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Hard Questions, Tough Answers - January 17, 2005

Q...senior security officials have issued severe warnings regarding likely negative security consequences of the disengagement from Gaza... Q. What's new with the security fence?

The views of Yossi Alpher, Israeli Security Expert, do not necessarily reflect those of Americans for Peace Now or
Peace Now.

Q. Several prominent current and former senior security officials have issued severe warnings regarding likely negative security consequences of the disengagement from Gaza. How do you reply to them?

The most strident warning thus far came on January 4 from Avi Dichter, head of the General Security Service, also known as Shabak or Shin Bet. In an appearance before the Knesset Foreign and Security Affairs Committee, Dichter warned that:

Extremist settlers would initiate provocations to "justify" shooting at soldiers who come to remove them from their settlements;
Settlers would try to attack the mosques on the Temple Mount in order to stop the disengagement;
Any move by the IDF to abandon the philadelphi strip along the Gaza-Sinai border, e.g., by integrating Egyptian security units on the Sinai side, would constitute "an unreasonable security step"; and
If the northern West Bank is evacuated the level of terrorism there will be like in Gaza.
Another security figure issuing similar warnings is Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, a recently retired former head of IDF intelligence assessments. Amidror warns that without an IDF presence in Gaza, Qasam type rockets will soon reach Ashkelon and damage a major electrical power facility. Like Dichter, Amidror (himself an orthodox Jew with close ties to the movement that produced the ideological settler movement, but whose integrity is generally not questioned) does not object to removing the Gaza settlements, but rather expresses doubts about the wisdom of removing the army from the areas slated for evacuation.

The Dichter statements provoked accusations from the left that the Shabak head is mainly interested in "covering his rear" in case something goes wrong with the disengagement. The Shabak, it is alleged, has been building alibis ever since it was surprised by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin.

While there may be some truth in this allegation, it does not go far enough in terms of dealing with the troubling assessments of experienced security figures like Dichter and Amidror. The best way to counter their arguments, or at least put them into perspective, is by going to the real logic of disengagement:

The main purpose of disengagement is demographic security, not tactical security. Removing the settlements puts Israel on course to remain a Jewish country demographically, and strengthens Israel politically and internationally by helping pave the way for a two state solution. Ultimately, without a viable Palestinian state to accommodate Palestinian Arab national aspirations, Israel cannot be secure as a Jewish state.

In this regard, disengagement may well end attacks on Israel from Gaza and the northern West Bank, thus bringing a net security profit. Even Hamas spokesmen in Gaza acknowledge that this will be the case, as long as the withdrawal is complete, i.e., includes the philadelphi strip. As recently as January 14 Hamas politburo member Ismail Haniyeh reiterated this position to bitterlemons-international.org. But if we assume for the sake of argument that Hamas or other Palestinian militants will abuse a ceasefire, then the IDF will indeed have to respond, perhaps massively. In a worst case scenario this could mean reoccupying parts of these territories. In this case Israel is still better off than before disengagement, because removal of the settlements from these areas remains a far-reaching step in the right direction from the standpoint of Israel's long-term interests.

As for withdrawing from the philadelphi strip, clearly this will only be possible if Palestinian security forces on the Gaza Strip side and Egyptian forces on the Sinai side are prepared to deal forthrightly with security issues. Such an arrangement will actually be an improvement on that envisaged by Israel and the PLO in their peace talks at Camp David in 2000, where a robust Egyptian role was never discussed. Here it must be understood that only withdrawal from philadelphi is likely to persuade the international legal and diplomatic community that Israel is no longer the occupying power in Gaza. As noted, this will actually improve the chances for disengagement to generate a genuine ceasefire. It will also bring Israel additional benefits internationally.

All this, against the possibility that disengagement will not end the violence from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank. This seems like a reasonable risk from Israel's standpoint. Obviously, the situation could be better if PM Sharon were willing to offer Palestinians the incentive of a viable strategy for a two state solution rather than confine his moves to unilateral measures. Yet even a full-fledged peace agreement and two state solution does not guarantee Israel that extremist Palestinians, egged on by Iran, Syria and Hizballah, will not continue to attack it.

The issue then, is one of priorities. Whatever the possible cost in tactical security dangers, Israel must choose its own sanctity and survival as a Jewish state-a strategic consideration-above all other considerations.

Q. What's new with the security fence?

A. International and domestic pressures and constraints over the past year have had a profound effect on the course of the fence-both improving and delaying it. The International Court of Justice in The Hague, the Israel High Court of Justice, and public opinion have combined to push the fence back toward the green line, where it is increasingly seen as a component of a future two state solution. White House pressure has also been effective here, as has the stand of the World Bank, which refuses to help Israel finance border crossings in the fence unless they are on the green line.

Not only are parts of the northern West Bank fence being moved toward the green line as Defense Ministry planners comply with the spirit of High Court rulings, but the entire southern West Bank fence is now being planned for the green line, with the exception of three small settlements abutting the line, and the Etzion Bloc.

The cost of moving sections of the fence that have already been built is estimated at around $20 million. The delays in building the fence due to the need to re-plan it produced a budget surplus in 2004 of over $100 million. Some 213 km. of fencing had been completed by the end of 2004, with another 80 km. under construction. All told, 329 km. have been planned, but 45 km. are still being delayed by court actions. Fence construction costs over $2 million per kilometer. When the fence is completed at the end of 2005 (according to the current schedule) it will be 560 km. long.

There remain relatively small scale disputes over portions of land affected by the northern West Bank fence (which still does "invade" the West Bank, particularly in the area north of Jerusalem). The Ariel and Maaleh Adummim settlement blocs thus far have not been attached to Israel by fencing due to American opposition. And at its far southern end, in the uninhabited Judean Desert, the path of the fence is being contested by nature protection groups that fear its effect on the movement and survival of protected species. But the main active areas of controversy are Jerusalem and the Etzion Bloc.

In Jerusalem the attempt to build portions of fence and wall along the mountain ridge to the east of the Old City and the north and south of the city-corresponding with the annexation boundary of 1967-has caused major disruptions in the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. Much fence/wall construction in Jerusalem continues to be delayed by High Court appeals. Meanwhile, in the spirit evinced by the courts, the possibility of moving the fence/wall more or less to the old green line that divided the city is understood to be increasingly attractive to security planners. They emphasize the need for Israel to avoid causing so much chaos in the lives of Palestinian residents of the city that they turn to open hostility.

A fence/wall in Jerusalem that corresponds roughly with the green line, as proposed by the Council for Peace and Security, would allow 200,000 Palestinian residents of the city to maintain their primary contacts with the West Bank unfettered by Israel. To bypass controversy it would avoid fencing the Old City (which is in any case surrounded by a wall dating back to Ottoman times) and the Holy Basin, the area extending from the City of David to the Mount of Olives Jewish cemetery. It would, however, have the effect of re-dividing Jerusalem along demographic/political/security lines, something PM Sharon and the Likud have not yet come around to accepting.

In Gush Etzion the situation is complicated by the demands of the settlers to be able to commute safely to Jerusalem, where nearly all of them work, and by their designs on the acquisition, from local Arab landowners in the Bethlehem area, of additional lands to widen the corridor linking them to Jerusalem. The upshot, if the settlers' demands are accommodated, will be the de facto annexation to Israel, by means of the fence, of some 18,000 West Bank Palestinians. This is a dangerous precedent both demographically and politically. Newly elected Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas made clear his objections during his recent election campaign.

In recent months Prime Minister Sharon avoided asking the Cabinet to approve the planned route of the southern West Bank fence, first because the right wingers in the government would have objected, and then because with the defection of the right he lost majority support for his coalition. Presumably he will now ask his new coalition, which includes Labor, to approve the southern fence, arguing that the inclusion of an expanded Etzion Bloc is a fair trade-off for running the fence along the green line nearly everywhere else in Judea.

Although President Moshe Katzav did say recently that the fence would not have to be built if Palestinian terrorism were to end, few Israelis argue against the fence any more. It is clearly acknowledged to constitute the primary factor in reducing casualties from Palestinian terrorism in 2004; it is anticipated that completion of the southern fence will further reduce not only terrorism but related phenomena like car theft and illegal migration.

The entire project would have been easier, cheaper, faster, more legal and safer had the fence been constructed along the green line in the first place.