Certain surveillance methods and documentation used by the perpetrators appear to have been compromised by virtue of the fact that Mabhouh's death, which was apparently intended to appear natural, was revealed to have been an assassination. But the true identity and appearance of the perpetrators remains unknown. In terms of real intelligence and operational assets, little appears to have been compromised. Nor does the Dubai chief of police, for all his media bravado, appear to have any hard evidence linking Israel or any other actor to the actual deed. 

On the other hand, the Dubai assassination (along with a previous, little noticed assassination of a Hamas senior operative in Beirut) moves the struggle against Hamas abroad. Hamas has vowed to take revenge. Until now, it has not operated against Israel outside of Israel/Palestine. That could now conceivably change.

Incidentally, the doomsday predictions that in the coming age of biometric passports such operations will be impossible seem silly. Obviously, not only the Mossad but the security agencies of many countries will, if sufficiently challenged, find ways to bypass these and similar technologies if and when the need arises.

A broader issue at stake here that affects Israel's security in the most comprehensive sense of the term is the assassination's contribution--given that it is nearly universally attributed to Israel--to Israel's growing global image of lawlessness and disregard for international norms. While European intelligence circles that share Israel's concerns about Iran and global jihad will probably make sure the commotion over the illegal use of European passports in Dubai does not disrupt the fabric of relations with Israel, public opinion is liable to work very differently and to contribute to the growing campaign to delegitimize Israel.

This brings us to a much more fundamental question concerning Hamas and Israel. Assassinating a Hamas bad guy might be a lot more understandable if Israel had a rational and constructive overall strategy for dealing with Hamas in Gaza. But it doesn't. All the strategies invoked by Israel in recent years have failed.

A. The use of force, as in Gaza last January, might achieve deterrence, but only temporarily. And in parallel it nourishes the "Goldstone effect" of Israel's progressive delegitimization and isolation. Economic warfare--the prolonged siege of Gaza and closing of its borders to commerce--has failed to topple or even weaken the Hamas regime there. It has inflicted collective punishment on 1.5 million Gazans. It has impoverished the moderate middle class and farmers who used to depend on Israel for trade while empowering Hamas nouveau riche tunnel operators. Reliance on Egypt to mediate between Israel and Gaza has generated few if any benefits. Cairo's strategy of making sure Gaza is Israel's problem, not Egypt's, hardly renders it an honest broker.

All these strategies, which form the backdrop to the Dubai events, have proven counter-productive. Israel can of course take comfort in the fact that the economic boycott of Gaza has enjoyed the blessings of the Quartet (the US, EU, UN and Russia). And true, Israel's military response a year ago got a wink and a nod from the moderate Arabs who themselves have no solutions for Hamas and what it represents. But at the end of the day, Egypt is right: Hamas is Israel's problem. The death of Mabhouh is hardly the solution.

A. I don't know for sure. In order to identify alternative strategies for dealing with Hamas, we must first acknowledge and study the failure of the existing strategies outlined above. This process has not begun. Israel appears content to live from day to day, ignoring Gaza to the best of its ability, particularly when the flow of incoming rockets is down to a dribble. A partial defensive military response to the rockets--the Iron Dome anti-rocket missile--is on the way, with initial deployment scheduled for later this year. But meanwhile, and almost certainly even after Iron Dome as well, Hamas can disrupt daily life in a growing expanse of Israel whenever it wants. Certainly, if and when peace talks resume between Israel and the West Bank-based PLO, Hamas may have the motivation to do so. 

Q. Last week you mentioned reports of Swiss facilitation of direct Israel-Hamas contacts. Is negotiating with Hamas the answer?

A. Hamas declares that it refuses contact with Israel, doesn't recognize Israel and will not make peace with it. Israel is currently bound by the three Quartet conditions for engaging Hamas: that it cease violence, abide by existing PLO-Israel agreements and recognize Israel. Furthermore, direct Israel-Hamas contacts could, if handled carelessly, be interpreted as endorsing a kind of "three-state solution" and weakening the hand of the PLO and Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. So any Israeli move to discuss, say, a long-term ceasefire with Hamas in Gaza must be contemplated with considerable caution.

Further, when it comes to Hamas decision-making about issues like war, peace, negotiating and prisoner exchanges, there appears to be more than one Hamas leadership. The political leadership in Gaza seems to be the most moderate; one or two of its members have reportedly been involved in brief informal talks with Israelis. But the military leadership in Gaza and the ultimate political decision-makers in Damascus led by Khaled Meshaal and a nebulous Shura council are more hardline.

One way or another, this is an avenue of altering Israel's strategy regarding Gaza that Jerusalem should at least discuss with the Quartet and even the PLO leadership. But first it behooves all these actors to review current strategies and see what can be learned from their failure.

A. Yes. Syria hosts the Hamas supreme political leadership. It hosted Mabhouh and even, according to the Dubai police chief, provided him with a fake Iraqi passport for his last trip to Dubai. It's interesting to note that nobody in Dubai or elsewhere has made a fuss about that passport, whereas doctored and original European passports used by the alleged Dubai assassins are the focus of a major controversy in several European countries and the European Union. 

It's also significant that Syria is able to maintain its close links with Hamas (and Hezbollah and Iran), reassert its hegemony in Lebanon and shrug off new IAEA accusations that uranium was indeed detected at the site in northeast Syria that Israel allegedly bombed two years ago--even as it is accepted back into the international community and welcomes the French prime minister in Damascus. The US embassy in Damascus, which will soon have an ambassador for the first time in years, just cancelled all travel advisories for Syria, too.

A. This is not the first time Israeli operatives have allegedly used such doctored passports. European anger is shared by the innocent Israelis whose identities were seemingly "borrowed". In the past, these issues blew over very quickly. It will be interesting to see if this is again the case; the UK embassy in Tel Aviv has reportedly already offered to issue new passports to the dual Israeli-UK citizens whose identities were compromised in Dubai. As noted above, European intelligence circles that depend on Israel for information and early warning are likely to lobby to ignore the transgression.

Further, when it comes to the Europeans, there is a hypocrisy factor to bear in mind. European governments, including Britain, France and Germany whose passports were used in Dubai, have for years been releasing captured terrorists to avoid "complications" and buy favors with Middle East terrorist movements and radical governments. Most recent was convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali Mohammed al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence officer, released last August on compassionate grounds as he was reportedly suffering from terminal prostate cancer and had a life expectancy of less than three months. Half a year later he is apparently still alive, while British-Libyan oil deals are flourishing.