A. First of all, in Israel at least it is recognized that this overall approach is not new. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is credited with first broaching the linkage between American military losses in the region and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a meeting with then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. But those were different days: relations between the Israeli leader and the president of the United States were excellent; there was an active peace process. Rice's statement was never followed up by the Bush administration.

Then-presidential candidate Barack Obama picked up on this theme when he told journalist Jeffrey Goldberg some two years ago that "[T]he lack of resolution to this problem provides an excuse for anti-American militant jihadists to engage in inexcusable actions, and so we have a national-security interest in solving this."

Secondly, the administration acted last week to extend the linkage to Iran, where the US has no military presence at all that could be jeopardized by local reaction to the Arab-Israel conflict. National Security Adviser James Jones told a Washington Institute for Near East Policy meeting on April 21: "One of the ways that Iran exerts influence in the Middle East is by exploiting the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran uses the conflict to keep others in the region on the defensive and to try to limit its own isolation." "Advancing peace," Jones added, "would help prevent Iran from cynically shifting attention away from its failures to meet its obligations."

This assertion is as problematic for Israel, and as doubtful, as the Petraeus doctrine. Even a critic of the administration's Iran policy (and a harsh critic of Israel) like former CIA and National Security Council official Flynt Leverett was quick to pour scorn on this new linkage: "belief that by pushing on Arab-Israeli peacemaking the United States can marginalize and contain the Islamic Republic and its regional allies is the equivalent of believing the earth is flat". 

But the Iranians hastened to develop their own version of the new linkage. "Given the Zionist regime's international isolation, the regime does not have the courage to attack Iran and cannot start a war with Iran's military forces," stated Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi on April 23. "The West Bank and Beit-ul-Moqaddas [Jerusalem] have today turned into the most vital problems of this regime." 

Vahidi's linkage actually seemed to be the most accurate.  The Netanyahu government's difficulties with the Obama administration and by extension with most of the world have amplified its international isolation and Israel's delegitimization to such an extent that it would today be hard put to take any sort of far-reaching military action against the Iranian nuclear threat without risking extremely far-reaching consequences. Indeed, even a decision to preempt militarily against the Syrian/Iranian buildup of Hezbollah's missile and rocket arsenal could be severely constrained by friction with Washington over the Palestinian issue.

Obviously, even Israeli hawks recognize that Israel-Arab peace and particularly Israeli-Palestinian peace would be good for the Middle East and good for American interests there.

But just how good is a totally theoretical concept given the many other ills and problems in the region. Most Israelis want peace for Israel's own good. Meanwhile, Israel faces the danger that, from herein, when the US suffers military losses in Afghanistan or when Iran and its Hezbollah and Hamas allies move toward greater hegemony in sensitive regions like the Gulf and Lebanon, the Israel-Arab conflict will be blamed by Washington. And when the intransigent actor in the conflict is deemed to be Netanyahu, the consequences cannot be positive for Israel.

A. The idea of a state with temporary borders as an interim stage is embodied in phase II of the roadmap. When that document was being drafted some eight years ago, the Palestinian leadership insisted on inserting a clause allowing the PLO to reject the idea when the time came. The Palestinians fear that such a temporary arrangement would become permanent and that Israel, having achieved a significant breakthrough, would find every imaginable reason not to proceed further toward a full-fledged Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and Gaza. In the past, the Palestinians have conditioned their agreement on an Israeli and American commitment to the 1967 borders--a concession Netanyahu is not likely to offer.

The idea of a state with temporary borders has been developed and embellished in recent years by President Shimon Peres and Kadima's Shaul Mofaz, both of whom would offer reassurances, with international guarantees, that the process would continue in good faith. Peres reportedly was disabused of the idea in a recent meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. 

Conceivably, if Peres or even Mofaz were the chief Israeli decision-maker, the Palestinian leadership might react more flexibly. Then too, had Israel carried out its roadmap phase I obligations (comprehensive settlement freeze, removal of outposts) in good faith, the idea of implementing this aspect of phase II might be more appealing. (The Palestinians have largely implemented their phase I obligations of creating the institutions of a state and restoring security, at least on the West Bank.) Alternatively, if final status negotiations were progressing, as they were under Olmert, and a state with temporary borders could easily be understood as an implementation phase, the Palestinians might conceivably be tempted to embrace the idea.

But under present circumstances, Palestinian rejection is almost axiomatic. Even if the Obama administration offers guarantees that the process will not end with a roadmap phase II truncated state, Abbas has no reason to believe the US could enforce its will with Israel any more than it has regarding the construction of Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem.

Perhaps paradoxically, it might not be a bad idea for the Palestinians to agree. It is extremely doubtful that Netanyahu--who has himself not confirmed media reports that he is ready to embrace roadmap phase II--could persuade his coalition to go along with the idea of transferring another 20 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority, particularly where this would involve the removal of even a few settlements and outposts. This could be precisely the move that obliges Netanyahu to bring Kadima into the coalition--an act that would create a momentum of its own concerning further progress.

On the other hand, Palestinian refusal leaves the government of Israel precisely where Abbas appears to want it: caught between its own extremism and American pressure. This enables Abbas to avoid the necessity of any decision at all. And this is an advantageous position for a Palestinian leader under pressure from his own Fateh hardliners and from Hamas in Gaza, and fighting the stigma of illegitimate leadership ever since his presidential mandate ran out last January.

Factoring in both Netanyahu's and Abbas' political problems and hang-ups, we can expect indirect talks, which Abbas has reportedly finally agreed to, to produce little genuine progress unless and until Washington and the moderate Arab states play a far more robust role.