A. Proximity talks are generally understood to be a poor substitute for direct talks, invoked by a mediator when direct talks are impossible but the parties want to begin negotiating. In this case, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' refusal to enter into direct talks until Israel fulfills additional preconditions and PM Binyamin Netanyahu's refusal, backed by the US, to accept those preconditions, are understood to be the backdrop to Mitchell's initiative. Thus far, Abbas has turned down proximity talks as well, but his resistance appears to be weakening.

This points to one advantage of proximity talks: everybody saves face. Abbas can compromise his preconditions to enable proximity talks and reserve the right to claim later that the talks merely proved that Netanyahu is not a viable negotiating partner, without risking heavy condemnation by Fateh hardliners. By the same token, Netanyahu can demonstrate to Washington his willingness to talk without reaching a position where concessions might endanger his coalition. Finally Washington, for its part, can finally, after efforts extending over a year, declare success in reconvening negotiations.

If Mitchell succeeds in convening Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks, it will be the first time Israelis and Palestinians attempt to negotiate this way. If the idea is merely to break the ice in order eventually to get the two sides into the same room, the talks will presumably concentrate on issues of procedure and agenda. This would make sense. That's what the Turks were trying to accomplish in 2008 when they carried out proximity talks between Israel and Syria and (according to the Turkish and Israeli versions) had brought them almost to the point of direct negotiations when Israel's Gaza offensive ended them.

On the other hand, if the talks deal with the actual final status issues, then in the Netanyahu/Abbas era they will ultimately confront the same dangers as direct talks: once issues of substance are put on the table (or on two tables in adjoining rooms or cities), the gap between the two sides' positions is liable to be significant. This is what happened in the last proximity talks Netanyahu initiated, with Syria during the second half of the 1990s, when Ronald Lauder was the go-between. Once those talks addressed the Golan Heights territorial issue, they collapsed.

A. According to the Paris-based "Intelligence Online", those talks have been going on in Geneva for several months. Other reports have placed former senior US diplomat Tom Pickering at these talks, as well as at recent talks in Geneva with Israeli former peace negotiator Gilead Sher and a senior Hamas official. 

Obviously, none of these meetings has yielded a significant breakthrough. But that doesn't stop the Swiss from trying. I recently heard details of the Swiss approach to Middle East issues from a senior Swiss diplomat involved in these sorts of talks.

He outlined seven areas of official Swiss involvement in Israel-related conflict. One is the Geneva Initiative: with Swiss financing, the entire Geneva virtual peace agreement is being completed, including the security annex. 

Another is open channels with Hamas. Here the Swiss very clearly depart from the Quartet and Israeli line of boycotting contacts with Hamas. The Swiss are trying to develop a mechanism to manage aid to the Gaza Strip that factors in Israeli and western concerns about Hamas. They are also, apparently, offering their good offices to informal Israel-Hamas meetings. Their special envoy to the Arab-Israel conflict, Jean-Daniel Ruch, is very active on these and related issues. One Swiss rationale for these and similar initiatives is that Switzerland's centuries-old experience of harmonizing relations among national minorities renders it a particular suitable facilitator.

The Swiss also take credit for using their open channels with Hezbollah in Lebanon to pave the way for the broader international contacts that organization has become involved in since its supporters joined the Lebanese government. And they assert that a Syrian-Israeli back channel or informal "track II" channel that they initiated a few years ago paved the way for Israel's proximity talks with Syria managed by Turkey in 2008. 

Then too, the Swiss are engaged in projects to promote Palestinian civil society and, with an Indian think tank, to promote a "regional water approach" in the Middle East. And finally, in the aftermath of the Goldstone report, Switzerland is planning to convene a conference on prospects for revising the Geneva conventions regarding warfare. Here the Swiss are not on the same Middle East wavelength with Israel and even the United States, both of whom argue that a new Geneva meeting would be too politicized. They very much want to discuss the issue, but elsewhere.

This sort of disagreement highlights the relative uniqueness of the Swiss approach, which is paralleled to a lesser extent by Norway and Turkey and reflects the freedom of diplomatic action gained by remaining outside the European Union. The Swiss emphasize that, as a small and neutral player, they can speak to all parties to a conflict in search of solutions. In some cases--if indeed the reports are true and they are hosting a US-Iran back channel--that is presumably an acceptable and even useful stance from Washington's standpoint. In others, such as talking to Hamas and Hezbollah in defiance of the policies of the United States and Switzerland's EU neighbors, less so.

A. Fayyad made an interesting statement in this regard at the Herzlia Conference held in early February: "Palestinian unilateralism is not about declaring a state but getting ready for one". Successful Palestinian state-building in the West Bank, which Fayyad wants to complete by mid-2011, will, Fayyad stated, not be in lieu of a peace process but rather "exert pressure on the political process if it fails".

This is an interesting and potentially significant departure. Until now, Fayyad has described his unilateral state-building process as destined to bring the issue of declaring a Palestinian state to the UN Security Council if, by mid-2011, negotiations fail. At Herzlia, addressing a primarily Israeli and international audience, he was definitely more conciliatory.

Was this statement intended only for Israeli and international ears, or will Fayyad be telling his fellow Palestinians the same thing? The answer could be significant, particularly regarding Israeli and American efforts to facilitate the Palestinian state-building process and perhaps match it with unilateral Israeli gestures in the West Bank. Once before, in the late 1990s, the PLO threatened to declare a state unilaterally, then backed down after considering the negative ramifications of an act that would effectively annul the Oslo accords and free Israel's hand to evoke a far-reaching response.