A. The renewal of direct negotiations is a positive development for a number of reasons. Obviously, there can be no peace agreement without direct talks of some sort, even though (see below) the chances for a genuine end-of-conflict agreement may appear to some observers to be slim at this juncture. 

But in the meantime, by forcing PM Binyamin Netanyahu to reveal his final status positions, these talks will finally give us a chance to see just how serious he is about making progress toward a Palestinian state. They also provide the necessary diplomatic "cover" for progress toward realizing the diplomatic endgame of the Palestinian Authority's state-building project--international recognition of a Palestinian state--through confidence-building measures and possible interim territorial and security agreements. 

In the immediate term, the advent of talks will hopefully provide the necessary framework for Israel, the Palestinians and the administration to agree on a new format for maintaining a full or at least partial settlement-construction freeze beyond the current September 26 deadline. The disruptive potential of that deadline appears to have been a major factor in the administration decision to pressure Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, directly and through the moderate Arab states, to drop his preconditions and finally agree to the talks. But Abbas now threatens to abandon the new talks if settlement construction is renewed.

Finally, against the backdrop of the Iran challenge, the US withdrawal from Iraq and concerns over possible escalation on Israel's northern border, the advent of final status negotiations is good for Israeli-American relations. Here we recall General David Petraeus' admonition that the absence of a peace process weighs heavily on the US military as it deploys hundreds of thousands of American troops in and around the Arab and Muslim worlds.

But there are, indeed, potential pitfalls. Both Netanyahu and Abbas are constrained by their own ideological positions and, more importantly, by the political and ideological worlds within which they operate. Conceivably, these worlds could even become violent. 

On the Israeli side, Netanyahu is vulnerable to settler and coalition pressure to avoid territorial and other concessions. Right-wingers in and outside the government could try to bring down his coalition if they deem he has gone too far. Worse, extremist settlers (remember Baruch Goldstein) could possibly invoke violence against Palestinians in order to disrupt the process. On the Palestinian side, Abbas faces pressures from his own Fateh hawks as well as Hamas. The latter could reopen the Gaza front, firing rockets deep into Israel, if it dislikes the process sufficiently; the former could threaten another intifada, as in 2000, if they believe the talks fail to satisfy their goals.

So for this process to go anywhere, it will require considerable political skill on the part of both Netanyahu and Abbas. Not to speak of President Obama and his team; given the ideological and political distance separating the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, a heavy American commitment is necessary. Both Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and the Quartet have raised expectations by committing these negotiations to "resolve all final status issues" within a year. 

Obviously, it is important for Washington and the international community to demonstrate optimism and resolve concerning Israeli-Palestinian peace. Yet it is not at all certain whether, under present circumstances, the core refugee/right of return and Jerusalem Holy Basin issues ("who owns the Temple Mount") are resolvable. A process limited to resolving the territorial and security issues, including in Jerusalem, might have a better chance of success. This is where the gaps separating Netanyahu and Abbas could conceivably be bridged with Washington's help.

A. Barak's decision followed a green light from the attorney general, based on the Israel Police determination that the "Galant document" (see last week's Q & A) is counterfeit and did not originate among the IDF senior echelon but rather was forged, apparently by a reserve lieutenant colonel. Barak wasted no time in putting Ashkenazy, with whom he does not have a good relationship, on the spot. Ashkenazy's term is not up until next February, but Barak almost certainly would prefer that he read the writing on the wall and step down earlier, perhaps within a month or two. 

Ashkenazy's position was rendered more vulnerable when it was revealed that he knew about the Galant document, i.e., about attempts to make serious mischief with regard to the appointment of his successor, many months ago and had done nothing. Barak also apparently acted quickly to appoint a new chief of staff in order to reaffirm the hierarchy of civil-military relations in Israel forthrightly, after the Galant document seemingly hinted at an attempt within the military to manipulate the appointment.

The upshot is one of two scenarios. Either there will be a prolonged period of overlap between the outgoing and incoming commanders of the IDF that could sow discord within the ranks, or Ashkenazi steps aside and Galant takes over just as final status talks are commencing, with all the possibilities of violence this implies (see above). Moreover, Galant's promotion will precipitate an additional shakeup within the IDF senior ranks that could be temporarily disruptive.

Galant will be the first former Israel Navy officer (he commanded the prestigious naval commandos, Shayetet 13) to head the IDF. He has direct experience with the Palestinian issue (in Gaza) from his long stint as CO Southern Command. He has never served in General Staff HQ, but a stint as PM Ariel Sharon's military aide exposed Galant to decision-making at the national level. 

In the Southern Command, Galant was considered a hawk, ready to use more force in Gaza than his superiors agreed to. Of course, that attitude often changes with promotion to a job with expanded responsibility. But it is tempting to see Barak's choice of Galant and his precipitate attempt to force Ashkenazi's early resignation against the backdrop of possible conflict in the coming months or years with Iran or its proxy, Hezbollah--conflict concerning which Barak apparently has more confidence in Galant than in Ashkenazi. This may be particularly pressing for Barak if he senses that the unfolding Palestinian process could bring about the early collapse of the Netanyahu government and an end to Barak's own stint as minister of defense.

A. Nasrallah is trying desperately to head off an approaching UN tribunal indictment of several of his senior lieutenants for the murder. By suggesting that Israel could conceivably have done the deed he has obliged the tribunal to postpone its decision and solicit his "evidence". The latter consists mainly of intercepted video transmissions from Israeli unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that ostensibly focus on the venue of the assassination, together with the hypothesis, popular among conspiracy-preoccupied Lebanese, that Israel killed Hariri for the same reason it supposedly does everything else in Lebanon: to destabilize the country.

Needless to say, Nasrallah does not have a case. Israeli unpiloted aircraft overfly every part of Lebanon. And Israel's only strategic goals concerning Lebanon are to obtain peace and quiet along the border separating the two countries and to neutralize or counter the influence in Lebanon of countries like Syria and Iran that are hostile toward Israel. But concern over a violent Hezbollah response to an indictment against its leadership has already led both Syria and Saudi Arabia to offer to guarantee the country's stability and has caused PM Saad Hariri, Rafic's son, to reassure both Hezbollah and Syria that he won't allow an indictment to rupture his good relations with them. Meanwhile, concern over Hezbollah's growing control within the Lebanese government and armed forces is causing some quarters in Washington to have second thoughts about delivering military aid to Lebanon.

So much for the Hariri assassination affair, which like most everything else in Lebanon is a nest of intrigue and mind-boggling double-dealing. But there is a heavier strategic issue here. Given Hezbollah's growing influence in the country and its pro-Iran Islamist agenda of rejecting Israel's right to exist, can Lebanon as currently constituted be considered a viable partner for peace with Israel? 

The question could be relevant if and when peace negotiations recommence between Israel and Syria. If those negotiations register progress, at a certain point Damascus can be expected to signal Lebanon that it, too, is free to negotiate with Israel. The territorial dispute between Israel and Lebanon is minor and, with good will on Syria's part, is easily resolved. But what then? Will Hezbollah allow Beirut to sign a peace agreement? Will it agree to enforce it in southern Lebanon and dismantle its separate army? Will Tehran allow it to? 

For the moment, these are theoretical questions. But they are worthy of thought. They could affect Israel-Syria negotiations and even Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. And according to the Arab League's important Arab Peace Initiative, without peace with Lebanon Israel does not qualify for normalization of its relations with the entire Arab and Muslim worlds.