Q. How do you explain Ariel Sharon's declaration that his new party will run on what appears to be the same platform as his outgoing government: adherence to an interpretation of the road map that guarantees non-implementation? Did he cause an earthquake in Israeli politics merely to revert to a policy designed to perpetuate stalemate?

A. In declaring on November 21 that he was leaving the Likud and forming a new party, Sharon indeed stated at a press conference that his election campaign would be based on adherence to the road map. He also reiterated previously stated views that there would be no more unilateral disengagements, that the Arabs, including the Palestinians, were not ready for genuine peace with Israel, and that he aspired to delineate Israel's final borders.

Clearly these positions are rife with contradictions. Since there is little prospect that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will fulfill his road map obligation of dismantling the terrorist infrastructure, now or after Palestinian elections (which will enfranchise Hamas, a terrorist organization), there is little chance for a road map-based process unless Sharon backs off on the terrorism condition, as Amir Peretz has. Moreover, if the Palestinians are not candidates for a peace process, then phase III of the road map is not feasible. Nor does it appear possible for Sharon to determine Israel's final borders without a Palestinian partner to an internationally-recognized agreement. Further, Sharon's key strategist, Eyal Arad, stated to The Guardian on November 23 that Sharon's approach to a deal with the Palestinians would be based on "security for independence" rather than the old formula of "territories for peace". Yet the road map adheres to the territories for peace formula, which has evolved from UNSCR 242.

Thus Sharon's "platform" does not appear to be a viable prescription for marketing a new center party--one that traces its origins to the disengagement program and seeks to move to the left of the Likud platform. While Sharon supporters and interpreters are busily explaining that he really means to carry out a second disengagement, the prime minister himself avoids articulating this intention. As matters now stand, his Kadima party will go to the elections with a murky platform that is likely to be nearly identical to that of the party he abandoned, the Likud.

Yet in some ways this situation is little different from that which has afforded Sharon two comfortable electoral victories in the past five years. He has never offered voters either an ideology or much of a political program. He and his PR advisors believe that he can appeal to the largest spectrum of voters if he bases his campaign on his credibility, security and political experience, and devotion to Israel's best interests, rather than on a detailed program. Note, for example, that he never really explained to the public his rationale for the August 2005 Gaza disengagement, yet this did not appreciably curtail public support.

Sharon also wants to market himself as the Israeli leader best equipped to handle relations with the United States. Since the Bush administration's program for Israeli-Palestinian relations is the road map, and despite its failure to even attempt to implement that plan, Sharon presumably calculates that a declarative adherence to the road map is the best way to signal to the public that he can be best trusted with the management of Israeli-American relations. In this connection, it is interesting to speculate as to how the administration will relate (if at all!) to Amir Peretz's call for an immediate return to direct peace negotiations, regardless of the Palestinian record regarding terrorism--a position that clearly contradicts phase I of the road map.

Can Sharon simply assume that the public on the left and center will read between the lines and understand that he will take Israel into a second disengagement, while potential voters on the right will somehow take his statements at face value? A number of electoral developments could yet oblige him to speak more specifically about his real plans.

One such development might be success on the part of Peretz in selling his peace program to potential voters. This could force Sharon to explain why he rejects negotiations with the Palestinians and prefers unilateralism. Another development could be a decision by the Likud leader elected on December 15 to adopt a program that is ostensibly similar to Sharon's: adherence to the road map and rejection of additional unilateral steps. Here Sharon might feel he has to differentiate himself from the right wing party he has abandoned and condemned.

Finally, depending on Hamas' achievements in the Palestinian elections on January 25, Sharon may see an opportunity to declare that negotiations with the PLO/PA are no longer possible, since both institutions now comprise an Islamist terrorist organization that rejects Israel's right to exist. Here, too, there could be an opportunity to opt openly for another round of disengagement.

Sharon's platform, as currently constituted, does not reflect the palpable shift to the left brought about in Israeli politics by disengagement, the ceasefire, and the emergence of Abbas (Abu Mazen) as Palestinian leader. Whether Sharon can win an election despite this apparent disconnect remains to be seen.

Q. Why did Hizballah attack Israel on November 21?

A. The Hizballah attack, in which it lost four dead and failed in an attempt to kidnap Israeli soldiers, was its strongest aggression against Israel in over three years, and its first attack since one of its patrons, Syria, withdrew from Lebanon. There were apparently a number of motives for this largely abortive operation.

First, Hizballah wanted to send a message to the Lebanese public, on the eve of Lebanon's first independence day in 30 years without the Syrian occupation (the Lebanese celebrate their independence from French rule 62 years ago), that it remains a potent actor on the Lebanese domestic scene. Hizballah currently represents almost exclusively the 40 percent of Lebanese who are Shi'ites, both in parliament and in politics in general, and enjoys the support of Shi'ite officers in the Lebanese Army. Confronted with ineffective pressure on the part of the government (of which it is a part) to carry out UNSCR 1559 and disarm and withdraw from the border with Israel, it in effect stated with last week's attack that it intends to remain a strong and defiant political and military actor.

Indeed, the attack was intended to signal all parties concerned with 1559, including the US, France, the UN, and Israel, that the Syrian withdrawal did not weaken Hizballah's capacity to defy the international community and retain its armed capabilities. That signal was further amplified when Israeli security authorities warned the public that, in the aftermath of the failed border kidnapping, Hizballah now intends to kidnap Israelis abroad as well. The Bush administration, in particular, has once again been put on notice that while Arab Islamists welcome that aspect of its Middle East democratic reform program that seeks to enfranchise them, they do not intend to comply with its demand that they disarm and cease hostile military activity.

The kidnapping intention also sends a message to the Lebanese public that many Lebanese consider positive: this is the only way to repatriate the Lebanese terrorists imprisoned in Israel who remained after the Tanenbaum swap more than a year ago. Not all of these terrorists are Shi'ites (the most prominent and veteran, Samir Kuntar, is a Druze), and the cause of obtaining their freedom enjoys a degree of non-Shi'ite popular support. The kidnapping attempt also apparently reflects an unhappy reality concerning lost Israeli navigator Ron Arad. In accordance with its commitments under phase II of the Tanenbaum swap, had Hizballah been able to produce any evidence concerning Arad's fate, Israel was committed to freeing the prisoners. This latest Hizballah attack appears to indicate that Hizballah has no such evidence.

The attack was also a statement of ongoing support on Hizballah's part for the regimes in Syria and Iran, its patrons, both of which currently face considerable pressures to abide by the demands of the international community: Syria, to produce the murderers of Rafiq Hariri and cease supporting terrorists in Israel and Iraq; and Iran, to abandon its nuclear program and cease calling for Israel's destruction. Anyone who assumed that the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon last spring had neutralized Hizballah was given notice that this is not the case. As the UAE daily al-Khaleej opined on November 23, "[Hizballah] had to respond implicitly to the widespread view since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon that it had lost an umbrella that provided it with cover, and that it had therefore become almost impossible for it to act along the borders."

Hizballah's attack took place in the face of month-long Israeli warnings that this was precisely its intention. Hence the IDF was well prepared, and succeeded in ambushing the Hizballah kidnap squad. That the Lebanese Shi'ite organization proceeded with the attack despite the obvious loss of the element of surprise appears to reflect its desperate need to demonstrate "business as usual", no matter how far-reaching the changes taking place in and around Lebanon.