting to assess the results of the election. Indeed, Washington has not begun to resolve the contradiction embedded in its policy of encouraging comprehensive Arab electoral democracy that enfranchises Islamist extremists and terrorists not only in Palestine, but in Iraq and Lebanon as well. Its post-election stance will be a key factor in Israel's decision-making process regarding post-election dealings with Palestine, and is likely to form the main topic in a Bush-Olmert summit sometime in February.

This brings us to Israel's position. The brand new policy team of PM Ehud Olmert and FM Tzippi Livni will have to begin dealing with this issue as soon as the election results are known. The Palestinian vote-counting process, as in Iraq, could take up to two weeks, and many more weeks could pass before the Palestinians themselves sort out the results and embark on a new governmental path. Israel will have to factor in the American position, consult with the EU, Egypt and Jordan, then ask what Kadima's voters want to hear. Assuming that Hamas does not surprise everyone by renouncing terrorism, disbanding its armed cadres and embracing a two state solution, it stands to reason that the Olmert government will be inclined to reject any direct dealings with Hamas elements in a Palestinian government.

On the other hand, a total boycott in contacts could conceivably precipitate a humanitarian crisis in the territories that would be blamed on Israel. Indeed, indirect dealings, particularly at the local level where Hamas controls many Palestinian municipalities that border on Israeli municipalities, are in some cases a pragmatic necessity. Certainly the unilateral withdrawal option, which Olmert is known to favor, is likely to draw renewed support from a situation in which Israeli-Palestinian negotiations become impossible because of Hamas.